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ABSTRACT 
 
 Why do some ceasefires last for days, while others last for months or years? Previous 
research on ceasefires has not directly considered the question of ceasefire durability, or has 
focused solely on the dynamics of ceasefire durability in interstate war. In order to address these 
knowledge gaps, this study explores the question of ceasefire durability in the context of ethnic 
civil wars. It is hypothesized that ceasefire durability is related to belligerents’ territorial 
satisfaction, relative power, and actor cohesion. Analyzing two ceasefires from the Bosnian civil 
war, the study finds that durability is a function of the interaction between territorial satisfaction 
and the presence of a mutually hurting stalemate. This interaction produces four types of 
ceasefires: (a) durable, with high satisfaction and a mutually hurting stalemate; (b) variable, with 
high satisfaction and no mutually hurting stalemate; (c) dependent, with low satisfaction and a 
mutually hurting stalemate; and (d) weak, with low satisfaction and no mutually hurting 
stalemate. This typology helps to clarify policy and timing choices for military officials, 
humanitarian organizations, and peace negotiators.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before the Peace  Justin Winokur 
 iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I owe heartfelt thanks to the many family, friends, and advisers who guided and supported me as 
I wrote this thesis. I am not able to acknowledge everyone, or to provide them with the 
recognition they deserve—that unto itself would require a volume the length of (or perhaps 
longer than) this project. Nonetheless, some people of central importance must be highlighted 
here, for I could not have done this without them.  
 
Professor Ryan Phillips: It is not an understatement to say that this research would have never 
gotten off the ground without your guidance. Thank you for your insight, invaluable suggestions, 
and willingness to read unending drafts as I learned how to approach a project of this magnitude. 
Your direction has made me a better researcher, writer, and student of political science.  
 
Professor Andrew Levin: Without your advice, I would still be searching for a topic to this day. 
Thank you for discussing my numerous ideas (even with a six-hour time difference), critiquing 
my project proposal, offering essential comments, reading a draft of the thesis in its entirety, and 
keeping me passionate about peace and conflict studies.  
 
Professor David Patton: Your introduction to comparative politics was my first step into the 
world of political science, and changed the course of my life. Thank you for your guidance and 
support throughout these four years, as well as your insightful comments on a first draft.  
 
Professors Dean Accardi and Sufia Uddin: Your courses on border conflicts and 
fundamentalism, respectively, were imperative for my understanding of ethno-religious conflict. 
Thank you for your wonderful teaching and valuable encouragement.  
 
CISLA, Professor Marc Forster and Mary Devins: It was because of CISLA that I began to 
entertain the idea of writing a thesis, and that I gained the international experiences at the root of 
this project. Thank you for your support throughout this entire process.  
 
Andrew Lopez, Research Support and Instruction Librarian: Thank you for your superhuman 
ability to track down sources and your vast knowledge of style and formatting. I am endlessly 
appreciative of your reliability and dedication. 
 
My friends, bandmates, and the MOBROC community: When I needed to step away from my 
research and relax (and maybe also complain a bit), I was grateful to be surrounded by you all. 
Our games of Catan and our Barn shows kept me smiling even in the hardest moments. 
 
My family: If I did not have the work ethic of my dad, the creativity of my mom, the ambition of 
my sister, or the pasta of my grandparents, I would never have been in a position to undertake 
this task in the first place. Thank you for your endless patience and love. 
 
 
 
 
Before the Peace  Justin Winokur 
 iv 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF MAPS .............................................................................................................................. V 
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................................... V 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................................. V 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1 
THE STATE OF THE ART ........................................................................................................................ 7 
CHAPTER 2: A THEORY OF COOPERATION ................................................................. 19 
ETHNIC CIVIL WAR ............................................................................................................................. 20 
ETHNIC CONFLICT AND TERRITORIAL SATISFACTION .......................................................................... 22 
CIVIL WAR, ACTOR COHESION, AND RELATIVE POWER ........................................................................ 29 
ETHNIC CIVIL WAR & COOPERATION .................................................................................................. 37 
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN .................................................................................... 40 
MEASURING THE DURABILITY OF PEACE ............................................................................................. 40 
TESTING THE DURABILITY OF PEACE .................................................................................................. 45 
DRAWBACKS & PROBLEMS ................................................................................................................. 46 
CASE SELECTION ................................................................................................................................ 50 
THE WAR IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA ................................................................................................... 52 
CHAPTER 4: THE CARTER CEASEFIRE ......................................................................... 56 
SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................................... 58 
SATISFACTION ................................................................................................................................... 62 
RELATIVE POWER ............................................................................................................................... 74 
ACTOR COHESION .............................................................................................................................. 83 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................... 88 
CHAPTER 5: THE TRIPARTITE CEASEFIRE ................................................................. 92 
SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................................... 93 
SATISFACTION ................................................................................................................................... 99 
RELATIVE POWER ............................................................................................................................. 110 
ACTOR COHESION ............................................................................................................................ 119 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................... 124 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 127 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................ 142 
 
 
 
 
 
Before the Peace  Justin Winokur 
 v 
LIST OF MAPS 
 
4.1: The Graz Map of May 1992      64 
 
4.2: The Contact Group Map of July 1994     65 
 
5.1: The Second Revised Vance-Owen Plan of March 1993   102 
 
5.2: The Serb-Croat Proposal of June 1993     104 
 
5.3: The Bosnian Presidency Proposal of June 1993    105 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
2.1: Ethnic civil war as related to cooperation    39 
6.1: A comparison of the cases using Mill’s method of difference  128 
6.2: A typology of ceasefire durability     131 
6.3: Ceasefire type and policy recommendations    136 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ARBiH   Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina 
  
FRY    Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
 
HV    The Croatian Army 
 
HVO    Croatian Defense Council 
 
SFRY    Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia  
 
SVK    Krajina Serb Army 
 
UNPROFOR   United Nations Protection Force 
 
VRS     Army of Republika Srpska 
 
 
Before the Peace  Justin Winokur 
 vi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“‘I know there is a cease-fire today, but I knew there would be no peace,’ the 
retired nurse said angrily, her eyes glistening but refusing to shed tears. ‘As long 
as the extremists are negotiating these agreements, there is no cause for trust.’”1 
 
 
 
“Front line commanders like Noman Burkin…believe they have a simple choice—
to fight, or to die.”2 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 Carol J. Williams, “Bullets Pierce Bosnia Truce, Hopes; Balkans: Cease-Fire in Sarajevo Fails to Take Effect. ‘I 
Knew There Would Be No Peace,’ Weary Refugee Says,” Los Angeles Times, 16 June 1992.    
2 NPR, “Muslims in Mostar Prepared to Fight Croats to the End,” All Things Considered, 4 November 1993. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Hell had been unleashed in central Bosnia, and there seemed to be no end in sight. 
It was late April of 1993, and a second front of the Bosnian civil war had just opened. 
Throughout the previous year, the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims had worked in tandem 
to fend off the aggression of the Bosnian Serbs, who sought to carve their own state out of the 
newly independent Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As the former Yugoslavia cannibalized 
itself, the scattered Serb elements fought to seize territory and create their own states, potentially 
laying the foundation for a Greater Serbia. Initially, this common enemy kept the Bosnian 
Muslims and the Bosnian Croats on the same side of the fighting. Yet with time pressure began 
to mount. Inter-ethnic disputes and conflicting territorial aspirations placed great strain on their 
relationship, and in April this strain grew unbearable. Neighbors turned their guns on each other 
as Croats and Muslims began vicious ethnic cleansing campaigns throughout the country. The 
three-sided Bosnian catastrophe had begun.  
As fighting escalated, the outside world watched vicariously through the eyes of 
reporters. On 27 April 1993, Christiane Amanpour of CNN related the following message to her 
American audience. In it, she details the circumstances surrounding a new ceasefire agreement:  
The sound of gunfire and shelling still echoes through central Bosnia, and smoke is 
billowing from the hills as ever more houses are torched and more people are forced to 
flee their homes. In this village, Muslim soldiers and peasant warriors are trying to fend 
off the Croats. But this fighter’s in tears. He says they don’t have enough weapons and 
can’t fight back. The killing goes on even as the U.N. tries to monitor these front lines, 
but these British soldiers have seen so many cease-fires come and go.3 
 
                                               
3 CNN News, “Bosnian Serbs Launch New Offensive as Sanctions Tighten,” 27 April 1993. 
Before the Peace: Introduction  Justin Winokur 
 2 
As if to underscore the routineness of this intense violence, even in the face of a promise to stop 
the fighting, a British UN soldier whimsically adds: “Yeah, it’s a typical Bosnian cease-fire.”4 
 A typical Bosnian ceasefire—a ceasefire that collapses before it has gotten off the 
ground, that steals peace of mind away from battered civilians, that disappoints a disgusted 
international audience. Such short-lived ceasefires do not belong solely to the Balkans; one must 
only look to Syria in recent months to find contemporary instances of these fragile agreements.5 
Indeed, ceasefires are everywhere. It is certainly difficult to uncover a conflict in which the 
parties did not agree, at least once, to lay down their arms for a time. Yet these agreements, 
though practically ubiquitous in violent conflicts, are not well understood and exhibit highly 
variable effects. Though the “typical Bosnian ceasefire” was short, there were significant 
exceptions to this rule. Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, for example, negotiated a Bosnian 
ceasefire that lasted for almost four months. Examining Europe beyond the Balkans, one finds 
even greater variation. Ceasefires in the “frozen conflicts” of Nagorno-Karabakh, Cyprus, 
Moldova, and Georgia have lasted for years without official agreement on the resolution of 
political incompatibilities. What makes these situations different from those short-lived 
agreements considered to be so “typical”?    
 Malin Åkebo writes that the central question of peace and conflict is: “What is it that 
leads belligerents to abandon lethal warfare and instead continue to disagree with one another 
without resorting to violence?”6 In this thesis I address a variation on this question, asking 
instead: What is it that explains differences in how long belligerents are willing to abandon lethal 
                                               
4 Ibid. 
5 Jamie Tarabay, “Haley blames Russia for failure of Syrian ceasefire,” CNN, 13 March 2018. Accessed on 10 April 
2018 at https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/13/middleeast/syria-ceasefire-failure-nikki-haley-intl/index.html.  
6 Malin Åkebo, Ceasefire Agreements and Peace Processes: A comparative study (Routledge: New York, 2017), p. 
2. 
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warfare while still continuing to disagree with each other? This study asks why some ceasefires 
collapse in days, while others endure for months or years. I seek to answer this question 
specifically in the context of ethnic civil wars. More specifically, therefore, this is a study of the 
relationship between ethnic civil war and the length of time belligerents are willing to cooperate 
while still embroiled in disagreement.  
A ceasefire is an agreement to stop fighting that does not address the underlying 
grievances responsible for the fighting in the first place. Ceasefires perform a separate function 
from peace settlements, political agreements that seek to resolve war-causing grievances. 
Ceasefires are challenging because the parties still have good reason to fight, despite having 
agreed to stop the violence.7 To explain variations in ceasefire durability is thus to explain which 
structures, short of an actual resolution to the conflict, are necessary to keep belligerents at 
peace.8 This is not a study of how ceasefires transition into peace settlements, nor is it a study of 
peace settlement durability. While I touch on some dynamics related to this question, my primary 
concern is with the presence of peace in the absence of conflict resolution. 
 In the following chapters, I construct a theory of inter-group cooperation rooted in the 
structural dynamics of ethnic civil war. This theory begins with Virginia Page Fortna’s 
proposition that ceasefires are a type of cooperation between belligerents, rooted in reciprocity 
and deterrence.9 Beginning with this framework, I disaggregate ethnic civil war into its two 
component elements—ethnic conflict and civil war—in order to identify their impact on 
cooperation. I theorize that these two elements, when combined, interact with cooperation via 
                                               
7 Virginia Page Fortna, Peacetime: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), p. 12.  
8 By “peace” I mean “negative peace,” defined by Galtung as the absence of direct, physical violence. This is the 
type of peace brought about by a ceasefire. It is the role of peace settlements to address other aspects of violence 
that might bring belligerents closer to a state of “positive peace.” See Johan Galtung, “An Editorial,” Journal of 
Peace Research, 1(1), 1964, p. 2. 
9 Fortna, Peacetime, p. 12. 
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three mechanisms: territorial satisfaction, the relative balance of power, and actor coherence. 
Given these mechanisms, I posit that cooperation will be most difficult when belligerents are 
dissatisfied with their territorial holdings, when belligerents experience or perceive a mutually 
hurting stalemate, and when the actors exhibit major internal divisions. In such circumstances, 
ceasefire durability should be low. Conversely, if belligerents are satisfied with their territorial 
holdings, are not constrained by a mutually hurting stalemate, and are highly cohesive, ceasefire 
durability should be high.  
 I test this theory by comparing two ceasefire agreements signed during the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, an emblematic instance of ethnic civil war. These cases were selected from the 
same conflict in order to ensure their similarity, which will help isolate changes in the 
independent variables and clarify any possible causal relationships with ceasefire durability. I 
use John Stuart Mill’s method of difference to test these variables, which eliminates causality in 
factors that remain constant across cases with different outcomes.  
The first ceasefire to be studied emerged from former U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s late-
December 1994 mediation mission, for which reason I have dubbed it the “Carter ceasefire.” 
This ceasefire was signed by the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs, and endured for 78 days 
before collapsing in the winter of 1995. The second ceasefire was signed by all three major 
parties in the civil war—the Muslims, Croats, and Serbs—for which reason I have dubbed it the 
“tripartite ceasefire.” This agreement endured for only 7 days in the spring of 1993, with major 
violations throughout. By comparing these two dramatically different ceasefires, I demonstrate 
clear connections between my theory of cooperation and ceasefire duration.  
 The results indicate that ceasefire durability is linked to the dynamic interaction between 
belligerents’ satisfaction with their territorial holdings and the existence of a mutually hurting 
Before the Peace: Introduction  Justin Winokur 
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stalemate. Despite my theoretical expectations, actor cohesion appears to have no direct causal 
relationship to ceasefire durability. In the Carter ceasefire, it was the confluence of low 
satisfaction and a mutually hurting stalemate that caused the ceasefire to endure. In contrast, the 
tripartite ceasefire collapsed quickly due to the belligerents’ dissatisfaction and confidence in 
their military capabilities. In effect, an actor must be dissatisfied with the allocation of territory, 
but also able to continue fighting, in order for ceasefires to collapse quickly. Given the limited 
scope of my case studies, however, I am unable to test every constellation of these variables. As 
such, other interaction effects may be at work. Nevertheless, the key finding of this study is that 
ceasefire durability depends upon the nexus of satisfaction and capability, and that different 
types of durability arise from different configurations of these factors.  
Extrapolating from the case studies, I present a typology of ceasefire durability that posits 
four different ceasefire types. Durable ceasefires exhibit high satisfaction and a mutually hurting 
stalemate, and should either endure or progress into a peace settlement. Variable ceasefires 
exhibit high satisfaction but no mutually hurting stalemate, and endure only if there is goodwill 
between parties. Dependent ceasefires exhibit low satisfaction and a mutually hurting stalemate, 
and endure only until belligerents no longer feel constrained by a mutually hurting stalemate. 
Finally, weak ceasefires exhibit low satisfaction and no mutually hurting stalemate, and will 
collapse quickly. Using this typology, I forward numerous policy recommendations regarding 
mediation, monitoring, and support, and suggest various approaches for humanitarian and 
negotiation missions. 
 This research will be useful for three primary audiences: military strategists, peace 
workers, and academics. Ceasefires are essential components of all three groups’ work, be that 
work to construct a more effective military strategy, design a more complete approach to 
Before the Peace: Introduction  Justin Winokur 
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humanitarian aid and peacebuilding policy, or to develop an ever-more nuanced understanding of 
the dynamics of peace and conflict. The pressing ubiquity of ethnic civil wars and the common 
occurrence of ceasefires in those wars makes this research of great interest to such specialists in 
peace and conflict. 
 Military strategists and experts in military affairs should find this study’s findings to be 
of great import, given that ceasefires are tightly interwoven with military strategy. No strategist 
should use his or her tools without a full understanding of their functionality. It is therefore 
imperative that military officials comprehend the manifold structures underlying ceasefire 
duration. A deeper understanding of ceasefire durability will help military decision-makers better 
choose when to use ceasefire agreements, and better grasp how to most effectively support them.  
 Those who work on the policy side of peacebuilding and humanitarian aid will also find 
this research of use, for, like military strategists, ceasefires are an important element of their 
work. Many humanitarian missions necessarily coincide with a cessation of hostilities in order to 
ensure the safety of aid workers, and the insertion of those workers is frequently conditioned 
upon the establishment of a demonstrably stable ceasefire. Such conditional aid was used, for 
example, in Bosnia.10 Similarly, policy makers often condition peace negotiations upon the 
establishment of a stable ceasefire.11 By providing a typology of ceasefire durability, the findings 
of this study will clarify when certain ceasefires are hospitable to or risky for missions on the 
ground in conflict zones. This will help both groups improve planning, resource effectiveness, 
and safety.   
Finally, this work will be useful to scholars of peace and conflict who desire a fuller 
image of the role that ceasefires play in war. Malin Åkebo rightly notes that ceasefires, tools of 
                                               
10 Andrew Katell, “Mediator Suggests U.S. Troops for Bosnia,” The Associated Press, 2 February 1993.  
11 Åkebo, Ceasefire Agreements and Peace Processes, p. 2. 
Before the Peace: Introduction  Justin Winokur 
 7 
conflict management routinely employed by both mediators and belligerents, have been 
insufficiently analyzed relative to the frequency of their occurrence.12  The conflict resolution 
literature has largely overlooked the study of ceasefires, concentrating instead on social 
processes more closely linked to the onset of war and the settlement of underlying 
incompatibilities between belligerents. This is a significant oversight, given that most major 
violent conflicts involve calls for and agreements on ceasefires, and that these ceasefires are 
intimately linked to the broader processes of waging and resolving war. To the extent that 
ceasefires have been studied, ceasefire durability has received little attention, and, where it has, 
this attention has not focused on intrastate warfare or ethnic conflict. My findings fill this gap by 
creating a clear link between ethnic civil war, cooperation, and ceasefire duration.  
 
The State of the Art 
 
Though their presence in the literature is far from proportional to their presence in war, 
ceasefires have nonetheless been considered by a number of scholars and practitioners. 
Generally, this literature offers important theoretical contributions that will improve our 
understanding of the mechanisms underlying ceasefires, their place in the broader nexus of war, 
and the importance of their study. We will also find, however, that there are conspicuous 
knowledge gaps that need to be addressed. These gaps are particularly apparent in relation to 
ethnic civil war, an essential absence given the increasing predominance of intrastate war in the 
post-Cold War era. This existing work can be stratified across four fields: ceasefires in the peace 
process, ceasefire onset and collapse, ceasefire durability, and ceasefire policy. 
 
 
                                               
12 Åkebo, Ceasefire Agreements and Peace Processes, p. 7. 
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Ceasefires in the Peace Process 
 
 A number of scholars have bridged the gap between the conflict management and conflict 
resolution literatures by exploring the role of ceasefires in the broader process of peacemaking. 
These studies seek to understand the impact of ceasefires on the resolution of underlying 
incompatibilities. In doing so, they embed ceasefire agreements in the context of general peace 
negotiations, linking two processes that have traditionally been considered distinct. These studies 
generally find that ceasefires can exacerbate conflicts and make them harder to resolve if they 
are not crafted and sequenced carefully.  
Åshild Kolås, for example, examines the impact of ceasefires on the conflict between the 
Indian government and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim in Northeast India.13 She finds 
that ceasefires throughout the fighting have increased splintering among various militant 
factions, widened the scope of militant activities, and bolstered militant groups’ political power 
and legitimacy.14 In effect, the Indian government’s policy of signing ceasefire agreements and 
subsequently offering to negotiate has made the conflict’s resolution more difficult by dividing 
and empowering militant groups.15   
 Similarly, in her study of ceasefire timing, Sylvie Mahieu argues that ceasefires can 
ultimately lengthen and increase the intensity of wars if they are not introduced at the right 
moment in the peace process.16 Her analysis finds that “premature” ceasefires either offer 
opportunities for belligerents to rearm, or, in certain instances, lead to complacency and an 
                                               
13 Åshild Kolås, “Naga militancy and violent politics in the shadow of ceasefire,” Journal of Peace Research 48, no. 
6 (2011).  
14 Ibid., pp. 790-791.  
15 Ibid., p. 791. 
16 Sylvie Mahieu, “When Should Mediators Interrupt a Civil War? The Best Timing for a Ceasefire,” International 
Negotiation 12 (2007), pp. 224-225. 
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unwillingness to find a  resolution—a state of frozen conflict.17 Ultimately, she concludes that 
negotiators should introduce ceasefires only after the belligerents have come to a consensus on 
the issues to be negotiated; after such a process agreement is established,18 negotiated peace will 
seem possible and the cessation of hostilities more acceptable.19 Yet while Mahieu argues that 
poorly-timed ceasefires worsen the human cost of conflict, others, such as Lottie Lane, maintain 
that ceasefires may help the international community manage human rights abuses in conflict 
zones.20 
 Kristine Höglund’s study of ceasefires in conflicts with non-state actors echoes Mahieu’s 
basic sentiment that ceasefires can help the peace process, but only when the timing is right.21 
She finds that ceasefires can function as useful confidence-building measures that allow parties 
to build the goodwill necessary for successful negotiations.22 However, a government calling for 
a ceasefire may also cast the non-state actor as illegitimate, harming the prospects of propitious 
negotiations in the long run.23 
Looking at the conflicts in Aceh and Sri Lanka, Malin Åkebo likewise finds that 
ceasefires can negatively affect peace processes if they are sequenced incorrectly.24 She also 
finds that the negative impact of ceasefires can stem from their symbolism, their influence on the 
                                               
17 Ibid. 
18 Bergmann and Niemann define a process agreement as an “agreement to hold further rounds of negotiations,  
establishment of procedural aspects for talks or strategies for implementation of concessions (but no agreement on 
the substance of the dispute).” In effect, it is an agreement on the issues to be negotiated and the way in which 
those negotiations will unfold. See Julian Bergmann and Arne Niemann, “The European Union as an Effective 
Mediator in Peace Negotiations? Conceptual Framework and Plausibility Probe,” Mainz: Chair of International 
Relations, Johannes Gutenberg University, 2013. 
19 Mahieu, “When Should Mediators Interrupt a Civil War?” p. 225. 
20 Lottie Lane, “Mitigating humanitarian crises during non-international armed conflicts—the role of human rights 
and ceasefire agreements,” Journal of International Humanitarian Action 1, no. 2 (2016).  
21 Kristine Höglund, “Tactics in Negotiations between States and Extremists: The Role of Cease-Fires and 
Counterterrorist Measures,” in Engaging Extremists: Trade-Offs, Timing, and Diplomacy, eds. I. William Zartman 
and Guy Olivier Faure (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2011).   
22 Ibid., p. 238.  
23 Ibid., p. 240. 
24 Åkebo, Ceasefire Agreements and Peace Processes, p. 5. 
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internal dynamics of the parties, and the possibility that ceasefires might be “understood as 
accepting a particular on-the-ground reality”—an essential insight that will feature heavily in my 
theory of cooperation (see chapter 2).25 They can, however, provide momentum to peace 
processes if they are structured in such a way as to open “political space.”26 For Åkebo, then, 
ceasefires are not hopelessly destructive, but they do require particularly careful design in order 
to be effective at bringing belligerents closer to peace.  
These issues are important for contextualizing ceasefires and understanding the depth of 
their interaction with conflict. Rather than being mere pauses in the fighting, ceasefires are 
deeply affected by, and have a significant impact on, the broader process of waging and 
resolving war. This dynamic relationship is at the heart of my own thinking on ceasefires and 
territorial satisfaction. However, these works on ceasefires in the peace process do not directly 
address why ceasefires collapse, and why there is such significant variation in their durability. 
For answers to these questions, one must look elsewhere in the literature.  
 
Ceasefire Onset and Collapse 
 
Numerous studies seek to explain the circumstances under which belligerents are likely to 
sign or break ceasefire agreements. These studies are not, however, concerned with variation in 
the period of time between ceasefire onset and collapse. James Smith concludes that belligerents 
typically encounter seven particular barriers to ceasefires: a lack of political will, which is 
derived from the lack of a mutually hurting stalemate; the fear of appearing weak, and the desire 
to appear strong; aggressive public statements that prevent politicians from later modifying their 
positions; a weak, passive, or uncritical inner circle of advisers; an insufficiently specific or 
                                               
25 Ibid., p. 6. 
26 Ibid., p. 6. 
Before the Peace: Introduction  Justin Winokur 
 11 
mutually acceptable ceasefire agreement; the proposal of a mediator seen as biased by at least 
one of the parties; and the external imposition of a ceasefire without sufficient commitment from 
the third party to continue providing security guarantees.27 Despite having done the important 
work of accumulating these variables, Smith analyzes both interstate and intrastate wars 
simultaneously, thereby muddying any potential structural differences between the two. As a 
result, it is unclear if certain obstacles will arise only with certain types of war. Therefore, a 
further disaggregation of conflict type is necessary to uncover these relationships.  
 Smith’s second obstacle is related, in part, to cultural markers of strength and weakness. 
The question of culture’s role in the ceasefire process is addressed by Montgomery Sapone in her 
study of ceasefires in Northern Ireland. Sapone argues that “The key to the continuity of the 
conflict is neither economic nor sectarian, but cultural.”28 Sapone identifies perceptions of 
trustworthiness, fear, political philosophy, organizational structure, hardliners and spoilers, 
claims to territory, and claims to representation as the key cultural obstacles to ceasefires.29 
However, Sapone over-attributes, or even misattributes, certain variables to culture. For example, 
she considers the IRA’s fear of disarmament, and its subsequent vulnerability to a still-armed 
British government, to be a cultural phenomenon.30 Power asymmetries of this type are likely 
better understood from a rationalist perspective than a subjective cultural perspective, given that 
Sapone does not convincingly argue why such security calculations might be culturally 
dependent. Other variables of hers, such as organizational structure, walk a fine line between the 
cultural and the arbitrarily organizational.31 Though Sapone effectively argues for the role of 
                                               
27 James D.D. Smith, Stopping Wars: Defining the Obstacles to Cease-Fire (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1995), 
pp. 8-10.  
28 Montgomery Sapone, “Ceasefire: The Impact of Republican Political Culture on the Ceasefire Process in 
Northern Ireland,” Peace and Conflict Studies 7, no. 1 (2000), p. 24. 
29 Ibid., pp. 36-42. 
30 Ibid., p. 37.  
31 Ibid., p. 38.  
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culture in the formulation of political will, not all of her variables can be justifiably considered 
“cultural.” Moreover, many of the cultural variables she considers—such as fear, trust, and 
claims to territory—are derived specifically from the nature of the Troubles as an ethnic conflict. 
Sapone misses an opportunity to discuss the important structural relationship between ethnic 
conflict and the ceasefire process, and therefore does not do justice to the underlying processes at 
work. By specifically highlighting the relationship between ethnic conflict and cooperation in 
this study, I intend to draw a clearer causal line between the two phenomena.  
Other scholars forward the notion that ceasefire collapse is related to the cost-benefit 
analyses of the belligerents. This logic posits that ceasefires fail because rebels will not cease 
hostilities if violence is their only leverage during negotiations; likewise, the government will not 
negotiate fairly if the rebels cannot apply pressure through violence. Mahieu, referencing Robert 
Clark32 and I. William Zartman,33 writes, “Since both parties want to negotiate from a position of 
strength, a truce, even if initially accepted by them, will be short-lived and likely followed by a 
show of force by the rebellion in order to demonstrate their resolve and determination to the 
government.”34 It is not beneficial for rebels to relinquish their access to violence, for the rebels’ 
sole means of leverage over the government is their use of force, as noted by Höglund.35 This 
cost-benefit calculation is anticipated to lead rebels to resist and, ultimately, to break ceasefires.  
Another logic of collapse maintains that ceasefires fail because effective negotiations and 
hostility cessations can only occur under the right battlefield conditions and with the right 
timing. According to the scholars in this stream of thought, ceasefires result from interventions 
                                               
32 Robert P. Clark, “Negotiations for Basque Self-Determination in Spain,” in Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to 
Civil Wars, ed. I. William Zartman (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 68.  
33 I. William Zartman, “Conclusions: The Last Mile,” in Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, ed. I. 
William Zartman (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 336. 
34 Mahieu, “When Should Mediators Interrupt a Civil War?” p. 211. 
35 Höglund, “Tactics in Negotiations between States and Extremists,” p. 238. 
Before the Peace: Introduction  Justin Winokur 
 13 
that create artificial pauses in the development of the conflict, and thus prevent the natural 
conditions for hostility cessation.36 Certain violent processes must inevitably unfold in order for 
peace to become possible. As Edward Luttwak writes, “since the establishment of the United 
Nations and the enshrinement of great-power politics in its Security Council…wars among lesser 
powers have rarely been allowed to run their natural course…a cease-fire tends to arrest war-
induced exhaustion and lets belligerents reconstitute and rearm their forces. It intensifies and 
prolongs that struggle once the cease-fire ends—and it does usually end.”37 Here, Luttwak 
discourages outside intervention that prevents the “natural” evolution of conflict, ultimately 
imploring policy elites to “give war a chance.”38 This logic is related to the concept of 
“ripeness,” originally forwarded by Zartman,39 in that it demands structural preconditions—a 
mutually hurting stalemate—to arise before peace may endure. If a ceasefire artificially pauses a 
conflict before a specific point of exhaustion is reached, the belligerents will not respect the 
agreement and will break it as they seek to further adjust the battlefield conditions in their favor. 
Others maintain that ceasefires will be durable if they are accompanied by either a 
process agreement, which will provide momentum for a peace settlement, or overbearing and 
powerful intervention, which will enforce commitment in lieu of a process agreement. Mahieu 
writes, “When a general formula for the negotiations has been achieved, it becomes propitious to 
persuade the parties to agree on a cessation of hostilities, not only because it is then more likely 
                                               
36 Edward N. Luttwak, “Give War a Chance,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 4 (July/August 1999); Edward N. Luttwak,   
“The Curse of Inconclusive Intervention,” in Turbulent Peace: The challenges of managing international conflict, 
ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall (Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press, 
2001); Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” International Security 20, no. 
4 (Spring 1996); Chester A. Crocker (Ed.), Taming Intractable Conflicts: Mediation in the hardest cases 
(Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press, 2004). 
37 Luttwak, “Give War a Chance,” p. 36.  
38 Ibid. 
39 I. William Zartman, “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond,” in National Research Council, International 
Conflict Resolution After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2000).  
Before the Peace: Introduction  Justin Winokur 
 14 
to last, but also because it will contribute to the achievement of a final settlement.”40 With a 
process agreement in place, belligerents are more likely to understand the underlying dynamics 
of their conflict, are more likely to see pathways to a negotiated settlement, and are more likely 
to turn away from violence as a means of dispute resolution.41 Without an accompanying process 
agreement, ceasefires “are likely to be mere quick fixes, ultimately prolonging the duration of the 
state of war.”42 Indeed, Mahieu argues that only in certain rare instances of committed and 
powerful third party intervention can ceasefires endure without preceding process agreements.43  
Dogukan Karakus and Isak Svensson add to these propositions, arguing that external 
intervention and agreement design may not be universally applicable methods of producing 
reliable ceasefire agreements.44 Studying numerous instances of ceasefires throughout the Syrian 
civil war, Karakus and Svensson find that informal and local peacemaking efforts were most 
important for establishing respected ceasefire agreements.45 They qualify these results, however, 
by noting that they may reflect the particularities of the Syrian conflict, bringing to attention the 
importance of individual conflict contexts.46 
These various perspectives each offer their own way of conceptualizing ceasefire onset 
and collapse. Nonetheless, much is still missing from their contribution to the study of ceasefire 
durability, the subject of this work. The above studies reduce the analysis of ceasefires to a 
binary question of “collapse” or “no collapse.” This leaves unanswered the question of 
duration—that is, these logics do not adequately explain why some ceasefire agreements might 
                                               
40 Mahieu, “When Should Mediators Interrupt a Civil War?” p. 211.  
41 Ibid., p. 212. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., p. 222. 
44 Dogukan Cansin Karakus and Isak Svensson, “Between the Bombs: Exploring Partial Ceasefires in the Syrian 
Civil War, 2011-2017,” Terrorism and Political Violence (2017).  
45 Ibid., p. 15.  
46 Ibid., p. 16. 
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last longer than others, even if they are all ultimately broken. It is true that conditions of collapse 
are necessary to understand durability, for their presence or absence determines whether or not 
the ceasefire will remain in place. As such, much of the above thinking on cost-benefit 
calculations and relative power will inform my own theory, presented in chapter 2. Nevertheless, 
these theories do not tell us when these conditions might arise, and how long it might take for 
them to arise under certain circumstances. This question is only briefly addressed by discussions 
of outside intervention, which hold that powerful third parties may, in some cases, cause 
ceasefires to last for as long as they provide security guarantees. However, it is not clear that 
third party intervention is the sole explanation for highly durable ceasefires, and this logic fails to 
explain durability variation in the absence of overwhelming intervention (as was the case for the 
two ceasefires to be studied in the following chapters). Still lacking is a general explanation of 
the underlying factors that affect the length of ceasefires. I seek to fill this gap in the literature by 
turning away from the binary question of collapse, addressing instead the issue of ceasefire 
durability.  
 
Ceasefire Durability 
 
The authoritative work on ceasefire durability was written by Virginia Page Fortna, who 
roots her study in a realist, rationalist perspective of ceasefire agreements.47 According to this 
perspective, ceasefires are a type of cooperative effort. Fortna writes: “The fact that belligerents 
have reached a cease-fire in the first place suggests that they do not prefer fighting for its own 
sake. The fact that they have fought once already makes it a good bet that they have conflicting 
interests. Taken together, these conditions mean that peace is possible, but precarious. It requires 
                                               
47 For the seminal work on rationalist explanations for war, see James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for 
War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995).   
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cooperation.”48 Cooperation, in this sense, means that belligerents must work together to not 
attack each other, even though they have not resolved the grievances that brought them to war 
initially. Drawing upon rationalist theory, Fortna argues that under conditions of global anarchy, 
commitments are unreliable; that, in the absence of trust, commitments derive their strength from 
systems of reciprocity and deterrence; and that certain obstacles, namely incentives to attack, 
fear, and accidents, can undermine these systems.49 It is the role of written agreements to 
overcome these obstacles.50 Ultimately, Fortna finds that strong agreements can and do 
effectively facilitate cooperation and increase ceasefire durability.51 This conceptualization of 
ceasefires as cooperation will serve as the crux of my own theorizing on ceasefire durability. 
Though a landmark addition to the ceasefire literature, Fortna’s work focuses solely on 
interstate conflicts and disregards civil wars entirely. Fortna hypothesizes that the two conflict 
types should not require dramatically different treatments, noting: “The most important 
difference between maintaining peace after civil and interstate wars is that in the latter, 
belligerents have the luxury of leaving the fundamental political issues unsettled. It is extremely 
rare for civil wars to end with a cease-fire that does not at least de facto settle the underlying 
issue.”52 For instance, the de facto partition of Cyprus into a Greek Cypriot territory and a Turk 
Cypriot territory is the direct result of the long-duration ceasefire that has divided the island 
since the 1970s. Other scholars likewise note the relationship between ceasefires and the fear that 
battlefield realities will be transformed into de facto settlements. In the following chapter, I shall 
argue that this awareness—among other variables—is a key determinant of ceasefire durability 
                                               
48 Fortna, Peacetime, p. 12.  
49 Ibid., pp. 10-20. 
50 Ibid., pp. 20-37. 
51 Ibid., pp. 211-214.  
52 Ibid., p. 215.  
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in ethnic civil wars. In performing such an analysis of ceasefire durability in ethnic civil war, this 
study will address Fortna’s disregard for intrastate war, as well as the literature’s general lack of 
work on ceasefire duration. This contribution will be essential for a policy space that has largely 
applied Fortna’s conclusions without having first exercised proper analytic rigor.   
 
Policy Documents 
 
 A number of scholars, practitioners, and humanitarian groups have worked to translate 
academic research on ceasefires into usable policy recommendations. These policy 
recommendations address the process of mediating, negotiating, and writing ceasefire 
agreements, often offering step-by-step instructions and cut-and-paste templates to guide 
agreement drafters.53 Some of this work makes narrower prescriptions, focusing on particular 
provisions that concentrate on such vulnerable groups as women54 and children.55 These 
documents are not expressly engaged in the process of theorizing about ceasefires, but they do 
implicitly argue that ceasefire agreements are embedded in broader patterns of peacemaking and 
violence prevention, and that agreement design has the power to strengthen ceasefire durability. 
As we have seen in the previous discussions of ceasefires in the peace process and ceasefire 
durability, both of these assumptions have received scholarly treatment in their own separate 
                                               
53 For example, see: Nat Colletta, “Mediating Ceasefires and Cessation of Hostilities Agreements in the Framework 
of Peace Processes,” in Peacemaking: From Practice to Theory, eds. Susan Allen Nan, Zachariah Cherian 
Mampilly, and Andrea Bartoli (Oxford: Praeger, 2011); United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New York: United Nations, 2008); The Public International Law & Policy 
Group, “Ceasefire Drafter’s Handbook: An Introduction and Template for Negotiators, Mediators, and 
Stakeholders” (May 2013); Luc Chounet-Cambas, “Negotiating ceasefires: Dilemmas & options for mediators,” 
(Geneva: The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, March 2011); Nicholas Haysom and Julian Hottinger, “Do’s and 
Don’ts of Sustainable Ceasefire Agreements,” paper presented at the IGAD Sudan Peace Process Workshop on 
Detailed Security Arrangements in Sudan During the Transition, and later revised for use by Peace Appeal in 
Nepal and Sri Lanka, 2010.  
54 Olivia Holt-Ivry, Allison Muehlenbeck, and Michelle Barsa, “Inclusive Ceasefires: Women, Gender, and a 
Sustainable End to Violence,” Inclusive Security (March 2017). 
55 Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, “Checklist for drafting children and armed conflict provisions in 
ceasefire and peace agreements,” 31 October 2016.  
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branches of the literature. What stands out, however, is that many of these documents claim to be 
universally relevant, while frequently citing Fortna’s work on ceasefire durability. They intend to 
guide ceasefire drafters in any circumstance, but the social science on which they are founded 
has only rigorously studied ceasefires in wars between states. This marks a significant need for 
further research into ceasefire durability in intrastate wars. Ceasefire drafters desperately require 
evidence-based policy recommendations tailored specifically to the dynamics of civil wars. My 
findings will answer this need for empirical support by highlighting key relationships between 
ethnic civil war and ceasefire durability that can be directly addressed with policy. 
The rest of this study will be dedicated to analyzing and testing the underlying dynamics 
of ceasefire durability in ethnic civil wars. In chapter two, I propose a theory of inter-group 
cooperation, which explores the cooperation-inhibiting characteristics of ethnic civil war. In 
chapter three, I specify my terms, outline my research methods, and explain my case selection. In 
chapter four, I analyze the high-duration “Carter ceasefire,” and in chapter five, I analyze the 
low-duration “tripartite ceasefire.” Finally, in chapter six I present conclusions, make policy 
recommendations, and suggest directions for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2: A THEORY OF COOPERATION 
 
 
Why do some ceasefires collapse in days, while others last for months or years? Why is 
cooperation in ethnic civil wars sometimes easy and sometimes impossible? As we have seen in 
the previous chapter, ceasefires are cooperative efforts to create peace in the absence of a 
meaningful solution to underlying incompatibilities.56 They function through systems of 
reciprocity and deterrence, which make continued warfare costlier than peace.57 However, such 
systems can encounter numerous roadblocks that make cooperation difficult.58 Theoretically, 
ceasefires should be most durable when cooperation is easiest, and least durable when 
cooperation is most difficult.  
In this chapter, I seek to expose the connection between cooperation and ethnic civil war. 
An examination of the underlying structures of ethnic and internal conflicts yields three primary 
factors that influence cooperation: territorial satisfaction, the relative balance of power, and actor 
cohesion. Cooperation is therefore anticipated to be a function of these three factors. I predict 
that ceasefire durability will be highest when belligerents are satisfied with the ceasefire lines, 
when a mutually hurting stalemate constrains equally-matched forces, and when there are few 
                                               
56 Virginia Page Fortna, Peacetime: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), p. 12.  
57 Virginia Page Fortna, Peacetime: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), p. 13.  
58 In her study of interstate war, for example, Fortna names “incentives to attack,” “fear of attack,” “accidents and 
involuntary defection,” and “distribution and relative gains” as primary challenges to cooperation. See: Virginia 
Page Fortna, Peacetime: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2004), pp. 13-19.  
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competing groups within and between actors. Likewise, I expect the inverse to be true. To begin 
our exploration of this theory, let us first define ethnic civil war.    
 
Ethnic Civil War 
 
 
Ethnic civil war contains particular structures that interact with cooperation and have a 
great bearing on ceasefire durability. In effect, ethnic civil war is the unification of ethnic 
conflict and internal conflict, and occurs when internal conflicts become defined along ethnic 
lines. Roy Licklider defines civil wars as conflicts fought among “geographically contiguous 
people concerned about possibly having to live with one another in the same political unit after 
the conflict.”59 Such conflicts unfold as the government becomes unable or unwilling to 
satisfactorily address issues of civil contention—what I. William Zartman calls the “breakdown 
of normal politics.”60 Groups may have a variety of grievances against the government that can 
motivate them to take up arms and go to war. Zartman organizes these grievances along two 
dimensions: “neglect” and “discrimination.”61 A group is neglected when it perceives inequality 
in the distribution of material resources throughout society, while a group faces discrimination 
when it perceives itself to be receiving disadvantageous treatment because of its identity.62 As 
Zartman notes, “without distributional deprivation, identity remains a positive factor and not a 
motivation for conflict; without an identity element, distributional inequities remain unfocused 
                                               
59 Roy Licklider, “How Civil Wars End,” in Stopping the Killing, ed. Roy Licklider (New York: New York 
University Press, 1993), p. 9.  
60 I. William Zartman, “Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts,” in Elusive Peace: 
Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, ed. I. William Zartman (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 5. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
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and nonmobilizing.”63 Although the ratio of this mixture may change, all civil wars possess a 
combination of material- and identity-based grievances.64  
According to Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff, ethnic civil wars are conflicts “in which the 
goals of at least one conflict party are defined in (exclusively) ethnic terms, and in which the 
primary fault line of confrontation is one of ethnic distinctions. Whatever the concrete issues 
over which conflict erupts, at least one of the conflict parties will explain its dissatisfaction in 
ethnic terms.”65 That is, no matter the ratio of neglect and discrimination, at least one of the 
parties to an ethnic civil war will perceive the conflict entirely through the lens of discrimination. 
In this framework, ethnic civil war is internal conflict defined along ethnic lines. 
Who defines these grievances, and what is a “party” to an ethnic civil war? When 
considering the causes and tactics of these conflicts, it is essential to avoid monolithic images of 
ethnic groups. Fearon and Laitin have noted that many cases of “ethnic conflict” include multiple 
fighters with multiple ambitions, not all of which are necessarily “ethnic.”66 Indeed, such 
conflicts are typically fought by a small number of armed thugs more concerned with pillaging 
than with ethnic identity.67 This violence is generally fomented, organized, and permitted by a 
few elites who capitalize on inflammatory ethno-nationalist rhetoric for their own political 
gain.68 These ethnic entrepreneurs couch issues in the language of ethno-national identity, 
bringing the perception of discrimination to the fore in order to garner political support and 
                                               
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid.  
65 Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff, “The study of ethnic conflict: an introduction,” in Routledge Handbook of Ethnic 
Conflict, eds. Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff, (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 4. 
66 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 
97, no. 1 (February 2003), p. 79.  
67 John Mueller, “The Banality of ‘Ethnic War,’” International Security 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000). 
68 Stuart J. Kaufman, “Ethnicity as a generator of conflict,” in Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict, eds. Karl  
Cordell and Stefan Wolff (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 92.  
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power.69 As elites instigate conflict and allow it to unfold, brutal violence initiates processes of 
identity hardening that cause groups to self-segregate for fear of persecution.70 Indeed, though 
there is a complex and dynamic interaction between the masses and the elites,71 it is elite-level 
instrumental politics that prioritizes identity-based grievances, shapes discourse, and permits 
violence. Thus, when “parties” are discussed, it is essential to recognize this manifold 
complexity. Ethnic conflicts are not the products of mass hysteria rooted in “ancient hatreds,” but 
are instead shaped, activated, and directed by elite decision-makers who benefit from a politics 
of discrimination and ethno-national grievance.   
Elite-led discourses prompt and organize internal conflicts along “ethnic” dimensions. 
Now we must look deeply into these two elements—ethnic conflict and internal conflict—in 
order to identify their independent effects on cooperation. Let us begin by developing an 
understanding of the relationship between ethnicity, territory, and violence.  
 
Ethnic Conflict and Territorial Satisfaction 
 
 When elites portray ethnicity as the primary organizing principle of separatist conflict, 
elements of ethnic identity come to play an essential role in determining the objects and methods 
of war. One element in particular—the attachment to territory—takes a central place in the 
ceasefire process. In the following section, I explain the “ethnic” connection to territory, its 
relationship to ceasefires and the broader peace process, and its bearing on cooperation. 
 
                                               
69 Ibid. 
70 Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” International Security 20, no. 4  
(Spring 1996), pp. 140-145. 
71 Stuart J. Kaufman, “Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War,” International  
Security 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996). 
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Ceasefires, Homeland, & Peace 
 
What is the “ethnic homeland”? Ethnic identity, according to Anthony Smith, is 
comprised of the following elements: a common name, a (perceived) common lineage, a 
(perceived) shared culture, a (perceived) historical tradition, a feeling of solidarity, and an 
attachment to a particular piece of territory—the homeland.72 The ethnic homeland derives its 
value not from its material utility, but from its spiritual and cultural force.73 The homeland may 
not necessarily be rich in resources, a key trade route, or strategically advantageous in order to be 
of value; rather, it is the homeland’s connection to ethnic ancestry—the group’s allegedly 
common lineage—that imbues it with value. It is on the homeland that the group’s elders lived 
and died, that they battled and forged collective mythologies, and that the shared culture 
evolved.74 These experiences give the land its spiritual value.75 Most of Smith’s aspects of ethnic 
identity—lineage, culture, and history—give meaning to and enhance the spiritual relationship to 
territory. Likewise, territory acts as a physical validation of ethnic identity, situating ephemeral 
history, mythology, and culture in real space, thereby offering the group stability.76 
 Ethnic identity as a temporal concept is “past-oriented,” deriving its potency from the 
historical-mythological considerations intertwined with the land. 77 Thus, territory is the central 
focus of this backward-looking-ness, and, by extension, the pole around which ethnic identity 
revolves. Territory is guarded because of its cultural role as the reifying element of the ethnic 
                                               
72 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (New York: Blackwell, 1986), pp 22-30. 
73 Stephen Worchel, “Some Unique Characteristics of Ethnic Conflict and Their Implications for Managing the 
Conflict,” in The Psychology of Ethnic and Cultural Conflict, eds. Yueh-Ting Lee, Clark McCauley, Fathali 
Moghaddam, and Stephen Worchel (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), p 297. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 George A. De Vos and Lola Romanucci-Ross, “Conclusion. Ethnic Identity: A Psychocultural Perspective,” in 
Ethnic Identity: Problems and Prospects for the Twenty-First Century, 4th Ed, eds. Lola Romanucci-Ross, George 
A. De Vos, and Takeyuki Tsuda (New York: Altamira Press, 2006), p. 375.  
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collective. The ethnic group acts as a fierce custodian of the markers of its heritage, beholden to 
its ancestors and its posterity to protect this physical link that binds generations.78 For this 
reason, territory is also seen a marker of existential security, without which the cultural and 
physical survival of the group is imperiled.79 
 Since ethnic identity is singular, and since territory is the representative home of that 
singularity, homeland territory is perceived to be irreplaceable.80 No other piece of land can 
serve the same purpose, for no other piece of land is so deeply engrained in collective story 
telling or so thoroughly soaked with the blood of one’s forebears. This naturally sits in stark 
contrast to capitalist approaches to land ownership, which assigns value in accordance with 
potential economic utility, translates that value into a money price, and gives that land to the 
person capable of affording its price or outbidding competitors.81 Importantly, if the buyer does 
not acquire the initially desired parcel of land, he or she may easily seek out a different parcel 
that is equally satisfactory in terms of its economic value and productivity. This is not so in the 
case of ethnic homelands, whose spiritual value is independent of economic utility, whose value 
may not be assigned a price, whose possession is a mark of existential security, and which may 
not under any conceivable circumstances be sold by the group or bought by an outsider.82  
 In his study of sacred spaces, Ron Hassner includes this concept of uniqueness as one of 
three factors that foster the perception of object indivisibility.83 The other two factors are 
boundedness (that all parties must refer to the same object in its entirety, with no parts claimed 
                                               
78 Stephen Worchel, “Some Unique Characteristics of Ethnic Conflict,” p. 298. 
79 Monica Duffy Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 19-20.  
80 Stephen Worchel, “Some Unique Characteristics of Ethnic Conflict,” p 297. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ron E. Hassner, War on Sacred Grounds (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), p. 41.  
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by just one party) and cohesiveness (that the division of the object would diminish its value).84 
Hassner notes that any of these elements in isolation is but a necessary condition for the 
perception of indivisibility; only when the three coincide are they sufficient for an object to be 
seen as indivisible. Indeed, indivisibility is a perceptual, not objective, reality.85 Few (if any) 
issues are truly indivisible—yet, in order to transition objects from states of indivisibility to 
divisibility, one must undertake the herculean task of altering the patterns of thought in which 
they are embedded.86  
 Hassner argues that it is difficult for plots of land to satisfy the sufficient conditions for 
perceived indivisibility. Land, he says, is rarely uniform in value (even nationalistic and 
historical value), such that some parts may be given away; that its bounds are rarely clear enough 
to define the size and location of the issue, such that compromises may be found; and that most 
land is fungible, such that it may be replaced by a different parcel of equal value.87 I contend, 
however, that “homeland” territory in ethnic separatist wars has a more complex relationship 
with Hassner’s conditions.  
The political elite, in order to legitimate and defend their territorial aspirations, will work 
to emphasize the “indivisibility” of their territorial desires, couching their claims in the language 
of the indivisible ethnic homeland. As a result, “homeland” territory—more than other types of 
territory—comes to be perceived as satisfying Hassner’s conditions of indivisibility. It is made 
so through the rhetoric of ethnic entrepreneurs. Yet these claims to the “homeland” may not, in 
reality, be unequivocally non-negotiable for elites, who, in times of dire peril, might compromise 
                                               
84 Ibid., pp. 41-42.  
85 For more on indivisibility as a perception, see Hassner’s engagement with the literature on issue indivisibility. 
Ibid. 
86 Ibid., pp. 168-171.  
87 Ibid., p. 43.  
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on their goals in order to avoid total defeat. In such instances, internal conflicts over the value 
and scope of the land are pushed to the fore, as elites decide what may be given up and what 
must be defended at any cost. That is to say, conflict reveals the true “homeland”—or, at least, 
the delineations of the territory over which political elites will refuse to compromise. 
 How is this perception of the ethnic homeland related to ceasefires? Reflecting on Sun 
Tzu’s writings, Henry Kissinger once noted:  
Perhaps Sun Tzu’s most important insight was that in a military or strategic contest, 
everything is relevant and connected: weather, terrain, diplomacy, the reports of spies and 
double agents, supplies and logistics, the balance of forces, historic perceptions, the 
intangibles of surprise and morale. Each factor influences the others, giving rise to subtle 
shifts in momentum and relative advantage. There are no isolated events.88 
 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, many scholars have explored the role of ceasefires in 
the nexus of war. When belligerents sign a ceasefire, they agree to much more than a temporary 
pause in the fighting. The cessation of hostilities comes laden with greater implications about the 
general peace process and the direction of negotiations. It is impossible to separate conflict 
management efforts from conflict resolution efforts—as Sun Tzu indicated centuries ago, the two 
influence one another dynamically and simultaneously.  
 Malin Åkebo finds that belligerents often perceive a connection between ceasefires and 
the confirmation of certain battleground realities.89 The language of peace negotiations often 
accompanies ceasefire agreements, and, in separatist ethnic wars, such negotiations frequently 
concern the distribution of territory. Naturally, belligerents may anticipate—rightfully or not—
that this distribution would closely mirror the distribution of territory as framed by the ceasefire 
lines. When belligerents agree to ceasefires, they are forced to consider the possibility that the 
territorial distribution at the time of the ceasefire may endure ex-post as the foundation of a peace 
                                               
88 Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin, 2011), p. 30.  
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settlement. This prompts a satisfaction calculation. Belligerents must ask themselves: would such 
a settlement be acceptable given the current frontlines? If frontlines closely approximate the 
desired territory, and therefore the conceptions of the ethnic homeland promoted by the political 
elite, then a ceasefire along those lines should be more acceptable. Belligerents will feel 
comfortable using the given territorial distribution as the basis for peace. It follows that territorial 
conflict is a series of satisfaction calculations, as leaders ask themselves whether certain possible 
divisions are acceptable or in violation of the “homeland’s” cohesion. This is, of course, a bare-
minimum calculation. It is quite possible that more territory is desired (potentially to satisfy 
economic needs, strategic goals, or the demands of internal actors with different perceptions of 
the homeland’s scope). As conflict progresses, belligerents must determine how much of the 
imagined homeland they would truly be willing to lose. Ceasefires offer the opportunity to ask 
that question.  
 A particularly sensitive issue when determining territorial distribution should be the 
presence of ethnic enclaves in enemy territory. These enclaves are deeply dissatisfying to all 
parties. Ethnic conflict, as discussed above, is organized along dichotomous ethno-national fault 
lines. This contrasts with ideological civil wars, in which ideologues fight over the principles of 
social order and governance, vying for the hearts and minds of the people.90 In such wars, 
belligerents draw from the same mobilization pool—the community to be governed—and seek to 
win their support.91 A capitalist can switch allegiance to communism, and an autocrat can be 
convinced of democracy’s merits. This is not so in an ethnic conflict.92 With the conflict parties 
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arranged according to group affiliation, belligerents generally draw from distinct mobilization 
pools—the ethnic community.93 The army representing group X can only call upon the service of 
members of group X; likewise, the army representing group Y can only recruit members of 
group Y. This means that both groups will perceive any members of the other group as potential 
military threats. These trapped individuals are effectively equivalent to “beleaguered 
combatants,” or soldiers trapped behind enemy lines.94 As Bailey has discussed, the presence of 
beleaguered combatants poses a significant danger to ceasefire durability.95 
Ethnic enclaves create dissatisfaction in two ways. Let us imagine a city with a majority 
population of people from group X, surrounded by hostile forces from group Y. The leadership 
of group Y will want to eliminate the enclave in order to secure the territory on which it sits, and 
to neutralize its potential as a military threat. The leadership of group X, observing group Y’s 
attempt to cleanse the enclave, will want to somehow save their imperiled ethnic brethren. If they 
do not, members of group X will have to contend with the notion of either the mass murder of 
their co-ethnics, or major and difficult to accommodate refugee inflows from the enclave. It 
would instead be preferable for the enclave’s inhabitants to remain safely in their homes. Group 
X may therefore want to claim a corridor of land connecting the enclave to the primary territorial 
body. If they do not, the perpetually surrounded enclave will remain perpetually vulnerable. 
Thus, for group Y, the enclave is an obstacle to territorial contiguity and security. It must be 
destroyed. For group X, the inhabitants of the enclave must be defended. If its security cannot be 
guaranteed from afar, then it must be joined to the main territory. As parties consider a 
                                               
93 Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” p. 140. 
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ceasefire’s relationship to the final peace, ethnic enclaves present a major conundrum. For both 
group X and Y, a solution with no enclaves would be most satisfactory.  
 In sum, belligerents perceive a connection between the territorial distribution at the time 
of a ceasefire and the final territorial distribution determined in the peace settlement. Therefore, 
ceasefires bring belligerents to make satisfaction calculations about territorial distribution. When 
agreeing to a ceasefire, belligerents review the frontlines in relation to their territorial desires. 
Simultaneously, they account for the presence of ethnic enclaves in enemy territory. If 
belligerents consider the arrangement of these factors to be dissatisfying as the foundation of a 
possible peace settlement, the ceasefire should collapse. On the other hand, if belligerents 
consider the arrangement of these factors to be satisfactory, the ceasefire should endure. As such:   
 
Hypothesis 1: The more satisfied belligerents are with the territorial distribution along 
the ceasefire line, the greater the durability of the ceasefire.  
 
Civil War, Actor Cohesion, and Relative Power  
 
     
 Civil wars typically involve combat between a “government,” which claims legitimacy 
over the political order and a monopoly over violence, and a “rebellion,” which uses force to 
contest the reigning government’s legitimacy.96 Frequently, these wars take on external 
dimensions as outside actors become embroiled in the conflict.97 Given this context, civil wars 
contain two factors that are fundamentally related to cooperation: relative power and actor 
cohesion. We shall see that these factors might lead to mutually hurting stalemates and spoilers, 
                                               
96 Zartman, “Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts,” p. 5. 
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respectively, which have the capacity to either increase or reduce ceasefire durability through 
their effects on capability and commitment. 
 
Relative Power 
 
 The relationship between belligerents in a civil war is typically marked by severe power 
asymmetry. Up until the point where the rebellion is able to topple the government, the 
government is likely stronger in both material, symbolic, and administrative terms.98 As the 
ruling power, it possesses “legitimacy, sovereignty, allies, armies, and access to resources,” as 
well as “the right to determine the rules of the game for the rebellion’s struggle.”99 The rebellion 
lacks all of these things, and must fight an uphill battle for its survival and success.100 Often, the 
rebellion compensates in part for its deficiencies by emphasizing its commitment and attachment 
to ends as a balance to the material capabilities of the government.101  
 A central obstacle posed by power asymmetry is the inability to establish functioning 
reciprocal systems. When there is a power imbalance, it is exceedingly difficult for a mutually 
hurting stalemate to arise.102 Such stalemates occur when “both sides are locked in a situation 
from which they cannot escalate the conflict with their available means and at an acceptable 
cost.”103 This inability to escalate the conflict undergirds systems of reciprocity and deterrence, 
which, as we have seen, allow ceasefires to function. If one side is not able to credibly deter an 
attack, reciprocity and mutual deterrence fail, dramatically increasing the difficulty of 
cooperation. Therefore, mutually hurting stalemates are key to durable ceasefires. If power is 
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extremely imbalanced, the stronger party (likely the government) may simply vanquish the 
opposition, or the opposition may employ guerilla tactics to continue fighting despite their 
weakness.104 It is only when both parties enter a mutually hurting stalemate—whether real or 
perceived—that the utility of force will decrease and cooperation will increase in ease. As such:  
 
Hypothesis 2: If there is a real or perceived mutually hurting stalemate, ceasefire 
durability will increase. 
 
 Internal conflicts are also subject to the external influence of third parties.105 When this 
happens, the challenges of power asymmetry may be addressed by the third party. This can occur 
through either intervention or mediation. If intervening, the third party offers military support to 
the weaker party in order to level out the playing field and create a mutually hurting stalemate. 
Some scholars go so far as to argue that external intervention is the only way for belligerents in 
civil war to make credible commitments.106 If acting as a mediator, the third party works to 
create the perception of a “turning point” in the conflict.107 Such turning points serve as the 
beginnings of “soft” stalemates, in which belligerents perceive escalation and continued warfare 
to be against their best interests, regardless of realities on the ground.108 Whether through 
intervention or the shaping of perceptions, external influence can serve to help balance power 
asymmetries, thereby creating more stable reciprocal systems and more durable ceasefires. As 
such, two hypotheses may be generated:  
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Hypothesis 3: If there is external intervention on behalf of the relatively weaker party, 
ceasefire durability will increase.  
 
Hypothesis 4: If there is third-party mediation, ceasefire durability will increase.  
 
In short, because ceasefires require reciprocity and deterrence in order to function, 
relative power is a key element of ceasefire durability. If power is symmetrical (in reality or 
perception) and the belligerents find themselves locked in a mutually hurting stalemate, 
functioning systems of reciprocity and deterrence will ensure that the ceasefire will last. If power 
is asymmetrical, the stronger party will be able to continue fighting at little cost, and the 
ceasefire is likely to be less durable. 
 
Actor Cohesion 
 
 
No parties to a civil war are monoliths. Instead, belligerents are comprised of numerous 
factions jostling for power and influence.109 These fractious power centers can result in the 
emergence of “spoilers,” defined by Stephen J. Stedman as “leaders and parties who believe that 
peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use 
violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.”110 These spoilers disapprove of the prospects for 
peace, and seek to perpetuate conflict or derail negotiations in order to realize their goals. Indeed, 
the presence of competing factions within and between actors hampers peace by making 
information unclear and loyalties unreliable.111 Spoilers arise, coordination grows more complex, 
and commitments become difficult to uphold. Actor cohesion is thus intimately linked to 
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cooperation: more cohesive actors should be more able to credibly commit to respected 
agreements, while less cohesive actors should be less able to commit to the agreement, less 
trustworthy, and more likely to unintentionally violate the peace. As a result, we should expect 
ceasefire durability to increase as the parties to the agreement become more cohesive.  
 Spoiler dynamics are particularly salient within the rebellion. Any opposition movement 
begins with a variety of organizations protesting and presenting various demands on behalf of 
various groups.112 As the movement evolves and seeks to mobilize popular support, it must work 
to pare down on this internal diversity in order to maximize its leverage and demonstrate both its 
legitimacy and representativeness.113  However, prolonged conflict with the government will 
challenge the unity of the movement, forcing it to work even harder to consolidate itself or risk 
the possibility of fragmentation.114 An enduring state of non-resolution encourages both 
“dissidents,” who question the adequacy of the leadership and offer their own alternatives, and 
“dreamers,” who fixate on and promote an unattainable notion of absolute victory, thereby 
undercutting moderate factions and inducing even greater diversity.115 These contrasting 
imperatives may create a negative feedback loop that paralyzes the movement, for “the 
movement needs solidarity in order to compel the government to provide it with some success, 
and it needs success to attract solidarity.”116 Internal struggles deprive the movement of success, 
and a lack of success deprives the movement of a basis on which to build unity. Yet unity is 
unstable even when victory approaches. The prospect of success tempts rival factions with 
defection, as they hope to approach the government independently and cut a better deal than 
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would have been possible in coordination with the entire movement.117 This defection, if it 
produces a more-acceptable deal, may end up capturing the rest of the movement, resulting in a 
mutually beneficial settlement; on the other hand, it may further divide the movement and 
prolong the conflict.118 Overlaid onto these organizational dynamics are shifting leadership 
imperatives, as different phases of the movement’s evolution call for different types of 
spokespeople endowed with different amounts of legitimacy.119  
How do these internal divisions manifest in reality? The Sikh insurgency in Punjab 
during the late 1980s and 1990s was particularly fissiparous. Members of the movement have 
noted that they were split by a number of internal conflicts, and that violence between different 
Sikh militant groups was quite common.120 A number of factions operated beneath the banner of 
the Sikh militant movement, such as the relatively moderate Khalistan Commando Force and the 
criminally involved Bhindranwale Tigers.121 There was often conflict between these more 
moderate and more extreme sects; for example, the Khalistan Commando Force would target 
members of the Bhindranwale Tigers in order to maintain the respectability of the movement as a 
whole.122 Moreover, the Khalistan Commando Force would eliminate some of its own members 
if they were thought to be abusing their power.123 As a result of these internal struggles, 
participants in the insurgency expressed frustration not just at the Indian government, against 
which they were fighting, but also at “the extremist members of the militant cadres, who [are 
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believed to have] destroyed the movement from within.”124 Infighting damaged and weakened a 
deeply divided movement.   
Internal actor division of this sort is dangerous for cooperation because it undermines 
credibility and encourages spoilers. As noted above, the dynamic process of conflict produces 
numerous factions that vie simultaneously for different outcomes. Since these factions can act 
independently, credible promises are difficult to make.125 The government, aware of the risks 
created by these internal divisions, may lose its willingness to cooperate with a potentially 
unreliable counterpart. If the government signs an agreement anyway, disgruntled factions might 
spoil the deal. In either scenario, increased internal divisions harm agreements and weaken 
cooperation. 
It is important to contrast the disunity of the opposition with the relative organization of 
the state. Though any social group will contain some element of internal competition, the state is 
typically designed with clear hierarchies and structures of decision-making authority. This design 
fosters greater internal unity than possible in a loosely organized and constantly besieged rebel 
movement. Internal division is, nevertheless, possible in both actors. As such, actor cohesion is 
an important variable for both the opposition and the government.  
This is also the case below the political level. Fortna draws attention to the importance of 
accidental defection in her study of interstate ceasefire agreements.126 If military forces are 
disorganized and soldiers undisciplined, it is likely that the probability of accidental violations 
will increase. It is also likely that disgruntled actors at the political level can seize on this 
disorganization to mobilize dissidents and purposefully breach ceasefires. This issue will 
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generally be more salient for the opposition than the government, given that the government 
should have an established military force and the opposition will have quickly scrapped together 
a militia. Yet it may be that disorganization is rife in either force. This military-level 
disorganization should amplify actor divisions and increase the difficulty of cooperation. As 
such:  
 
Hypothesis 5: The greater the internal divisions of any actor, the lower the ceasefire 
durability.  
 
As previously noted, civil wars are not purely internal phenomena, but frequently involve 
external actors in a variety of different formations.127 In many conflicts, the government-rebel 
binary fails to fully explain the landscape of actors. Instead, there may be a multitude of 
participants in the civil war. In such non-dyadic situations, the coordination between actors 
becomes more complex than would be the case in a dyadic situation. Cunningham points to the 
issue of “veto players” in civil war resolution, arguing that it becomes increasingly difficult to 
find a mutually acceptable agreement as the number of stakeholders who must approve the 
agreement increases.128 The same principle should theoretically apply to ceasefire agreements. 
This heightened complexity in turn poses a challenge to cooperation, since belligerents must 
grapple not only with internal but also external spoilers. Therefore:  
 
Hypothesis 6: The more belligerents participating in the conflict, the lower the ceasefire 
durability.  
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The scope of the ceasefire is related to the number of belligerents involved. Ceasefires 
may be either local or general. A local ceasefire seeks to prevent fighting in and around a certain 
region of a country, such as a city or province. A general ceasefire, on the other hand, seeks to 
prevent fighting in all theaters of combat. Local ceasefires are likely to involve fewer actors, 
whereas general ceasefires, due to their expanded scope, should necessitate the cooperation of a 
larger number of actors. Above I hypothesize that cooperation will become increasingly difficult 
as the number of relevant actors increases. Therefore, a related hypothesis may be derived:  
 
Hypothesis 7: Local ceasefires will be more durable than country-wide ceasefires. 
 
Ethnic Civil War & Cooperation  
 
 When ethnic conflict and internal conflict merge to produce ethnic civil war, they 
combine their own unique dynamics and social processes. Above, I demonstrated that the 
primary characteristics and underlying structures of ethnicity, ethnic conflict, and civil war pose 
three potential challenges to cooperation. The belligerents’ satisfaction with the ceasefire lines, 
the relative balance of power, and actor cohesion all have the capacity to dramatically inhibit 
cooperation in ethnic civil war, resulting in less durable ceasefires and more constant fighting. 
Yet there may also be instances in which these aspects of ethnic civil war are not salient enough 
to inhibit intergroup cooperation. It is therefore useful to imagine two ideal-type scenarios: one 
in which cooperation is easiest and ceasefires most durable, and one in which cooperation is 
most difficult and ceasefires least durable.  
In a high-cooperation scenario, the three factors should all facilitate successful 
cooperation. First, belligerents should be satisfied with the distribution of territory and willing to 
see it form the basis of a peace settlement. Second, power asymmetry should be minimal, with 
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either the parties themselves enjoying relative parity or a third party providing such parity from 
beyond the conflict dyad. Third, actor division should be low, with belligerents exhibiting strong 
organizational structures and effective means of controlling potential defectors. In addition, the 
conflict should be dyadic in nature. In this scenario, commitment to the agreement should be 
high, reciprocal systems should function, spoilers should be minimal, and coordination should be 
easy. In such circumstances, I predict that ceasefires will be most durable. Moreover, this 
constellation of variables would seem to foster the necessary environment for the negotiation of a 
final peace settlement—however, the question of conflict settlement and ceasefires in the peace 
process is beyond the scope of this study.  
In a low-cooperation situation, the inverse should be true. First, territorial dissatisfaction 
should be high, with neither actor willing to accept the territorial distribution at the time of the 
ceasefire as the possible foundation for a peace settlement. Second, power asymmetry should be 
severe, with at least one of the parties holding definitive military dominance over its rival/rivals, 
and with no third parties intervening to foster balance externally. Third, actor division should be 
high, with at least one of the groups experiencing intense internal competition as rival factions 
compete for dominance. This should be compounded by a complex, non-dyadic landscape of 
belligerents and third-party participants. In such circumstances, commitment to the agreement 
should be low, reciprocal systems should fail, spoilers should be active, and coordination should 
be challenging. Ultimately, I expect ceasefires in this environment to be less durable.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Ceasefires are cooperative efforts, for belligerents must agree to stop fighting without 
having resolved their differences. This is possible, but contingent upon numerous structural 
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factors. In ethnic civil wars, cooperation is a function of territorial satisfaction, the relative 
balance of power, and actor cohesion. This may be graphically represented as such:  
 
Figure 2.1: Ethnic civil war as related to cooperation. 
 
 When belligerents are satisfied with the territorial distribution, when they have entered a 
mutually hurting stalemate, and when they are highly coherent, cooperation should be easy and 
ceasefires should endure. Conversely, when they are dissatisfied with the territorial distribution, 
have not yet entered a mutually hurting stalemate, and are ruptured by internal divisions, 
cooperation should be difficult and ceasefires should collapse quickly. These ideal-types address 
the underlying mechanisms of ceasefire duration, and therefore go one step beyond existing 
knowledge about ceasefire onset and collapse in intrastate warfare. Likewise, they incorporate 
mechanisms of ethnic and internal conflict that are absent from existing thinking on interstate 
ceasefires. Yet it remains to be seen how these theoretical propositions compare to the reality of 
social behavior. In the following chapter, I operationalize my terms and discuss how I will test 
my hypotheses against actual cases of ceasefires in ethnic civil war.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
 The fundamental argument of this study is that ceasefires are more likely to endure when 
cooperation between ethnic groups is easiest. In the previous chapter, I argued that cooperation 
in ethnic civil wars is a function of belligerents’ territorial satisfaction, relative power, and 
internal cohesion. In order to determine the validity of these theoretical claims, I will test my 
hypotheses against two ceasefires in the Bosnian war: the 78-day “Carter ceasefire” of 1995, and 
the 7-day “tripartite ceasefire” of 1993.  Aspects of the conflict relating to belligerents’ territorial 
satisfaction, relative power, and internal cohesion will be carefully examined in order to develop 
an understanding of their connection to cooperation. As a multivariate study, the dependent 
variable (ceasefire durability) may be the product of any of the three independent variables 
(territorial satisfaction, relative power, actor cohesion), or, more likely, a combination of them. 
This study will seek to understand how all three independent variables work in tandem to 
produce different outcomes. In the following chapter, I explain how I will measure the dependent 
and independent variables and how I will conduct my case studies. I then present the conflict and 
ceasefires to be studied, and discuss the validity of my sources. 
 
Measuring the Durability of Peace 
 
The dependent variable is the period of time between ceasefire onset and collapse. 
Ceasefire onset is considered to be the moment that a ceasefire agreement enters into force. 
Ceasefire collapse is considered to be the moment when either the belligerents, international 
observers, or news sources declare that the ceasefire was broken and that war has begun anew. 
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This is not the only definition of ceasefire collapse. Fortna, for example, qualifies ceasefire 
failure as the date that belligerents began war according to the Correlates of War dataset 
(COW).129 I cannot do the same, however, since COW does not account for short-lived 
management efforts.130  
Measurement of the period between ceasefire onset and collapse has been approached in 
a variety of ways. In her study of ceasefire durability, Fortna used large-N quantitative analysis 
to construct a duration model (enriched by a qualitative survey and case studies). “Duration 
models,” writes Fortna, “estimate the effects of independent variables on a dependent variable 
measuring a length of time, and they can incorporate our uncertainty about how long a 
phenomenon (in this case peace) will continue into the future.”131 Large-N duration analyses of 
this type are growing increasingly common in the peace durability literature.132 Regardless, such 
an extensive quantitative study is beyond the scope of this work.  
In lieu of a duration model, I will use a cutoff point to create a binary distinction between 
“short” and “long.” In their study of more than 1,400 settlements, Scott Gartner and Jacob 
Bercovitch address duration by establishing a cutoff point of 8 weeks, or 56 days, for a short-
lived settlement.133 After presenting their statistical data, Gartner and Bercovitch also apply their 
cutoff point to a qualitative analysis of the Balkan conflict, demonstrating the relevance of their 
measures for my purposes.134 Thus, for the sake of comparability, I will employ this same cutoff.  
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Any ceasefires of a duration greater than 56 days will be categorized as “long,” and any 
ceasefires of a duration less than 56 days will be categorized as “short.” In some instances, of 
course, ceasefires are negotiated to be temporary and given specific durations, which may be less 
than 56 days. In such cases where intended duration is stipulated in an agreement, “success” will 
be achieved when the ceasefire has endured for 90% or more of the allotted time. For example, if 
parties agree that a ceasefire is to be in effect for 40 days, the ceasefire will have been a success 
if it lasts for 36 days or longer. It is also necessary to consider those instances where a ceasefire 
directly preceded a peace settlement. For example, on 5 October a ceasefire was signed in Bosnia 
that endured until the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords.135 In these cases, ceasefire 
“duration” is not a useful concept, as the circumstances of the cessation of hostilities change 
dramatically with the introduction of political solutions. Therefore, such ceasefires that progress 
into peace settlements will not be considered in this study. I am only concerned with the duration 
of ceasefires in the absence of political resolutions to underlying incompatibilities.  
The cutoff approach to duration measurement is imperfect because the cutoff is 
determined relatively arbitrarily.136 For example, the above cutoff will consider a ceasefire of 60 
days a success, a ceasefire of 40 days a failure, and a ceasefire of 5 days a failure. Intuitively, 
however, the 40-day ceasefire is closer to success than failure. Therefore, it is justifiably 
puzzling to judge it more akin to the 5-day ceasefire than its 60-day counterpart. To mitigate this 
issue, I have picked ceasefires at the relatively extreme ends of the duration spectrum in the 
Bosnian civil war (7 days and 78 days). There are many intermediary positions with less extreme 
cutoff points and intensity measurements that may be calculated. However, accounting for these 
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will serve only to muddy the results of this limited project, and would be best done using large-N 
quantitative methods. For my purposes, one need only know the circumstances under which 
ceasefire duration is longest and shortest in order to have a sense of the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables. Further research can then clarify the gradations between 
the two poles.  
This study focuses on the relationship between ceasefire durability and three independent 
variables. The values of these variables will be gauged using a number of guiding questions, 
which correspond to the hypotheses forwarded in chapter 2. The first independent variable of 
interest is any actor’s satisfaction with the allocation of territory at the time of the ceasefire. 
Since actors will analyze ceasefire agreements in relation to possible peace settlements, ceasefire 
durability should be influenced by the extent to which the parties would accept permanent 
territorial division along the ceasefire line. As such, the following guiding questions direct my 
research: how satisfied are the belligerents with their territorial holdings? How large are the 
ethnic enclaves beyond the ceasefire lines? Qualitative sources, such as secondary historical 
literature, public statements, news reporting, and internal communiqués should offer insight into 
the intent of the belligerents to commit to non-aggression.  
 The second variable of interest is the balance of relative power between the actors. 
Previous measurements of relative power have taken a variety of different approaches. Paul 
Diehl, Jennifer Reifschneider, and Paul Hensel, for example, observed the ratios of population, 
economic, and military data included in the Correlates of War project’s indicator of capability.137 
Reed Wood developed a calculation of relative rebel capability based upon infantry data 
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included in the UCDP database,138 and Philip Hultquist expanded upon this calculation by 
including a time lag to account for the effects of approaching victory, settlement, or defeat.139 
Gartner and Bercovitch, drawing from the International Conflict Management dataset, created 
three dummy variables to determine if the conflict initiator was stronger, if the initiator was 
weaker, or if both parties had equal power.140 Given that the cases under study lack sufficient 
representation in the data, I cannot directly appropriate any of the methods. However, I will use 
similar approaches. The following questions will direct my analysis of relative power: What is 
the ratio of infantry forces? What is the ratio of equipment? How do the belligerents perceive the 
power of their opponents? Who is providing external support to whom, how much support are 
they providing, and what is the character of that support? Is the conflict being mediated? These 
questions will be answered using soft measures, primarily news reporting and secondary 
historical literature. Some quantitative military data will also be provided by Military Balance, 
Balkan Battlegrounds, and Charles Shrader’s history of the Muslim-Croat civil war in central 
Bosnia.141 
 The third variable of interest is actor cohesion. One notable approach to this variable is 
Kathleen Cunningham’s measurement of actor fragmentation, which examines the number of 
autonomous actors all claiming to represent a single cause.142 This is a useful concept, which I 
will fold into a number of additional guiding questions.  How many actors are engaged in the 
                                               
138 Reed M. Wood, “Rebel capability and strategic violence against civilians,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 5 
(September 2010). 
139 Philip Hultquist, “Power parity and peace? The role of relative power in civil war settlement,” Journal of Peace 
Research 50, no. 5 (September 2013). 
140 Gartner and Bercovitch, “Overcoming Obstacles to Peace,” p. 826.  
141 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1993-1994 (London: Brassey’s, 1993); The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1994-1995 (London: Brassey’s, 1994); Central 
Intelligence Agency, Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1900-1995, Volume I 
(Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2002); Charles R. Shrader, The Muslim-Croat Civil War in 
Central Bosnia: A Military History, 1992-1994 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003). 
142 Cunningham, “Actor Fragmentation and Civil War Bargaining,” p. 662. 
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conflict zone? How many actors are party to the ceasefire agreement? What is the scope of the 
ceasefire? How fragmented are the actors? How contested is decision making? How efficient is 
the military chain of command, and how disciplined its fighting force? As with the other 
variables, these questions shall be answered using primarily soft measures provided by news 
reporting and secondary literature.   
 
Testing the Durability of Peace 
 
 I will employ the method of difference initially forwarded by Mill to test the causal 
relationship between my independent and dependent variables. In this method, two cases with 
different outcomes are compared. Those variables that are shared among cases are not considered 
to be independently causal, while causality is attributed to those variables that vary across 
cases.143  I expect to see each independent variable coded differently across the cases, which 
would account for the variation in their outcomes. If an independent variable were the same in 
both a short and long ceasefire, it would indicate that the variable itself is not solely responsible 
for the outcome. For example, were power asymmetry to be high in both a long and short 
ceasefire, the relative power of the belligerents alone would not seem to affect their ability to 
cooperate. Rather, I expect to find that power asymmetry will be high in shorter ceasefires, and 
low in longer ceasefires. The method of difference is useful because it eliminates causality in 
variables that are shared across multiple outcomes. Of course, if a variable is present in multiple 
outcomes, this may mean that certain variables are interacting to produce the result. Mill’s 
methods do not account for interaction effects—it is up to the researcher to discover these 
                                               
143 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, 8th Ed (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1882), pp. 482-483. Accessed at 
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/27942/27942-pdf.pdf.  
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relationships between independent variables.144 I will thus carefully consider such interactions as 
I conduct my analysis, but lack a reliable methodology to guide these observations.   
The utility of Mill’s methods has been the subject of major debate. It is neither possible 
nor necessary for me to engage fully with these methodological questions in this study; others 
have handled that task comprehensively elsewhere.145 Nevertheless, it is necessary to recognize 
that small-N qualitative research such as this is far from capable of identifying perfect causal 
relationships. Even so, this method is quite useful for identifying preliminary, plausible 
relationships between variables.   
   
Drawbacks & Problems 
  
 No methodology is foolproof, and the research design outlined above has some important 
flaws. First, and most essential, is that the method of difference is useful only for eliminating, not 
generating, hypotheses.146 This means that, in order to establish causality, the researcher needs to 
have first asked the right questions. The methods in this study will reveal only if one of the 
hypotheses is incorrect. They will not introduce new variables that were not tested at all—the 
introduction of such variables is the burden of the researcher during the theorizing process. 
Though I am relatively confident that I have included the most relevant variables, there may be 
much that my theory does not take into consideration. In an extreme case, I may find that none of 
my independent variables correlate to the dependent variable as expected. On the one hand, this 
                                               
144 Jukka Savolainen, “The Rationality of Drawing Big Conclusions Based on Small Samples: In Defense of Mill’s 
Methods,” Social Forces 72, no. 4 (June 1994), p. 1221.  
145 For important examples of this debate, see James Mahoney, “Strategies of Causal Inference in Small-N 
Analysis,” Sociological Methods & Research 28, no. 4 (May 2000); Stanley Lieberson, “Small N’s and Big 
Conclusions: An Examination of the Reasoning in Comparative Studies Based on a Small Number of Cases,” 
Social Forces 70, no. 2 (December 1991); Savolainen, “The Rationality of Drawing Big Conclusions Based on 
Small Samples.”  
146 For a fuller explanation, see Savolainen, “The Rationality of Drawing Big Conclusions Based on Small 
Samples,” p. 1218. 
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is a useful result because it redirects research efforts; on the other hand, it does not inherently 
offer ideas for alternative hypotheses to be researched in future studies. In a potentially worse 
situation, I may find that the independent variables correlate to the dependent variable, but, in 
reality, a fourth variable that was not examined is the actual source of this ostensible causality. In 
such a case, any policy prescriptions or general knowledge derived from the results would be 
misguided, for I would have unwittingly assigned causality to non-causal variables.  
 It is also important to be candid about possible issues with data collection. Much of the 
history discussed in this study is contentious and fraught with dispute. Disagreements over the 
interpretation of historical data are commonplace among ethno-nationalists throughout the world, 
and the Balkans are no exception. Arguments continue to this day over what happened, why it 
happened, and how it might be rooted in centuries of complex and contested history. The 
hermeneutic practice, when applied to the holiest of national traditions, as well as to the lowest 
moments of (anti-)social behavior, easily transforms into the legitimation of terrible violence and 
oppression. Such is the root of epistemic violence, which stems from the (mis)interpretation of 
social-scientific data to justify the subordination or mistreatment of the object of study; though 
alternative evaluations may be possible, the academic sanctification of one singular 
understanding establishes this interpretation as an “uncontestable” system of knowledge.147 I 
hesitate to unwittingly participate in the perpetuation of such systems of knowledge, which, in 
the Balkan context, are used to excuse certain groups of aggression while shunting the 
responsibility for horrid crimes onto the shoulders of others. Therefore, it is essential to consider 
                                               
147 Thomas Teo, “What is Epistemological Violence in the Empirical Social Sciences?” Social and Personality 
Psychology Compass 4, no. 5 (2010). This concept can also be subsumed into the broader idea of cultural 
violence, as forwarded by Galtung. See: Ines-Jacqueline Werkner, “Zum Friedensbegriff in der 
Friedensforschung” [On the Concept of Peace in Peace Studies], in Handbuch Friedensethik [Handbook of Peace 
Ethics], eds. Ines-Jacqueline Werkner and Klaus Ebeling (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2017), pp. 22-23. 
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my sources critically, and to be honest about their potential biases and perspectives (whether 
malicious or unintentional). Given that their data serve as the foundation of this study, those 
biases and perspectives are, in many ways, incorporated into these pages.  
 I make particular use of two types of sources: military histories and newspaper articles.148 
As far as the latter is concerned, it is not difficult to see where there may be significant issues. 
Published during the conflict itself, these pieces lack the retrospective insight to contextualize the 
often confusing, fast-paced events on which they are reporting. Given my lack of proficiency in 
the Serbo-Croatian language, I worked almost exclusively with English-language sources from 
the U.S. and UK; though these reporters may not have been as deeply entangled in the 
nationalistic back-and-forth to which publications in the Balkans were party, it would be 
shortsighted to say that these Anglophone authors did not themselves have particular interests in 
or perspectives on the conflict. Both America and Britain were highly active participants in the 
Yugoslav wars, which were themselves embedded in a global shift of world order in the newly 
arrived post-Cold War era. Clearly no such writing can be entirely free of bias, and, while I have 
attempted to steer away from the most egregious examples of one-sided reporting, it is difficult 
to accurately determine to what extent the selected articles exhibit partiality. Nevertheless, such 
sources provide much-needed and detailed insight into developments on the ground, as well as 
into the thought processes of both the belligerents (through interviews) and the international 
community (through the voice of the author).  
 The military histories seem, at the outset, less partial—they are, after all, supposedly 
neutral, retrospectively contextualized historical accounts. But it is this seemingly “expert” 
neutrality that makes their danger particularly insidious. Such claims of “authoritative” findings 
                                               
148 The vast majority of these articles were accessed through the Lexis Nexis database.  
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can, as noted, serve as the basis of violent epistemologies. I make particular use of two studies: 
one by the CIA, and one by the military historian Charles R. Shrader. Regarding the former, the 
American public has generally viewed the Serbs as the primary engines of violence in Bosnia;149 
steeped in this discourse, any work published by the CIA might be expected to include, at least to 
some extent, this perspective on aggression and victimization. Regarding the latter, Shrader has 
reached controversial conclusions about the Muslim-Croat civil war in central Bosnia, flipping 
an established narrative by finding the Bosnian Muslims to be the primary aggressors and the 
Bosnian Croats to by the generally blameless victims.150 It may, indeed, be that he has uncovered 
groundbreaking new evidence. Yet his reliance on Croatian narratives over those of Muslims 
may very well skew these results, as noted by Shrader himself.151 More speculative, but a 
necessary observation, is to note Shrader’s years of work in American military institutions, as 
well as the book’s publication in 2003, just as the United States began to engage in the Middle 
East following the 9/11 attacks. It may not be inconsequential that a book published at the 
intersection of these two circumstances would portray the Catholic Croatians as victims and the 
Muslims as violent conquerors.  
It is not my intention to indict Shrader or the CIA as elements of some devious 
propaganda machine, particularly as I can never truly know their intentions. I wish merely to 
demonstrate that the conclusions presented in their works may be far from empirically impartial, 
                                               
149 As images from the Balkans exposed the horrors of the war to the American people, public opinion turned in 
favor of the Bosnian Muslims and exerted pressure on the American government to act on their behalf. See 
Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International 
Intervention (New York: Sharpe, 1999), p. 202. These images were frequently selective and ideological. 
Contracts between media companies in the Balkans and the US stipulated the portrayal of Slovenia and Croatia 
as “western states,” while the Serbs were to be portrayed as analogous to Nazis. See Marie-Janine Calic, 
Geschichte Jugoslawiens im 20. Jahrhundert [A History of Yugoslavia in the 20th Century] (Munich: Verlag 
C.H. Beck, 2010), p. 318.    
150 Shrader, The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia, pp. xvii-xix.  
151 Ibid., pp. 211-213.  
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and that this ambiguity seeps into the evidence used in my own research. Acknowledging that the 
discipline of international affairs must be more responsible in its treatment of history 
(particularly given the irony that this is an account of ethnic conflicts, for which historical 
interpretation is a central tool of mobilization and manipulation), it is imperative that all scholars 
of peace and conflict recognize the ambiguity of their cases and approach their sources with a 
critical and honest eye.  
 
Case Selection 
 
I have used the most-similar method of case selection to determine which ceasefires are 
to be compared with the method of difference. The most-similar method seeks out cases that are 
similar in every respect, except for the variables of interest.152 For this reason, I selected 
ceasefires from only one conflict: the Bosnian war. The war in Bosnia is both highly dynamic 
and highly static in useful ways. Regarding its dynamism, the character of the conflict changed 
drastically throughout its lifespan. Beginning as a Serbian separatist movement within Bosnia, 
which had itself declared independence from Yugoslavia, the conflict quickly devolved into civil 
warfare marred by brutal ethnic cleansing. During this early period of the war, there was a 
relatively clear dyad composed of the Bosnian Serbs and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) on one end, and the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats on the other. Later, the failure 
of the Muslim-Croat alliance prompted the collapse of this dyad. As the Croat-Muslim civil war 
erupted in 1992, the conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina took on a multipolar character. The final 
stages of the conflict saw a rebuilding of the Croat-Muslim alliance and a concomitant return to 
the conflict’s original dyad, as well as a significant change in the level of international 
                                               
152 Jason Seawright and John Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative 
and Quantitative Options,” Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 (June 2008), p. 304.  
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involvement. Major NATO bombing campaigns and powerful international mediation changed 
the dynamics of the war and increased the pressure on belligerents to find a resolution. Despite 
all of this dynamism, however, important factors—such as the belligerents’ leadership, the 
geography of the area, the structure of the societies, and the history of contention—remained the 
same. This is methodologically important, as it allows for the control of variables that are not of 
primary interest. The conflict’s dynamism is likewise important, as it allows for the values of the 
independent variables to change over time within this static conflict environment.  
I also selected cases from Bosnia because the conflict has proven to be invaluable in the 
study of ethnic civil war. The motivations of the belligerents and the structure of the conflict 
correspond harmoniously with existing thinking on ethnic civil war,153 and there is significant 
precedent for the study of Yugoslavia’s violent collapse in similar research projects.154 Though 
continuing this work on Bosnia may perpetuate a myopic focus on the dynamics of conflict in 
Southeast Europe, it increases the comparability of my results with other research on ethnic civil 
war. The benefits and tradeoffs of this focus on Yugoslavia’s demise merit more extensive 
discussion elsewhere; here, it suffices to say that there is precedent for the study of Bosnia in this 
field.  
The collapse of Yugoslavia was a tremendously complex historical event, and a brief 
summary can hardly do it justice. The same is true of the subsequent war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Nevertheless, in order to provide context for the cases, I present here a brief summary of the war 
                                               
153 This may, of course, be the case because much of the theorizing on ethnic civil war was done in the wake of 
Yugoslavia’s collapse. As a result, it could be that Bosnia does not correspond to the theory, but that the theory 
has been designed to explain Bosnia.  
154 See, for example, Gartner and Bercovitch’s study of the effects of mediation on short-lived conflict settlements. 
Gartner and Bercovitch, “Overcoming Obstacles to Peace,” pp. 833-835.  
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in Bosnia, the rationale of its onset, the composition of its belligerents, and the path to its 
resolution.  
 
The War in Bosnia-Hercegovina 
 
Situated in the south-east of Europe, the Balkans have long been populated by a variety 
of ethnic groups. These groups developed and solidified national identities as regional control 
ebbed and flowed through a number of formations: the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, the 
Serb-dominated Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the Axis occupation and Croat-
dominated Ustaše regime of the 1940s, and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY).155 It was primarily the SFRY’s charismatic leader, Josip Broz Tito, who reigned in 
ethnic divisions and maintained unity within the state.156  
Following Tito’s death in 1980, political elites competing for control in the new power 
vacuum began to use ethnic identity to their advantage.157 Eventually, maneuvering by Slobodan 
Milosevic, President of Serbia, brought the Serbs to dominate Yugoslavia’s federal 
institutions.158 Fearing for their well-being under this new political arrangement, Yugoslavia’s 
other ethnic republics began to secede.159 In June 1993, Slovenia and Croatia declared their 
independence from Yugoslavia, prompting war as the Serb-dominated Yugoslav People’s Army 
invaded the republics.160  
                                               
155 For a comprehensive history of Yugoslavia (in German), see Calic, Geschichte Jugoslawiens im 20. Jahrhundert.  
156 Carole Rogel, The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia (London: Greenwood Press, 1998), pp. 15-16. 
157 Ibid., pp. 17-24. 
158 Ibid., pp. 19-20, p. 24. 
159 Ibid., pp. 24-27. 
160 Ibid., p. 29. 
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Bosnia-Hercegovina was the most ethnically diverse of Yugoslavia’s republics, with no 
majority national or religious group.161 In the wake of the Slovenian and Croatian secessions, 
Bosnia’s President, Alija Izetbegovic, dismissed demands that the republic split into numerous 
autonomous regions for its many ethnic communities.162 In response, the Bosnian Serbs declared 
certain areas of Bosnia to be Serbian autonomous regions in September of 1991, and on 24 
October 1991 the Bosnian Serbs established an autonomous Serb national assembly.163 This 
separatist region was called the Republika Srpska, and the city of Pale was made its capital. War 
broke out between the Bosnian government and these Bosnian Serb separatists in April of 
1992.164 Initially, the Bosnian Croats fought alongside the Bosnian Muslims; however, from 
mid-1993 to mid-1994, the Bosnian Croats and Muslims fought each other as well.165 The 
Bosnian Croats attempted to carve out their own autonomous republic, called the Croatian 
Republic of Herceg-Bosna. These three groups were primarily represented by three military 
forces: The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina (Armija Republike Bosne i 
Hercegovine, ARBiH) for the Muslims, the Croatian Defense Council (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane, 
HVO) for the Bosnian Croats, and the Army of Republika Srpska (Vojska Republike Srpske, 
VRS) for the Bosnian Serbs. Eventually, the war in Bosnia ended as combat in Croatia, a NATO 
bombing campaign, and international diplomatic efforts forced the parties to agree to a peace 
settlement.166  
 I have selected two ceasefires to study from the Bosnian civil war. In chapter 4, I will 
look at the “Carter ceasefire.” This ceasefire was the product of a mediation mission by former 
                                               
161 In 1991, Bosnia-Hercegovina was 43.7% Muslim, 31.4% Serb, 17.3% Croat, and 5.5% “Yugoslav.” “Muslim” in 
the Bosnian context refers to a national, rather than solely religious, identity. See Ibid., p. 27.  
162 Ibid., p. 29.  
163 Ibid.  
164 Ibid., p. 30.  
165 Ibid., p. 34.  
166 Ibid., p. 35.  
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U.S. President Jimmy Carter, and resulted in an agreement between the Bosnian Muslims and the 
Bosnian Serbs that entered into force on 1 January 1995. Though it collapsed before its stipulated 
end-date, the ceasefire lasted for 78 days with no major breaches by either side. This ceasefire 
was selected because it was among the most durable that I could identify in the conflict, and is 
dramatically more durable than its counterpart to be studied in chapter 5. It is also typical of 
other long-duration ceasefires that were identified in preparation for this study, and thus 
generalizes well to other cases within the Bosnian context. The Carter ceasefire is also an 
important case, as it came at a time when the Bosnian government began to lose the support of 
the United States, its last internationally influential backer, and it preceded the final bout of 
fighting that would ultimately lead into the Dayton Peace Accords. As a long-duration ceasefire, 
I expect to find that the belligerents were satisfied with the territorial allocation at the time of the 
ceasefire, that their armies were locked in a mutually hurting stalemate, and that all actors were 
cohesive and well-organized.  
In chapter 5, I will look at the “tripartite ceasefire.” This ceasefire was a three-way 
agreement between the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Croats, and the Bosnian Muslims, which 
entered into force on 18 June 1993. Fighting continued even after the ceasefire took effect, and a 
major assault in central Bosnia on 24 June 1993 brought any illusion of its success to an end. I 
selected this ceasefire because it was among the least durable that I could identify, and stands in 
stark contrast to the Carter ceasefire’s durability. It is also reminiscent of other short-duration 
ceasefires that I was able to uncover—the sort of “typical Bosnian ceasefire” referred to in 
chapter 1. The case is also important, in that it came at a time of major transition in final peace 
negotiations and was among the first substantial efforts to manage three-way fighting between 
the Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. As a short-duration ceasefire, I expect to find that the 
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belligerents were dissatisfied with their territorial holdings, that there were significant power 
asymmetries between the armies, and that the actors were marred by major internal divisions. 
In the following two chapters, I will closely examine the political and military contexts of 
these ceasefires, exposing the structures that resulted in their vastly different durations. The case 
studies will offer clues into the relationship between these structures and cooperation, which will 
in turn allow us to see more clearly the connection between ceasefire durability and ethnic civil 
war. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE CARTER CEASEFIRE 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I analyze the long-duration Carter ceasefire. This agreement between the 
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs entered into force on 1 January 1995, and endured for 78 
days before a Bosnian government offensive caused its collapse in the spring of 1995. Given the 
agreement’s relatively long lifespan, the findings of this case study should offer insight into the 
factors that enhance ceasefire durability.  
Despite ongoing fighting in the Bihac region, the Bosnian Serb side had significantly 
greater incentive to abide by the ceasefire agreement than the Bosnian government. At the time 
of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s mediation efforts in late 1994, the Bosnian Serbs had 
achieved the territorial ambitions that they had formally declared at the beginning of the war. 
Having just fought to a bitter stalemate with the Bosnian government, which was now 
empowered by its renewed alliance with the Bosnian Croats, and under the pressure of both 
economic sanctions and the possibility of NATO airstrikes, the Bosnian Serbs faced a grim 
reality if fighting was to recommence. The quick negotiation of a peace settlement seemed to be 
the only way for the Bosnian Serbs to capitalize on their tenuous military advantage. Initially, the 
peace plan offered by the Contact Group called for a dramatic reduction of Bosnian Serb 
territory. However, both the European Community and the United States, motivated by domestic 
frustrations, began to move away from their staunch demands that a peace settlement be 
favorable to the Bosnian Muslims. Rather, at this desperate point in the war, any peace 
settlement at all seemed desirable. This loss of support for the Bosnian Muslims opened brand 
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new bargaining space for the Bosnian Serbs. As a result, they could attempt to consolidate their 
territorial claims through negotiation, where they enjoyed the advantage, instead of military 
force, where they perceived a looming risk of defeat. Nevertheless, the Bosnian Serbs prepared 
military operations in anticipation of the failure of negotiations. 
On the other side of the table, the Bosnian government openly favored the peace plan 
offered by the Contact Group, which would undo many of the Bosnian Army’s territorial losses. 
A renegotiation of this plan with better terms for the Bosnian Serbs would be disastrous. 
However, stalemates and defeats in key battles throughout central Bosnia made clear the fact that 
continued fighting was not (at least for the moment) an option. As such, the Bosnian government 
was incentivized to agree to the ceasefire in order to buy time as it planned and prepared for a 
new offensive.  
The duration of the winter ceasefire of 1995 was therefore contingent upon two factors: 
one, the Bosnian Serbs’ confidence that they would benefit more from negotiation than force, 
and two, the amount of time it would take for the Bosnian Army to believe it could overcome the 
military stalemate and shift battlefield conditions in its favor. In the end, it was the Bosnian 
Army that renewed full-scale fighting, having spent the winter building confidence in its ability 
to successfully mount a major offensive against its opponent. The Bosnian Army ultimately 
seems to have never been committed to a permanent ceasefire. Given shifts in the international 
environment, such an agreement would have resulted in losses of territory that the Bosnian 
government considered to be unequivocally unacceptable. With satisfaction so low that 
commitment to the agreement was impossible, the ceasefire was to endure for only as long as the 
Bosnian Government perceived a mutually hurting stalemate. When military force once again 
became an option, the ceasefire collapsed.  
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In the following, I present a brief historical overview of the circumstances surrounding 
the Carter agreement before further exploring the role of satisfaction, relative power, and actor 
cohesion in the duration of the ceasefire. Ultimately, I find that this long-duration ceasefire 
exhibited low satisfaction, a mutually hurting stalemate, and moderately low actor cohesion. 
Interestingly, these results do not map onto the ideal-type imagined in chapter 2. 
 
Summary 
 
 
 By the end of 1994, the war in Bosnia had taken a major toll on all of its participants. The 
VRS had lost its momentum, shifting to a defensive posture as the HVO and ARBiH ended 
combat operations against one another, entered into a Muslim-Croat Federation, and took the 
offensive.167 Now faced with the unified fury of the Bosnian Croats and Muslims, the Bosnian 
Serbs’ territorial possessions were in grave danger. November saw the VRS lose control of 
Kupres, as well as some territory near Tesanj, Konjic, and in the Livo-Glamoc valley; defenses 
against Muslim attacks on Mt. Vlasic, Mt. Stolice, Donji Vakuf, and Tesanj-Teslic, though 
successful, were costly and tiring.168 Stalemate had set in. Fear was mounting among the Bosnian 
Serbs, however, that the tides could turn in favor of the Bosnian government.169   
 It was in the context of this dire situation that Radovan Karadzic, President of the 
Republika Srpska, invited former U.S. President Jimmy Carter to mediate the Bosnian 
conflict.170 After obtaining approval for the mission by President Clinton, arrangements were 
made to transport Carter and his negotiating team to Sarajevo.171 Before Carter embarked for 
                                               
167 Central Intelligence Agency, Balkan Battlegrounds, p. 251.  
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid.  
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171 The Carter Center, “President Carter Helps Restart Peace Efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” 31 August 1994. 
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Bosnia on 18 December 1994, Karadzic pledged to free imprisoned UN peacekeepers and 
Muslim soldiers under the age of 19, guarantee the free movement of UN convoys, reopen the 
Sarajevo airport, and establish a ceasefire around the embattled city.172  
 On 18 December 1994, Carter met with Bosnian President Izetbegovic, where the former 
U.S. president recommended that further negotiations be based upon the most current peace plan 
offered by the Contact Group, a mediation task force comprised of representatives from the U.S., 
UK, France, Germany, and Russia.173 This peace plan demanded a 51-49 split of Bosnia’s 
territory between a Muslim-Croat federation and the Republika Srpska, reducing the Bosnian 
Serb holdings by approximately one third from the 70 percent of Bosnian territory they had 
seized through military force.174 On 19 December, following a meeting in Pale (the capital of the 
Republika Srpska), Carter announced that the Serbs had proposed a four-month ceasefire—a 
statement that Karadzic later denied, despite noting the need to consider such a possibility—as 
well as an offer to continue negotiations rooted in the Contact Group’s peace plan.175 The 
following day, Izetbegovic agreed to the four-month ceasefire after a meeting in Sarajevo with 
Carter.176 Carter subsequently returned to Pale, where the Bosnian Serbs accepted a general 
ceasefire in Bosnia to begin on 23 December.177 On 22 December, UN Special Envoy Yasushi 
Akashi received that same commitment from both Bosnian Muslim and Serb officials.178 
Izetbegovic and Karadzic, on 23 December, subsequently signed separate documents 
establishing a short-term ceasefire to last until 1 January, priming the parties for a four-month 
                                               
172 Central Intelligence Agency, Balkan Battlegrounds, p. 28.  
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“cessation of hostilities.”179 At the time, such a cessation of hostilities was considered to be more 
substantial than a ceasefire, in that it required the withdrawal of forces and the insertion of UN 
troops in certain flashpoints—given the terminology established in this study, however, both 
agreements were effectively ceasefires.180 After approval from the Bosnian Serb Assembly on 19 
December and the signing of separate documents by Bosnian Government and Serb officials on 
31 December, the Carter ceasefire took effect at noon on 1 January 1995.181 It was intended to 
last until 30 April 1995, 119 days after the start of the new year.182 On 2 January, the Bosnian 
Croats signed the agreement.183  
 The parties faced a number of obstacles throughout January of 1995. A joint Muslim-
Serb commission encountered significant difficulties arranging the withdrawal of Bosnian 
government forces from Mt. Igman from 4 January to 11 January, which became linked to a 
contentious dispute over the opening of supply routes into Sarajevo by the Serbs (resolved, along 
with a number of other issues, by agreement on 23 January).184 More seriously, the Contact 
Group suspended its shuttle diplomacy efforts on 25 January after it became clear that the Serbs 
would not negotiate from the basis of the proposed peace plan.185 Despite these setbacks, the 
Bosnian government and Bosnian Serbs were able to successfully swap 101 prisoners in 
Sarajevo—the first exchange of its kind since October of the preceding year—and the UN 
Security Council extended relief for its limited sanctions against Serbia by 100 days.186   
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 In February, there was further progress in the opening of routes into Sarajevo (though not 
for commercial use) and in the strengthening of the Muslim-Croat Federation.187 Nevertheless, 
the Bosnian Serb Assembly again rejected the Contact Group plan on 13 February, and, in an 
effort to maintain control over the negotiations, banned any unauthorized interaction between 
Bosnian Serbs and the Contact Group.188 A delicate game subsequently unfolded as the Contact 
Group eased sanctions in order to procure Belgrade’s recognition of Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, 
and Slovenia, while the Bosnian Serbs conditioned consideration of the Contact Group’s peace 
plan upon the status of these sanctions.189 By the end of the month, Milosevic still steadfastly 
refused to recognize the independence of these republics.190  
 Tensions began to rise at the end of February, with Krajina and Bosnian Serbs forming a 
joint defense council on the 20th to foster cooperation and pool resources in the event of a new 
round of fighting.191 On 6 March, Croatian, Bosnian, and Bosnian Croat military commanders 
signed a similar agreement to bolster military cooperation against Serbs in both Croatia and 
Bosnia.192 Then, on 20 March, the Bosnian government shattered the ceasefire by launching 
major assaults on radio installations at Mt. Vlasic and Mt. Stolice.193 With Karadzic calling for 
the mobilization of all Bosnian Serbs on 26 March to counter the offensive, it became apparent 
that the ceasefire was no longer in effect.194 Regardless, the Contact Group called for the 
ceasefire’s extension past its 30 April expiration date on 27 March, 4 March, 19 April, and 20 
April.195 Meeting with Bosnian Government and Serb officials on 20 and 21 April, UN Special 
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Envoy Akashi attempted to secure an extension of the ceasefire, but the prospect was definitively 
rejected by both Sarajevo and Pale.196 On 1 May 1995, the agreement’s nominal end date, the 
ceasefire expired as fighting continued in Bosnia.197 Indeed, it was the Bosnian government’s 
offensive on 20 March 1995 that marked the true collapse of the Carter agreement.  
 Though the Carter ceasefire lasted only 66 percent of its anticipated duration (78 out of 
119 days), it endured well beyond the 56-day cutoff established by Gartner and Bercovitch for 
short-lived settlements. The questions must now be asked: why did the ceasefire last for so long? 
Why did it ultimately collapse? And how did cooperation play a role in determining the 
agreement’s durability? Let us now look to the variables of satisfaction, relative power, and actor 
cohesion to gauge how their interactions produced this 78-day ceasefire.  
 
Satisfaction  
 
How satisfied are the belligerents with their territorial holdings? How large are the ethnic 
enclaves beyond the ceasefire lines? 
 
 The Carter ceasefire is inextricably intertwined with the broader peace process that 
unfolded in Bosnia throughout the duration of the conflict. In many ways, it came at a critical 
period in the war: on the Bosnian Serb side, established territorial aspirations had not only been 
reached, but were in dire peril; on the Bosnian government side, the long-standing goals of Mt. 
Vlasic and Mt. Stolice seemed barely within reach, yet current trends in the international 
environment and peace negotiations threatened their realization. Mt. Vlasic and Mt. Stolice were 
essential radio transmitters, which the ARBiH had unsuccessfully attempted to seize for much of 
1994.198 In effect, Bosnian Serb territorial satisfaction was high, allowing them to commit to the 
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ceasefire and pursue a negotiated settlement, while Bosnian Muslim satisfaction was quite low, 
causing them to seek military avenues that would change battlefield realities.  
 In May 1992, just as the Bosnian conflict was beginning to unfold, Karadzic and Mate 
Boban, leader of the Bosnian Croats, met in Graz, Austria, to discuss the potential territorial 
partition of Bosnia.199 Initially opposed to Bosnian independence, the Bosnian Serbs desired a 
union with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro), or, 
at the very least, a partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina.200 At the Graz meeting, the Bosnian Serbs 
offered a map of the partition. In this map, they controlled 70 percent of Bosnian territory.201 10 
percent of this land was contested by the Croats, and 20 to 30 percent was contested by the 
Bosnian Muslims, shrinking Muslim holdings to a small central enclave.202 Moreover, the 
Bosnian Serbs were adamant about possessing particular pieces of territory: parts of Muslim 
eastern Bosnia and parts of Sarajevo (which were to serve as the Republika Srpska’s new capital) 
were non-negotiable.203 As the war progressed into 1993, it seemed as if the Bosnian Serbs 
would be willing to compromise on this partition in exchange for international recognition of 
their new state.204 When international recognition became a more distant prospect, however, 
Bosnian Serb officials continued to advocate for their initial position.205 Indeed, at this point in 
the war, the Bosnian Serbs had seized much of the territory initially set out in the Graz map: 
approximately 70 percent of Bosnia-Hercegovina fell under their control, the fulfilment of their 
aspirations in 1992.206  
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Map 4.1: The Graz Map of May 1992.207 
 
In July of 1994, the Contact Group offered a peace plan that undermined all the Serbs had 
worked towards. This map called for the reduction of Bosnian Serb territory from its current (and 
long desired) 72 percent to a significantly lesser 49 percent, with the Muslim-Croat Federation 
receiving a 51 percent share of the territory.208 If this map were to be adopted, the Bosnian Serbs 
would lose hold of the territory they had long desired, which they considered absolutely 
necessary for their secession,209 and which they, in 1992, had demanded as solely their own. As 
the VRS lost its strategic advantage to a renewed Muslim-Croat alliance in late 1994 (see the 
following section on relative power),210 it became apparent that Serb territorial gains could 
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realistically disappear.211 The diplomatic and military tides no longer seemed unequivocally in 
their favor. 
 
 
Map 4.2: The Contact Group Map of July 1994.212 
 
Jimmy Carter’s arrival in Bosnia offered the Bosnian Serbs an enticing way out of their 
predicament, for the former U.S. President’s mission coincided with a major shift in U.S. foreign 
policy. President Clinton had long supported the Bosnian Muslims,213 as did his constituency, 
given that and the American media routinely painted the Serbs as the brutal aggressors and 
oppressors in the Bosnian war.214 However, a change in the administration’s stance was forced as 
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Republicans swept congressional elections in 1994.215 Clinton, still unable to achieve a 
settlement in a war widely horrifying to the American public, saw his reelection threatened by 
the foreign policy stalemate in the Balkans.216 Pushed by concern for this domestic 
dissatisfaction, the U.S. in late 1994 changed course and aligned itself with the position of the 
European Community: the Bosnian Serbs were clearly the victors of the war, and the conflict 
needed simply to be settled quickly and in any way possible.217 Therefore, as the Clinton 
administration offered its support to Carter’s mediation mission, it maintained support (through 
Carter) of the Contact Group’s peace plan and its territorial division of Bosnia. Yet it also 
provided major flexibility, for the first time, to the Bosnian Serbs. Indeed, it would appear as if 
Carter’s mission as an unofficial representative of the U.S. government was an attempt by the 
Clinton administration to subtly open this new bargaining space for the Serbs without doing 
damage to its credibility. 
In Pale, Carter’s respectful dealings with the Serbs signaled that the U.S. would accept 
negotiations over the Contact Group plan, comforting the Serbs enough to give up previous 
demands that the plan be rejected entirely.218 U.S. officials stated, “It was always true that 
territorial adjustments had to be made,”219 openly marking the abandonment of their previous 
insistence that the Muslim-Croat Federation receive more territory than the Bosnian Serbs. In 
effect, Carter’s mediation offered the Serbs a vast expansion of bargaining space at a time when 
military means seemed unlikely to secure their goals. A ceasefire combined with the opportunity 
to renegotiate Bosnia’s territorial partition was thus an ideal package. An elated Nikola Koljevic, 
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vice president of the Republika Srpska, declared after talks with Carter: “Yes, [the Contact 
Group peace plan] is open to negotiation, yes, the whole plan…. This is a victory for democracy, 
for us, for the Serbs.”220 Karadzic himself later remarked that “Everything is negotiable.”221 With 
Carter signaling that the United States would no longer advocate for a settlement favorable to the 
Muslim-Croat Federation, the Bosnian Serbs capitalized on an opportunity to lay down their 
arms, seize their political advantage, and deliberately negotiate a deal tailored to their territorial 
aspirations.222  
The Bosnian government, on the other hand, was staunchly opposed to a territorial 
partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina designed by the Bosnian Serbs, and the Muslim insistence on 
Serb capitulation as the path to peace was a point of tension between the government and its 
Western backers.223 Izetbegovic, however, placed a great premium on the idea of Bosnia-
Hercegovina as a multiethnic state, and, unlike his Muslim nationalist counterparts, was 
amenable to the concept of partition in order to secure that end.224 It was the shape and scope of 
that partition that generated major challenges and conflicts in the peace process, for the Bosnian 
government would not accept the Serbs’ attempts to approximate the proposed Graz map of 
1992.  
After meeting with both the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian government, President Carter 
minimized as semantic differences what amounted to the key issue of Bosnia’s division: the role 
that the Contact Group’s plan would play in negotiations for a final peace.225 The Bosnian Serbs 
stated that talks would begin “with the proposal of the contact group as the basis for negotiation 
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of all points,” while the Bosnian government stated that talks would begin “with the acceptance 
of the proposal of the contact group as a starting point.”226 It is clear, however, that these 
differences amounted to more than pure semantics. Sarajevo preferred the plan and desired talks 
that would commence with the proposed 51-49 split of the country, whereas Pale rejected the 
plan and signaled that it would attempt to alter the proposal to more closely reflect the Bosnian 
Serbs’ 72 percent holdings at the time of the ceasefire.227 Moreover, according to the Contact 
Group’s plan, the Muslim-Croat Federation was to receive territory on which the majority of 
Bosnia’s industry, main cities, major airports, and higher education institutions were located, an 
outcome considered wildly unfair by the Bosnian Serbs.228 Karadzic himself argued that the 
proposed plan’s allocation of 30 percent of Bosnia’s resources to the Serbs was unacceptable, 
and that they deserved at least 50 percent.229 Thus, with the Serbs aspiring to distance themselves 
from the proposed map, “acceptance” of the plan was removed from their negotiating lexicon.230  
The Bosnian government, fearful of such an unfavorable division and likely aware of the 
increased bargaining leeway allocated to the Bosnian Serbs by the shifting American position, 
resisted the Bosnian Serbs’ refusal to begin negotiations without formally rooting them in the 
Contact Group’s plan. Ejup Ganic, Vice President of the Muslim-Croat Federation, stated in late 
December, 1994: “Mr. Karadzic wants to start with the peace plan and then destroy it, while we 
want to build on it.”231 That the Bosnian government perceived this possibility and feared its 
outcome was key to their (un)willingness to abide by Carter’s ceasefire.  
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Indeed, the process of negotiations signaled clearly to the Bosnian government the 
Bosnian Serbs’ intentions, as well as the international community’s support for movement away 
from the initial division proposed in the Contact Group’s plan. In early 1995, a duplicitous 
United States attempted to reassure the Bosnian government that the Contact Group plan would 
be upheld, while hinting to the Bosnian Serbs that it could be changed.232 On 25 January 1995, 
following a period of intense shuttle diplomacy, the Bosnian Serbs rejected the Contact Group’s 
peace plan and caused the Contact Group to momentarily suspend talks.233 On 13 February 1995, 
the Bosnian Serb assembly once again did not accept the plan, and officially limited the 
interaction between the Contact Group and those Bosnian Serbs that favored the plan.234 The 
stated political rationale behind this rejection was that the plan would require the Bosnian Serbs 
to enter a unified Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, an outcome considered absolutely 
unacceptable by the assembly.235 In response, the Contact Group accepted a French proposal for 
concessions to the Serbs, namely the lifting of sanctions on Belgrade in order to secure the 
recognition of Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina.236 The Bosnian Serbs’ 
stubbornness was being met with inducements, concessions, and accommodation.   
The Bosnian government hinted at its serious dissatisfaction with the direction of the 
negotiations in a number of portentous statements. When asked during the initial negotiations if 
the ceasefire agreement was a breakthrough with the Bosnian Serbs, Ganic made clear the 
government’s mistrust of both the Serbs and the international community: “Unfortunately not. 
We might have a cease-fire in 72 hours. But I still worry, because President Carter signed some 
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papers with Karadzic, and we don’t know what is in those papers. So, we have to wait and see. 
We hope for a cease-fire, but from our experience we have to be careful.”237 Later, in mid-March 
of 1995—just as the Bosnian government prepared to break the ceasefire with its offensives on 
Mt. Vlasic and Mt. Stolice—Izetbegovic stated:  
Germany understands our decision not to extend the cease-fire upon its expiry on 30th 
April unless the Serb side accepts the contact group peace plan. Of course, this does not 
mean that on 1st May we shall launch any offensives, nor that we are planning them at the 
moment. But, at the same time this means that we shall very effectively defend ourselves 
if need be. We have said several times and we are saying it again: we shall negotiate 
whenever we can, and fight whenever we are forced to.238 
 
The Bosnian government was making itself clear: the ceasefire would not continue if the Bosnian 
Serbs continued to strive to uphold the status-quo through negotiations.  
This tension was also clear to the global community of observers, who, from the outset of 
the ceasefire, were dubious about the signatories’ commitment to abide by its stipulations. On 21 
December 1994, as Carter’s mediation mission concluded, Roger Cohen reported for the New 
York Times:  
… the durability of the cease-fire, the latest of more than 30 announced since the since 
the war began in 1992, and the eventual success of peace talks, remained open to 
question because, despite the agreement, none of the deep differences between Muslims 
and Serbs that caused the war have been resolved. These differences center on whether 
Bosnia should remain a single state or be dismembered, and what territory each side 
should get.239 
 
Here, Cohen clearly links the final division of territory to ceasefire durability, and observes that 
the continued dispute over the Contact Group was not to bode well for an enduring cessation of 
hostilities between the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serbs. Likewise, John Pomfret 
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reported for the Washington Post that ongoing territorial disputes indicated that fighting would 
likely begin anew after inclement weather conditions passed:   
Despite the appearance that Bosnia’s fratricidal combatants are lumbering toward a 
cease-fire, today’s developments failed to guarantee that either side has abandoned its 
territorial goals. Bosnia’s harsh winters make warfare difficult, so both sides may have 
decided to suspend fighting to buy time to prepare for more killing in the spring.240 
 
To these reporters, the connection between the peace process and ceasefire durability was self-
apparent, as was the negative impact of the fierce disagreement over the Contact Group’s 
proposed partition.  
 Ultimately, it was the Bosnian government that shattered the ceasefire on 20 March 1995, 
though the Bosnian Serbs had themselves prepared offensive plans throughout the winter of 
1995.241 Tellingly, the first targets of the Muslim offensive were key radio transmitters on Mt. 
Vlasic and Mt. Stolice, both of which had been the subject of major ARBiH operations 
throughout 1994.242 That the Bosnian government chose to continue this onslaught in these 
locations, after numerous previous failures, is indicative of the persistence of the government’s 
territorial aims. Moreover, as Karadzic called on the international community’s support in 
returning the frontlines to their positions at the start of the ceasefire, it became clear that the 
Bosnian Serbs would not tolerate a further loss of territory.243 
 
How large are the ethnic enclaves beyond the ceasefire lines?  
 
 
Much of the territory possessed by the Bosnian Serbs at the end of 1994 was inhabited by 
Bosnian Muslims. As negotiations over the Contact Group peace plan continued, Pale attempted 
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to consolidate control over many of these enclaves. Karadzic expressed a clear commitment to 
maintaining possession of Brcko, Jajce, Sanski Most, Doboj, Gorazda, Zepa, Srebrenica, and the 
region of Posavina, all areas which were to be returned to the Bosnian government as per the 
proposed peace plan.244 In exchange, Karadzic intimated that Pale would willingly concede much 
of Sarajevo, though not the southern and western suburbs, which were to be used as the basis for 
the construction of a separate Sarajevo.245 However, the Bosnian Serbs also claimed that the 
Muslim enclaves of Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica were major security risks.246 This territorial 
situation was untenable for the Bosnian government, as was the prospect of accepting more than 
180,000 refugees into central Bosnia, where the civil war with the Bosnian Croats—begun, in 
part, over the ethnic balance between Croats and Muslims in light of anticipated refugee 
movements247—had only recently come to its tenuous close.248 The Bosnian Muslims, therefore, 
were clearly antagonized by the presence of significant irredenta in Serb-controlled Bosnia.  
The issue of ethnic enclaves was less salient for the Bosnian Serbs, though their 
nationalist rhetoric was intended to foster the opposite perspective. President Carter experienced 
this firsthand upon visiting Pale, where Karadzic claimed that all of Bosnia’s Muslims had been 
Serbs before the Ottoman Empire brought Islam to the region.249 In this Serb nationalist 
worldview, all of Bosnia’s Muslims were, in a way, irredenta. Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
believe that this justificatory historical interpretation was truly capable of overcoming the 
national barriers between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims, particularly given that the 
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Bosnian Serbs engaged in the ethnic cleansing and genocide of Muslims, rather than their 
conversion “back” to “Serb-hood.” 
What should we make of this tangle of ambitions, claims, and interests? Let us analyze 
this territorial contest in terms of satisfaction calculations and homeland. The Bosnian Serbs, as 
forwarded in the Graz map of 1992, desired 70 percent of Bosnian territory, an ambition which 
had been decisively satisfied. This territory was considered imperative for the establishment of 
the Republika Srpska, the state of the Bosnian Serbs. Military exhaustion, as will be explored in 
greater detail below, threatened these holdings in the event of continued fighting. However, a 
less risky, non-violent route opened as the Contact Group peace plan became negotiable with the 
realignment of international (particularly, American) interests. The Bosnian Serbs were satisfied 
with their territorial holdings, were satisfied with a ceasefire along the established frontlines, and 
thought possible the prospect of negotiating a final peace that conformed to the contours of these 
front lines. In short, Pale had every incentive to abide by the ceasefire, as long as the Contact 
Group continued to appear amenable to the adoption of a peace plan that closely matched the 
battlefield realities of late 1994.   
In stark contrast, the Bosnian government was deeply dissatisfied with the distribution of 
territory in late 1994. However, as will be discussed in greater detail below, the ARBiH was 
militarily incapable of continuing an armed attempt to change this distribution. Yet negotiations 
were not progressing in the Bosnian government’s favor: increasingly abandoned by the 
international community, the Contact Group peace plan appeared liable to become unanchored 
from its initial 51-49 territorial split. A shift in the military balance was the only factor that could 
result in the upheaval of the status-quo and a more satisfactory territorial arrangement. 
Therefore, Sarajevo was never committed to an enduring peace; rather, it was to abide by the 
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ceasefire for only as long as was necessary to clandestinely prepare the ARBiH for an offensive 
that could realign the frontlines into a more favorable configuration.  
Interestingly, this result does not corroborate Hypothesis 1, which anticipates that high 
dissatisfaction would result in shorter ceasefires. However, it does support the notion that high 
dissatisfaction will reduce the belligerents’ cooperative will, and therefore make ceasefires more 
volatile as other conditions (such as relative power and actor cohesion) change.  
 
Relative Power 
 
What is the ratio of infantry forces? What is the ratio of equipment? How do the belligerents 
perceive the power of their opponents? 
 
 Looking at the balance of military capabilities and perceptions, it is clear that the parties 
had entered a mutually hurting stalemate in the weeks before signing the Carter ceasefire. During 
the ceasefire, major improvements to the Bosnian Army’s structure and ability caused the 
ARBiH to believe that it could successfully break out of the stalemate and defeat the VRS in 
battle. This shift in perception prompted the winter offensive that ultimately caused the Carter 
ceasefire to collapse, indicating that the perception of a mutually hurting stalemate is 
fundamentally linked to ceasefire durability.  
By mid-1994, there were stark differences in the operational specialties of the ARBiH-
HVO tandem and the VRS. Data provided by Military Balance creates a particularly clear image 
of enemy armies with dramatically different competencies. As of 1 June 1994, the ARBiH 
comprised approximately 110,000 soldiers, the HVO approximately 50,000, and the VRS 
approximately 80,000. Taken together, the Muslim-Croat Federation possessed twice as many 
infantry as their Bosnian Serb foes—a ratio of 2:1. However, as of that same date, the balance of 
equipment (artillery, vehicles, heavy weapons, etc.) was the exact opposite. The ARBiH 
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possessed approximately 522 pieces of equipment, the HVO approximately 284, and the VRS 
approximately 1,742. In all, the Muslim-Croat Federation had approximately half as much 
matériel as the VRS—a ratio of 1:2250—which likely stems from the VRS having received many 
of the Yugoslav People’s Army’s resources.251 For most of the war, this astounding mismatch 
had worked in favor of the VRS, which made significant inroads into Bosnia, as discussed above. 
1994, however, was to prove a major turning point that would ultimately result in a stalemate 
and, subsequently, the Carter ceasefire.  
   In 1994, the VRS was pushed from an offensive to a defensive posture.252 With the 
Washington Agreement having put an end to the Muslim-Croat civil war,253 the VRS now faced 
a unified fighting force, significantly stronger in concert than when divided by internecine 
combat.254 This new Muslim-Croat cooperation enabled a number of otherwise impossible 
offensives, freeing up both armies to concentrate their forces on a common goal.255 Success 
began to slip away from the Bosnian Serbs; though capable of halting ARBiH offensives on Mt. 
Vlasic, Mt. Stolice, Donji Vakuf, and Tesanj-Teslic in the spring of 1994, these persistent attacks 
drained the energy and capacity of the VRS.256 October of 1994 saw the situation grow even 
more dire for the Bosnian Serbs in Bihac, where territory was beginning to slip away, and 
November bore major losses for the VRS in Kupres, Tesanj, Konjic, and the Livno-Glamoc 
Valley.257 The Carter ceasefire came at this juncture of stubborn resilience and impending loss, 
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as both the ARBiH and VRS felt the tides shifting but were too exhausted to see that shift 
through.  
 While the Bosnian Serbs worked towards a negotiated settlement of the conflict on their 
terms, the Bosnian government, committed to an eventual return to the use of force, began major 
reconfigurations of its military. Using the relative calm brought about by the ceasefire, the 
ARBiH dramatically improved its capabilities and competencies through a series of 
organizational and doctrinal changes.258 Most importantly, the Army converted its “Operational 
Groups” (OGs) into permanent divisions, which led to a redistribution of heavy equipment and 
facilitated strategic adjustments.259 By allowing for the dynamic concentration of precious 
resources wherever need was greatest, the divisions enhanced the Army’s mobility, logistics, fire 
control, responsiveness, and supply distribution—improvements that, though imperfect, signaled 
the evolving sophistication of the ARBiH.260 The Army also made improvements to its elite and 
special operations units.261 These organizational changes resulted in a general improvement in 
the ARBiH’s efficacy and efficiency, with the intention of increasing gains while reducing losses 
and costs.262  
 The Bosnian Army remained infantry-heavy over this period of time, though its earlier 
material deficiencies were greatly ameliorated.263 This was due primarily to the settlement of the 
Muslim-Croat civil war, which opened coastal territory for arms shipments to central Bosnia; 
nevertheless, the Croat government confiscated or refused many shipments of essential 
equipment (notably, armor and artillery) as a tax for access to the coast, as well as out of 
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continued weariness of their former enemy.264 As a result, the Bosnian Army in early 1995 
possessed only some tanks and heavy artillery, relying primarily on mortars for its indirect fire 
support.265 Ultimately, though the ARBiH was better equipped than ever before, it was still 
primarily an infantry force and needed to carefully allocate its sparse resources.266 Aware of this 
imbalance, and highly conscious of the negative impact it had on the ARBiH’s offensive 
capabilities, Bosnian Army leadership reformulated doctrine to more accurately reflect and take 
advantage of its military realities.267 These changes resulted in major improvements to the 
Army’s ability to contest the VRS and make territorial gains.268  
 In contrast to the Bosnian Army, the HVO made few improvements to its force structure, 
efficiency, or efficacy. Weak leadership, a reliance on the Croatian Army’s (Hrvatska vojska, 
HV) command, and a dependence on Croatian Army equipment kept the HVO weak, 
subordinating it to the HV and hindering its autonomy in combat.269 Moreover, though the 
fighting between the HVO and the ARBiH had ceased, trust between the two was low, 
cooperation was tentative, and formal joint institutions were either totally lacking or generally 
insufficient.270 
On the other side of the battlefield, the VRS was the weakest it had been since the war’s 
onset. Though still able to maintain a grasp on its territorial gains, the defense of its positions 
was growing unsustainably costly.271 Resources, such as ammunition and fuel, became 
increasingly spare, and reserves of (often undertrained) troops were drained as casualty rates and 
                                               
264 Ibid. 
265 Ibid. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Ibid., p. 285. 
268 Ibid. 
269 Ibid., p. 287. 
270 Ibid., p. 288. 
271 Ibid., p. 222.  
Before the Peace: The Carter Ceasefire  Justin Winokur 
 78 
desertions increased.272 The VRS offset these difficulties, in part, through command, logistical, 
and maintenance support from the Yugoslav Army,273 as well as combat support (mainly in 
Bihac) through alliances with the Krajina Serb Army and Fikret Abdic’s dissident Muslim 
army.274 Doctrinal changes were also put into effect to combat the ARBiH’s growing 
effectiveness and accommodate the Bosnian Serb Army’s increasingly dire material situation.275 
When the Carter ceasefire took effect, the Bosnian Army almost immediately took 
advantage of the relative calm to increase its capabilities and prepare for a new phase of the war. 
The ARBiH’s instrumental approach to the winter ceasefire is particularly apparent when 
looking carefully at the local preparations for the ARBiH’s spring offensive in 1995. Soon after 
the Carter ceasefire’s onset, the 7th Corps of the ARBiH began to undergo intensive preparations 
for its assault on Mt. Vlasic.276 Brigadier General Mehmed Alagic assigned 21,000 troops to the 
attack (dwarfing previous Bosnian Army assaults) and arranged weeks-long, highly specialized, 
and rigorous training regiments to prepare his troops specifically for a coordinated winter 
mountain offensive.277 New barracks, field hospitals, bakeries, and roads were built, equipment 
and supplies were stockpiled, officers were reeducated, troops practiced combat in daily 
exercises and simulations, officers meticulously planned every step of the assault, and individual 
soldiers were trained in specific skills needed to accomplish this particular attack.278 In short, the 
7th Corps spent much of the winter, 1995 ceasefire not attempting to abide by the peace, but 
preparing to break it. As a visibility-impeding snow storm set it on Mt. Vlasic in late March of 
1995, the ARBiH felt confident in its ability to surprise VRS positions and begin the fighting 
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anew.279 Its subsequent victory on Mt. Vlasic, though hard-fought, indicated that the military 
preparations had been well worth the while.280 As Belgrade placed sanctions on Pale for its 
continued refusal of the Contact Group’s peace plan, the Bosnian Army’s improvement in skill 
coincided with a major loss of morale among the Bosnian Serb fighters, causing a number of 
desertions that helped to weaken the VRS’s position at Mt. Vlasic.281 However, the Bosnian 
Army’s defeat at Mt. Stolice, a result of both inclement weather and the VRS’s still-greater skill, 
indicates that the Bosnian Serbs continued to be a generally superior force.282 Nevertheless, the 
coordination of the two attacks, as well as the success at Mt. Vlasic, demonstrated the ARBiH’s 
growing momentum and resolve.283 
Of course, the Bosnian Serb Army did not rest on its laurels throughout the winter 
ceasefire. On 8 March 1995, only a few weeks before the ARBiH launched its offensive, VRS 
officials ordered the preparations of numerous offensives alongside plans for continued 
defensive operations.284 These ambitious plans were cut short by the Bosnian Army’s intense 
spring offensive. Many never materialized, and, when some did, they were relatively 
unsuccessful; the ARBiH, fresh from its long winter preparations, continued to keep the VRS on 
the defensive.285 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that a mutually hurting stalemate—actual or perceived—will result 
in greater ceasefire durability. The above results support this proposition. The Carter ceasefire 
came as the capacity gap between the VRS and the ARBiH shrank dramatically: the new 
ARBiH-HVO cooperation, an increasingly skilled and experienced ARBiH, and low manpower 
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wore away at the Bosnian Serbs’ resources and led to painful stalemates in late 1994. Though the 
VRS was still materially and operationally dominant as the Carter ceasefire brought relative calm 
to Bosnia, the power imbalance between the Bosnian Serbs and the Croat-Muslim tandem had 
been significantly reduced.286 This mutually hurting stalemate facilitated Carter’s mediation 
efforts in December of 1994, yet the political and military will to accept the 4-month winter 
ceasefire was rooted in dramatically different strategic rationales. While the Bosnian Serbs 
sought to use the changing international environment to forge a favorable negotiated settlement 
and escape risky military solutions, the Bosnian Muslims sought to use the ceasefire to increase 
its military advantage and escape risky political solutions. The ARBiH’s major, targeted military 
preparations throughout the winter of 1995 demonstrate just how little the Bosnian government 
was committed to respecting the ceasefire. The ARBiH was to abide by the agreements 
provisions for only as long as it believed the stalemate would continue; as the Army’s military 
preparations changed both the actual balance of power as well as the leadership’s confidence in 
victory, the Army felt prepared to renege on its commitments. The 78-day duration of the Carter 
ceasefire was therefore in large part a function of the preparations felt necessary by Bosnian 
Army officials. As their calculations of the relative power balance shifted over time, so did their 
willingness to respect the peace. The VRS, of course, planned some offensives at the beginning 
of March, causing the ceasefire’s duration to be, in some ways, dependent upon a race for 
military preparedness between the Bosnian government and Bosnian Serbs. However, the VRS’s 
efforts were too little and too late—the Bosnian Army’s commitment to challenge the status quo 
from the very beginning of the ceasefire lent it the initiative.  
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Who is providing external support to whom? How much support are they providing? What is the 
character of that support? Is the conflict being mediated?  
 
 
 In terms of external military support, it was noted above that UNPROFOR troops were 
monitoring the ceasefire lines, thereby providing support in an effort to facilitate conditions of 
relative power symmetry.287  During the week-long preparatory ceasefire preceding the 1 January 
1995 agreement, this involvement was generally military in nature.288 However, after the Carter 
ceasefire took effect, it shifted its mission to primarily humanitarian work.289 This would do little 
for either party to foster hesitance about returning to the offensive. More convincing, perhaps, 
was earlier discussion of NATO airstrikes on Bosnian Serb positions following escalated 
violence and difficulties for the UN peacekeeping mission in mid-1994.290 In fact, some air 
attacks were carried out against the Serbs in 1994, but to little effect.291 These military threats, in 
conjunction with the mutually hurting stalemate between the ARBiH and VRS, likely 
incentivized Pale to accede to the ceasefire agreement and attempt to reach a negotiated 
settlement. Also notable is the lack of major outside arms support for the Bosnian Army; as 
mentioned above, the ARBiH was able to receive some weapons shipments after the settlement 
of the Muslim-Croat civil war, but essential equipment was still prohibited by the Croat 
government. More prohibitive was the continued arms embargo on the Balkans, which had been 
primarily responsible for perpetuating the equipment asymmetry between the HVO-ARBiH 
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tandem and the VRS.292 It was only in 1994 that smuggled weapons were able to offer some 
balance between the belligerents.293 
  As has been discussed extensively above, the conflict was mediated by the United States 
(through official representatives as well as through President Carter), the United Nations, the 
European Community, and members of the international community (the U.S., France, UK, 
Germany, and Russia) in the form of the Contact Group. It was also noted that the support of the 
international community generally shifted to the side of the Bosnian Serbs in late 1994, notably 
through their willingness to offer economic inducements to Pale and Belgrade by partially lifting 
tight sanctions imposed in 1992.294 Though this international support may have been effective in 
assisting the onset of the ceasefire, it did little to extend its duration once the Bosnian Army 
began its offensive.295 
Hypothesis 3 posits that external intervention on behalf of the weaker party will increase 
ceasefire durability. Though the Carter ceasefire exceeds the cutoff point, the Bosnian Army (the 
weaker party) did not receive effective direct aid from the international community at any point: 
the humanitarian UNPROFOR mission of winter 1995 was not designed to provide military 
balance; arms shipments were stifled by the Croats; the international arms embargo continued to 
be enforced; and NATO airstrikes were not effectively employed until after combat had 
recommenced in the spring of 1995.296 These results, therefore, do not clearly support the 
proposition. However, since there was an effective military stalemate between the ARBiH and 
                                               
292 Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pp. 35-36. 
293 Ibid., p. 36.  
294 Pomfret, “Carter Gains Accord with Bosnian Serbs.” 
295 Greenhouse, “US and Russia Agree to Try to Extend Fraying Bosnia Cease-Fire”; Mojsilovic, “Enraged  
by Government Offensive, Serbs Ready to Retaliate”; Central Intelligence Agency, Balkan Battlegrounds, p. 
300.  
296 Central Intelligence Agency, Balkan Battlegrounds: Volume II, p. 563.  
Before the Peace: The Carter Ceasefire  Justin Winokur 
 83 
VRS in late 1994 at any rate, extensive international intervention may simply not have been 
necessary to achieve a durable ceasefire.  
Hypothesis 4 posits that mediated conflicts will have more durable ceasefires. The Carter 
ceasefire supports this proposition. The international community was involved in extensive 
mediation efforts throughout late 1994 and early 1995, and the winter ceasefire—though it was 
neither observed for the entirety of its stipulated duration nor extended by the signatories—did 
endure well beyond the cutoff point. 
 
Actor Cohesion  
 
How many actors are engaged in the conflict zone? How many actors are party to the ceasefire 
agreement? What is the scope of the ceasefire? 
 
  
The politico-military landscape of Bosnia in late 1994 was complex and contested. In all, 
five major actors were actively engaged in the conflict: the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Muslims, 
the Bosnian Croats, the Krajina Serb Army (Srpaska Vojska Krajina, SVK), Fikret Abdic’s rebel 
Muslims, the Yugoslav Army, and the United Nations.297 There were, however, roughly three 
sides: the Muslim-Croat tandem, the Serb coalition, and the international community. These 
alliances were typically more or less the products of common enemies than common goals, and 
their constituent elements—themselves divided internally—remained guided by their own 
personal goals and aims (see below for more on actor fragmentation).  
Of these actors, three signed the Carter ceasefire: the ARBiH, the HVO (as part of the 
Muslim-Croat Federation), and the VRS.298 The agreement was primarily concerned, however, 
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with the military relationship between the ARBiH and VRS. This relationship was to be 
managed throughout the country, as the general ceasefire took effect across the entirety of 
Bosnia-Hercegovina.299 In January, the UN worked fruitlessly to gain the agreement of the SVK 
and Fikret Abdic, who were actively engaged in combat in the Bihac region of western 
Bosnia.300 In fact, on 28 December 1994 Fikret Abdic agreed to the principle of a ceasefire,301 
and on 2 January 1995 the UN stated that he would abide by the agreement and that the SVK 
would assume responsibility for his troops.302 However, despite a UN announcement on 3 
January that troop withdrawals from Bihac had begun, neither the SVK nor Abdic committed to 
the ceasefire.303 Fighting continued to rage in Bihac as a result.304  
In hypothesis 6, I posit that a greater number of belligerents will increase the complexity 
of cooperation, leading to less durable ceasefires. The Carter ceasefire seems to support this 
proposition: fighting did continue in the militarily crowded region of Bihac, an area that Carter 
specifically mentioned as being subject to the ceasefire.305 Most of the actors involved in this 
combat were not party to the agreement; in some instances, however, the ARBiH and VRS did 
directly engage with each other.306 Yet in the rest of the country, where fewer parties were 
active, the ARBiH-VRS ceasefire held steady for 78 days. Hypothesis 7 posits that local 
ceasefires will involve less complex cooperation than general ceasefires, and therefore that local 
ceasefires will be more durable. Given that the Carter ceasefire exceeded the cutoff point despite 
its generality, the proposition is not corroborated. 
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How fragmented are the actors? How contested is decision making? 
 
 As noted above, there were major divisions among all sides of the conflicts, as well as 
within each individual actor. Actor fragmentation was more pronounced in the Serb coalition, 
with the Bosnian Serbs, Krajina Serbs, FRY, and Abdic’s Rebels all under autonomous 
leadership. The HVO-ARBiH tandem was a much less complex pole. 
Internal divisions were particularly pronounced among the Serbs. At the end of 1994 and 
into 1995, long-standing social and political rifts grew deeper between the Serbs of the 
Republika Srpska and the FRY. These rifts—between ex-Communists, socialists, chetniks, and 
partisans—would come to open significant schisms at the highest echelons of the Bosnian Serb 
Army.307 These differences were also the products of conflicting approaches to military and 
political strategy. Radovan Karadzic was isolated and forced to face an alliance between Ratko 
Mladic and Slobodan Milosevic, for Milosevic, a more practical, decisive figure than Karadzic, 
was more ideologically attuned to the general of the VRS.308 Yet Mladic was also frequently at 
odds with Milosevic, who was more accepting of the idea of territorial compromise with the 
Muslims and Croats than the general.309 Nevertheless, his relationship with Milosevic was 
stronger than his relationship with Karadzic: Mladic saw the President of the Republika Srpska 
as corrupt,310 and (like much of the VRS’s military leadership) was disgruntled with Karadzic’s 
political “stunts,” including his agreement to stop the VRS offensive in Bihac as per the Carter 
ceasefire.311 Indeed, Mladic sought total victory in the war, while Karadzic generally sought the 
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political favor of the West, supporting negotiations throughout the span of the conflict.312 These 
tensions would eventually grow powerful enough to result in Karadzic’s failed demotion of 
Mladic in 1995.313 
 The Bosnian Serbs’ agreement to the Carter ceasefire was primarily the decision of 
Karadzic and the Republika Srpska’s Supreme Command, made in spite of staunch objections 
from the VRS.314 Officials in the Bosnian Serb Army believed that the ceasefire was a foolish 
strategic decision that would incur significant costs for the Republika Srpska in Bihac. For 
example, Colonel Milovan Milutinovic (chief of the VRS Information Service) later wrote of the 
decision:  
The Supreme Command’s decision to hear out former President of the United States 
Jimmy Carter and agree to yet one more cease-fire, thus halting the operation to break up 
the 5th Muslim Corps near Bihac, was surprising. According to numerous assessments, 
the halting of the operation near Bihac was a big mistake, the consequence of which was 
the loss of the strategic initiative.315  
 
The Bosnian Serbs were therefore clearly fragmented along many political, social, and military 
lines, leading to mistrust, squabbling, and disagreement over such decisions as the winter 
ceasefire of 1995.  
 In contrast, the Bosnian government was not comparably fragmented. There were, 
naturally, ideological divisions with the leadership. This rift occurred primarily along the fault 
line between pro-Western politicians that sought friendship with Croatia, and the belligerent 
military-hardliners in the Sandžak faction.316 There was also a notable split between secularists 
and conservative Muslims.317 However, none of these divisions had a significant impact on the 
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Bosnian Army’s strategic decision-making.318 The Bosnian Muslims were much less fragmented 
than the Bosnian Serbs, and were less affected by this fragmentation.  
 
How efficient is the military chain of command? How disciplined its fighting force?  
 
 
 As was made clear in the treatment of relative power above, the Bosnian Army 
underwent major organizational changes, reeducation programs, and intensive training regiments 
during the winter ceasefire of 1995. When ultimately the ARBiH launched its spring offensive, it 
had never once been more organized, disciplined, or operationally capable, and though the VRS 
was still a logistically and materially superior army, the ARBiH had made major strides to rival 
its organization.319  
 Discipline was still high in the VRS, despite notable tension. Even when Karadzic 
requested a political solution to the Bosnian Army’s attack on Mt. Vlasic, his soldiers were 
ideologically prepared to continue fighting.320 There seems to have been little will among the 
Bosnian Serb troops to deal diplomatically with their enemies, or to support such an approach. 
Harrowingly, when asked about the spring offensive, a local Serb commander, Maj. Milan 
Kikovic, replied: “We’re only awaiting for Karadzic to give us an order to attack and we will not 
stop until we reach Travnik…. And if he signs [the Contact Group] peace plan, our people will 
cut off the hand he signs with.”321 Clearly the political tensions at the highest levels of the 
Republika Srpska’s military command were reflected in its lower levels.  
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 Taking all of these various factors into account, we arrive at a somewhat unexpected 
result. The Serbian side was more prominently fragmented than the Bosnian side, with a greater 
number of autonomous actors representing the Greater Serb cause than the number of actors 
representing the Muslim-Croat Federation. The Republika Srpska was likewise subject to more 
internal divisions, power contests, and ideological rifts than the relatively stable Bosnian 
government, and these divisions in the Bosnian Serb leadership had substantially more impact on 
strategic policy than those within the Muslim leadership. On the other hand, though the VRS had 
noticeable political tension within its military ranks and the ARBiH did not, the VRS was the 
operationally superior force, with the ARBiH having only just undergone the reorganization and 
training necessary to become a sophisticated military organization. Hypothesis 5 posits that 
greater division in any actor will reduce ceasefire durability, yet, despite the major disunity in the 
Serb side, the Carter ceasefire endured. Moreover, one may have predicted that, given their 
disunity, the Bosnian Serbs would have borne the responsibility for the ceasefire’s collapse—it 
was, however, the non-fragmented and relatively unified Bosnian government that used its 
freshly disciplined, newly organized military to abrogate the agreement. These results do not 
support the hypothesis. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As the Carter ceasefire took shape in late December, President of Bosnia Alija 
Izetbegovic stated: “I don’t see a chance for peace… but I do see a chance for a cease-fire.”322 
This prescient statement describes clearly the reasons for the ceasefire’s duration, and ultimately 
its collapse: a lack of commitment, but a need for time. While the Bosnian Serbs used the 
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temporary peace to stave off impending military losses and negotiate a favorable peace, the 
Bosnian government used the ceasefire to prepare for a new offensive that would fundamentally 
change its bargaining leverage. The status quo in late 1994 was unacceptable to the Bosnian 
government, but its capacity to change circumstances via military force was thoroughly lacking. 
When the Carter ceasefire offered the window of opportunity to focus on military preparations, 
the Bosnian government graciously accepted, but with no intention of honestly pursuing 
diplomatic solutions.  
What do the circumstances surrounding this agreement indicate about the relationship 
between ethnic civil war, cooperation, and ceasefire durability? Having endured for 78 days, the 
Carter ceasefire is well above the cutoff for short-term settlements established by Gartner and 
Bercovitch. In chapter 2, I predicted that low satisfaction, low relative power asymmetry, and 
high cohesion would be conducive to long-duration ceasefires. These predictions do not map 
precisely onto the case of the Carter ceasefire. Indeed, when evaluating the results, some 
surprising patterns make themselves apparent. When considering satisfaction, it is clear that the 
Bosnian government was deeply displeased by the location of the ceasefire line, and that large 
enclaves still existed beyond the potential line of partition. On the Bosnian government side, 
therefore, territorial satisfaction was quite low. When considering relative power, it is 
noteworthy that the VRS and ARBiH had reached a mutually hurting stalemate, for their 
different competencies (manpower for the ARBiH, equipment and training for the VRS) 
effectively balanced each other out; that international support, while initially coercive towards 
the VRS, ultimately shifted away from the Bosnian Muslims; and that mediators were highly 
active in facilitating negotiations. Power asymmetry can therefore be considered moderately low, 
for there was relative parity between sides, despite the ARBiH’s slight disadvantage vis-à-vis the 
Before the Peace: The Carter Ceasefire  Justin Winokur 
 90 
VRS. This, in turn, fostered the perception of a mutually hurting stalemate. Finally, when 
considering actor cohesion, it was shown that the ceasefire was effective in areas where the 
signatories were less crowded by other actors, that the ceasefire applied generally to the entirety 
of Bosnia, and that division among the political leadership of the Serbs was extremely high, 
though the VRS was a slightly more disciplined fighting force than the ARBiH. In sum, there 
was high dissatisfaction, low power asymmetry with the perception of a mutually hurting 
stalemate, and moderately low actor cohesion.  
Given these conditions, why did cooperation endure for so long? In effect, it seems as if 
the confluence of dissatisfaction and shifting capabilities was primarily determinative of the 
ceasefire’s durability. The Bosnian government was, from the outset, never committed to a fully 
durable ceasefire, given the unacceptability of the frontlines possibly transforming into 
permanent lines of partition—the goal of the Serbs’ negotiation efforts. They were, however, 
also militarily incapable of continuing to shift battlefield realities at the time of Carter’s 
mediation mission, though the military tides seemed to be shifting in their favor. Thus, the 
Bosnian government was to respect the ceasefire until military preparations shifted their 
perceived ability to continue the fight and rearrange the frontlines into a more favorable 
configuration. Ceasefire duration, in this instance, was thus a function of dissatisfaction with 
territorial distribution and time necessary to shift the (perceived) military balance.  
Interestingly, part of this process included increasing the organization and discipline of 
the ARBiH, decreasing the likelihood of spoilers; likewise, despite the high probability that 
spoilers would arise on the Serb side, they did not. Why, then, was it the Bosnian government 
that abrogated the agreement, and why did this abrogation not occur sooner? It may be that the 
Bosnian government’s immediate military preparations comforted hardliners by concretely 
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signaling the government’s intention to continue the fight, defusing internal tensions over the 
agreement. Likewise, on the Serb side, it may be that the pursuit of a negotiated settlement on 
terms favorable to the Serbs was a comforting signal to hardliners, despite their protests over the 
pause in Bihac. Moreover, that the Serbs did begin to plan military operations could have further 
acted to mitigate the protests of hardliners in the military leadership. Though these are 
speculative observations, their intention is to underscore the idea that the Carter ceasefire does 
not inherently preclude the notion that actor cohesion is unrelated to ceasefire durability. Spoilers 
may surely be problematic in other contexts. Yet the belligerents party to the Carter ceasefire 
were likely successful at taking actions that (perhaps unintentionally) quelled the protests of 
hardliners, reducing the saliency of their internal divisions and enhancing the ceasefire’s 
durability.  
These conclusions are only meaningful from a comparative perspective. As such, in the 
next chapter I analyze a different ceasefire of a different duration. Let us now examine the 7-day 
tripartite ceasefire of 15 June 1993, and the underlying sources of its immense instability.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE TRIPARTITE CEASEFIRE 
 
 
 
 
Turning now to an earlier period of the Bosnian civil war, this chapter explores the short-
duration tripartite ceasefire. This ceasefire, signed on 15 June 1993 and effective as of 18 June 
1993, was marred by numerous violations before ultimately collapsing on 24 June 1993, just 
seven days after entering into force. In the following case study, I seek to identify the structural 
causes behind the ceasefire’s quick collapse. Ultimately, I find that the tripartite ceasefire maps 
exactly onto my ideal-type of a low-duration ceasefire: with low territorial satisfaction, no 
mutually hurting stalemate, and low actor cohesion, the agreement could barely endure for a 
week.   
 The tripartite ceasefire was signed as the possible arrangement of Bosnia’s borders and 
the allegiance of its stakeholders were thrown into particularly heightened disarray. This disarray 
all but precluded successful cooperation, and, as a result, the ceasefire endured only for a painful 
week filled with violations and breaches. In the weeks preceding the ceasefire, the landscape of 
the Bosnian conflict and the battlefield imperatives of the belligerents shifted dramatically with 
the start of the Muslim-Croat civil war and the collapse of the Vance-Owen peace plan (a peace 
settlement written by former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and former British Foreign 
Secretary Lord David Owen, and sponsored by the International Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia323). This plan required that the Serbs and Croats surrender significant portions of 
their territory, and refused to acknowledge any sort of ethnic partition of Bosnia. After its 
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collapse, the Serbs and Croats proposed a new plan of their own design, which called for the 
three-way partition of Bosnia along ethnic lines. This arrangement, which ossified the territorial 
acquisitions of the Serbs and Croats, received the support of the European Community but 
engendered major rifts within the Bosnian Presidency. The Serb-Croat peace plan was to isolate 
the Bosnian Government in central Bosnia and seriously undermine its security. This security 
seemed more fragile than ever before as fighting broke out between the Muslims and Croats, 
with the Serbs bolstering either side as necessary in order to weaken their opponents. Needing to 
shift battlefield realities in order to win over international actors and gain negotiating leverage, 
the Bosnian Government had little incentive to abide by the ceasefire and implicitly accept the 
territorial demands of the Serbs and Croats. Needing to consolidate their gains, defend their 
acquisitions from a Bosnian Muslim offensive, and apply pressure on the Bosnian Government 
to accede to their demands, the Serbs and Croats were likewise compelled to continue fighting. 
Compounding these dynamics were stark political divisions and issues of military discipline, 
particularly within the Muslim and Croat sides, that further impeded cooperation and 
coordination. As the Bosnian war entered a liminal space in which previous demands for peace 
and tentative alliances were revealed to be purely transitory, the war’s participants were to prove 
incapable of abiding by the ceasefire agreement.  
 
Summary 
 
 
 The origins of the tripartite ceasefire and its collapse can be traced back to late 1992 and 
early 1993, when the tense relationship between the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats began 
to grow increasingly violent.324 In a 27 January 1993 joint call for peace, President Izetbegovic 
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and Mate Boban, leader of the Bosnian Croats, acknowledged these tensions, rooted in disputes 
over the arrangement of the Vance-Owen peace plan, the relocation of displaced peoples in 
central Bosnia, and the distribution of military power.325 Despite these calls for peace, on 15 
April, the Bosnian Croats demanded for the second time that any Muslim soldiers in Croat-
majority areas were to either disarm or relocate to a Muslim-majority region.326 When this 
ultimatum was refused, full-scale fighting erupted between the former allies in central Bosnia.327  
 On 16 April 1993, the HVO put contingency plans for a major attack on the Lasva Valley 
region into action.328 The offensive, marked by its brutal ethnic cleansing campaign,329 
successfully overwhelmed the ARBiH. Surrounded, faced with a two-front war, and unable to 
access supplies, the Bosnian government’s forces were terribly handicapped by early June of 
1993.330 It was this dismal situation that General Rasim Delic, the Bosnian Army’s new 
commander in chief, inherited.331 His response was to reorganize the Army and its doctrine, 
culminating in a major counteroffensive throughout central Bosnia.332 This counteroffensive 
included a successful assault on the central town of Travnik from 4 June to 8 June 
(encompassing three failed ceasefires), followed by massive pushes towards the southeast, east, 
and west.333 From 14 June to 15 June, the ARBiH overtook numerous villages near Novi 
Travnik;334 on 16 June, the ARBiH captured Kakanj;335 and on 18 June, the ARBiH began its 
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assault on Novi Travnik.336 Meanwhile, as June of 1993 saw central Bosnia marred by Croat-
Muslim fighting, the ARBiH continued its engagements with the VRS, notably in the Muslim 
enclave of Gorazde in eastern Bosnia.337  
 Throughout the summer of 1993, the political responses to these military developments 
were manifold. On 13 June, as the ARBiH expanded outwards from Travnik, the Bosnian 
Presidency issued a call from Geneva for a ceasefire between Bosnian Croat and Muslim 
forces.338 On 15 June, following a four-hour meeting at the Sarajevo airport,339 Commander 
Rasim Delic of the ARBiH, Commander Milivoj Petkovic of the HVO, and General Ratko 
Mladic of the VRS all signed a general ceasefire agreement to take effect at noon on 18 June.340 
This agreement required that each side stop all military activities, cooperate with UN monitors 
and provide them with daily reports, allow UN monitors and humanitarian aid workers total 
freedom of movement, keep a military official available to manage and discuss disputes, and 
repair utilities such as water and electricity, rather than weaponizing them.341 Moreover, Delic 
and Petkovic signed a separate accord pledging daily reports to the UN on the situation in central 
Bosnia, and Mladic signed an order allowing UN monitors freedom of movement throughout all 
Serb lines between Pale and Gorazde.342  
 This three-way ceasefire agreement was met with mixed reactions. Statements given by 
Delic seem to indicate that the Bosnian Government was generally supportive: 
As far as the Bosnia-Hercegovina army is concerned, we shall observe everything that 
has been agreed, and it is up to the other sides to do the same. I personally think that what 
we want has been achieved. We want, above all, a cease-fire, and resolution in line with 
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political decisions made so far, that is, what has been achieved so far in connection with 
the implementation of the peace plan in Bosnia-Hercegovina…. [UNPROFOR] has 
specified sanctions in the sense that they will supervise the agreement. But these are not 
yet concrete sanctions. I expect that the time will come for these too. But we do not want 
these sanctions to be reduced to reporting violations but to become real sanctions which 
ensure that the agreement is observed.343  
 
Delic’s cautious optimism was not, however, shared by the Bosnian Croat representative. 
Petkovic gave the following, markedly more fatalistic statement in response to the ceasefire: 
You know what, I shall believe in these agreements five days after they come into force. I 
shall forecast nothing… Well, I give it three days to see where [it will be observed], 
although hostilities can die down—perhaps not 100%—in two hours. All movements, 
everything can be halted if there is the will…. I do not know [if the ceasefire will be 
different from others], I do not know why it should be different. I am afraid it will be just 
like the previous ones.344  
 
Petkovic also reportedly states, “I haven’t got any faith in any of this anymore. It’s enough to 
hear one bullet to have a whole street open fire.”345 Ratko Mladic, in contrast to Delic’s cautious 
optimism and Petkovic’s fatalism, struck a boldly confident note in his post-agreement 
statement: “As far as we are concerned, this agreement will certainly hold…. I hope that our 
enemies will come to their senses and realize we must negotiate and not make war.”346 Finally, 
Philippe Morillon, Commander of the United Nations forces in Bosnia, expressed a tremendous 
sense of relief on behalf of the international community: “It’s another bit of paper, but I really 
needed it to be sure of being able to continue my mission. So we have put a number of practical 
conditions in this bit of paper…. The catastrophe we were about to plunge into—we have given 
ourselves a way to stop it.”347 
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 Of these initial reactions, it was Petkovic’s pessimistic fatalism that proved most 
prescient. After the ceasefire came into effect on 18 June, Muslim-Croat fighting continued 
around Vares, Visoko, Novi Travnik, and Mostar.348 Commander Barry Frewer, a UN 
spokesman, reported that he did not observe “any reduction of fighting” between the ARBiH and 
HVO.349 Though direct engagements with the Bosnian Serbs generally decreased, a UN 
peacekeeper’s death was blamed by the Bosnian Army on Serb shelling, and some explosions 
were reported around Sarajevo.350 There were also reports from Sarajevo that eight people had 
been killed and 24 wounded in a Serb attack on Gorazde.351 On 19 June, fighting continued to 
decrease despite each party accusing the others of ceasefire violations, particularly near 
Gorazde.352 Fighting was also reported between the Muslims and Croats in Mostar and near 
Konjic, and more explosions and gunfire were reported around Sarajevo.353 On 20 June, combat 
and shelling continued across the country, and major Bosnian Croat troop movements were 
observed around Gornji Vakuf and Bugojno.354 According to a UN official, there was “still no 
lull whatsoever” as Jablanica, Konjic, Brcko, and the safe areas of Srebrenica, Zepa, and 
Gorazde saw fighting from all parties.355 The same official added that “the Serbs are being very 
cooperative, particularly considering that fact that they know as well as we do that the Bosnian 
Army is putting troops through Zepa. We’re trying to stop them.”356  
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This ongoing fighting reached its apex on 23 and 24 June, as major battles began between 
the Muslims and cooperating Croat and Serb forces in the Zepce, Zavidovici, and Maglaj area.357 
Control over this essential region meant control over roads leading to the key Muslim cities of 
Zenica and Tuzla, as well as to Croatia.358 Zepce had not previously seen full-scale warfare, 
having maintained a tentative peace between its Croat and Muslim residents through a system of 
virtual ethnic apartheid.359 In addition, the HVO forces in Zepce were an important bulwark 
against the VRS,360 dissuading the ARBiH from attacking.361 However, as the Bosnian Army 
began its June counteroffensive, the HVO in Zepce began military preparations and 
entrenchment operations in anticipation of an assault.362 As the assault arrived, the HVO 
expelled all of the Bosnian Croats from Zepce, Zavidovici, and Maglaj in order to clear the 
region for extensive bombardment.363  
 It remains unclear who bears responsibility for the onset of this fighting. Some sources 
argue emphatically that the Bosnian Army fired the first shot, while others claim instead that it 
was the HVO.364 Given the situation’s intense politicization, the instigator may always remain 
unknown. Regardless, just seven days after the tripartite ceasefire took effect on 18 June, it 
became undeniably clear that the agreement would not hold. Indeed, as Delic submitted a formal 
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complaint to UNPROFOR about the ceasefire’s violation,365 fighting raged between the ARBiH 
and the unlikely HVO-VRS alliance in Zepce and the surrounding area.366 Combat in the region 
was to continue into July,367 as was renewed fighting in Gorazde368 and Novi Travnik.369 As June 
came to a close, no illusions could remain that the tripartite ceasefire was, or would continue to 
be, in effect. 
 Unlike the 78-day Carter ceasefire, the tripartite ceasefire falls far below the 56-day 
cutoff for short-lived settlements established by Gartner and Bercovitch. We must now look to 
the dynamics of territorial satisfaction, relative power, and actor disunity to determine their 
impact on cooperation, and, ultimately, how their configuration contributed to this ceasefire’s 
rapid collapse.   
 
Satisfaction  
 
How satisfied are the belligerents with their territorial holdings? 
 
 As military officials agreed to the tripartite ceasefire on 15 June 1993, and as fighting 
continued virtually unabated throughout the end of June, a number of concurrent political 
developments relating to plans for a final Bosnian peace unfolded. These military and political 
developments cannot be considered in isolation, for this particular moment in the evolution of 
the broader peace process carried with it significant military challenges for all parties. The 
distribution of territory was at the center of these challenges, for none of the parties were 
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satisfied with the frontlines as the basis of a peace settlement. Instead, each party felt compelled 
to continue using military force to adjust and solidify territorial claims.  
Throughout the tripartite ceasefire’s brief lifespan, peace negotiations at the highest level 
unfolded in parallel. On 16 June 1993, the day after the tripartite ceasefire was signed in 
Sarajevo, Tudjman, Milosevic, and Izetbegovic began talks in Geneva with Stoltenberg and 
Owen.370 These talks were to mark a key shift in the approach to a resolution of the Bosnian 
conflict, with Tudjman and Milosevic offering a controversial alternative to the increasingly 
hopeless Vance-Owen peace plan.371 This shift in approach, and a concomitant shift in 
international power dynamics, necessitated a simultaneous reassessment of the battlefield.  
The Vance-Owen peace plan called for the division of Bosnia-Hercegovina into 10 
autonomous provinces, unified by a weak central government.372 According to its proposed 
division, three provinces would be majority Serb, three would be majority Muslim, two would be 
majority Croat, one would be mixed Croat and Muslim, and the tenth, Sarajevo, would be run via 
a power-sharing arrangement.373 Such a division would have allocated 43 percent of Bosnia’s 
land to provinces with a Serb majority.374 At this point in the war, the Bosnian Serbs had seized 
control of 70 percent of Bosnian territory, which, as noted in the previous chapter, fulfilled the 
earlier aspirations of the 1992 Graz map.375 As such, the Vance-Owen plan was to necessitate a 
40 percent reduction in Bosnian Serb territorial holdings.376 The Bosnian Serbs, unsurprisingly, 
were strongly opposed to this idea and refused to back the plan, citing the magnitude of the 
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territorial losses and the resulting destruction of the contiguous state for which they fought.377 
However, sanctions and diplomatic pressure forced Milosevic to not only support the peace plan, 
but to lobby for it among the Bosnian Serb leadership.378 This was acceptable to Milosevic for 
two reasons: first, he did not believe that that plan’s territorial division would every truly come 
to fruition, and second, he anticipated accruing some benefits from the plan—namely, a ceasefire 
that would guarantee recognition of an autonomous Bosnian Serb state (note, here, his conviction 
that ceasefire agreements confirm battlefield realities).379 Milosevic’s pressure eventually caused 
Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, to accede to the plan on the condition that it receive 
ratification by the Bosnian Serb Assembly.380 The Assembly, in turn, voted for a referendum on 
the matter, which the Bosnian Serb people used to strike the plan down on 5 May 1993.381  
On the other side of the table, reactions to the Vance-Owen plan were mixed. The 
Bosnian Croats generally supported the plan, and accepted it immediately.382 They were attracted 
to its territorial awards in central Bosnia and western Herzegovina,383 and particularly desired the 
access that it opened to the Croatian border.384 Like the Bosnian Serbs, however, the Bosnian 
Muslims were hostile towards the plan. Their commitment to the idea of a strong, unitary 
Bosnian state, and their revulsion at the idea of formalizing the results of Serb aggression and 
ethnic cleansing, compelled them to resist.385 Izetbegovic was, however, pushed by the 
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international community and the Bosnian Croats to sign, believing—as it turned out, correctly—
that the Bosnian Serbs would ultimately cause the plan’s collapse.386 
 
 
Map 5.1: The Second Revised Vance-Owen Plan of March 1993.387 
 
 Fundamental to the Vance-Owen plan’s failure was its lack of credibility and lack of 
support. Indeed, there was very little political will among any of the parties to accede to its 
provisions. The Bosnian Serbs, Muslims, and Croats continued their military campaigns, hoping 
to cement their territorial gains even after the latter had signed the plan.388 Compounding this 
was the international community’s inability, and particularly the United States’ unwillingness, to 
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send troops to enforce a peace to which the parties did not seem wedded.389 With a lack of 
Balkan political will discouraging the international community, and with no international 
community to enforce agreement among those without political will, the Vance-Owen plan was 
trapped in a catch-22 that ultimately spelled its doom.390 
 On 16 June 1993, as talks in Geneva began, the belligerents indicated that it would be 
necessary to replace the Vance-Owen peace plan with a new arrangement of their own design. 
After meeting with Milosevic and other Serb officials, Radovan Karadzic reportedly called the 
Vance-Owen plan “unrealistic,” saying: “The reality is we already have three entities… If they 
are not delineated properly, then let’s do it by negotiation and not by fighting.”391 This 
delineation was the cornerstone of a new Serb-Croat peace proposal, presented officially by 
Milosevic on 19 June, the day after the tripartite ceasefire came into effect.392 The new proposal 
called for Bosnia’s partition into three autonomous republics, largely reflecting the military 
frontlines established throughout the previous year’s combat.393 Under these circumstances, the 
Bosnian Muslims were to receive only 23 percent of the country’s territory, 394 which was to be 
split between one pocket in central Bosnia and another pocket in the country’s northwest.395 The 
Serbs would hold the largest portion of territory, the Croats would receive the rest, and both 
groups would establish borders with their respective patron state.396 Serb and Croat territory 
would completely surround Muslim territory.397 
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Map 5.2: The Serb-Croat Proposal of June 1993.398  
 
Though the plan entailed a loose confederal structure joining the three regions together,399 the 
Bosnian Muslims feared that the Serb-Croat proposal was simply a pretense for the annexation of 
the Serb and Croat regions into Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia, respectively.400 These 
apprehensions may have been magnified by the Krajina Serb referendum advocating for unity 
with other Serb territories.401 Though Tudjman made some efforts to console the Muslims,402 
these apprehensions about the Serb-Croat proposal created major rifts within the Bosnian 
government (see below). Indeed, on 18 June, as the plan was just beginning to take shape—and 
as the tripartite ceasefire took effect—Izetbegovic abandoned the negotiations in order to protest 
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the territorial claims of the Serbs and Croats,403 calling the plan “genocidal.”404 Tension rose 
within the Bosnian government caucus, as some members of the Presidency sought to continue 
negotiations, and others—like Izetbegovic—sought to abandon them; eventually, the peace talks 
continued with a Bosnian government delegation that did not include Izetbegovic.405 
 
Map 5.3: The Bosnian Presidency Proposal of June 1993.406 
 
As the belligerents forged a new bargaining space, the international community reevaluated 
its position. On 21 and 22 June, the European Community met in Copenhagen, where it declared 
its continuing support for a unified Bosnia and its non-recognition of land seized by force.407 
Nevertheless, consensus was difficult to find; the French, for example, wanted the new peace 
plan to maintain many of the Vance-Owen plan’s features, whereas the Italians wanted to 
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embrace the proposed three-way partition and focus on minority protections.408 After Milosevic 
debuted a proposed map on 23 June, European diplomatic pressure began to mount on the 
Bosnian Government to accept the deal, infuriating the increasingly isolated Muslim 
delegation.409 On 24 June, one day after Milosevic proposed his map in Geneva, fighting began 
in the Zepce-Zavidovici-Maglaj region. After the tripartite ceasefire had undeniably dissolved, 
Lord David Owen, the EC’s mediator, reportedly scorned Izetbegovic for his seeming 
unwillingness “to make the necessary compromise to save people.”410 This marked the beginning 
of the EC’s preference for any settlement, as opposed to its previous insistence on a settlement 
favorable to the Muslims.411  
As the Europeans began their movement towards the Serb-Croat plan, the Bosnian Muslims 
looked elsewhere for support. The Bosnian Government had, in fact, grown confident that 
NATO was preparing an intervention in Bosnia, and had to be pressured by the U.S. to continue 
attending the Geneva talks.412 At the talks, media reports publicized the United States’ support of 
the Bosnian Muslim position and noted its role as a counterbalance to the Europeans, though in 
private the U.S. seems to have also pressured the Muslims to accommodate the Serb-Croat 
proposal.413 The Bosnian Muslims were growing increasingly isolated, a condition that would 
reach its apex with Carter’s mediation mission in late 1994.  
 From the perspective of satisfaction calculations and homeland, it is clear to see why the 
tripartite ceasefire did not hold. The Bosnian Serbs and Muslims were deeply dissatisfied with 
the Vance-Owen plan. It did not recognize the military realities that the Bosnian Serbs had 
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established, it threatened their pursuit of an autonomous state, and it deprived them of territorial 
aspirations that had been envisioned since the start of the war. On the other hand, the Bosnian 
Muslims, who were reeling at their loss of territory and fearful of annexation by Croatia and 
Serbia, found the plan to be too generous to the Serbs. Lacking political will and international 
commitment, the Vance-Owen plan collapsed. As a result, the parties opened a new, unexplored 
bargaining arena. The Serb-Croat proposal that emerged in this space was dramatically more 
favorable for the Serbs, equally as favorable for the Croats, and enticing to a tired and frustrated 
international community. Nevertheless, the international community still had some reservations, 
and the Bosnian Muslims were deeply opposed to the proposal’s initial allocation of territory. In 
this liminal space between two proposals, all of the belligerents—Serb, Croat, and Muslim 
alike—decided to make military moves to bolster their leverage and assert the legitimacy of their 
claims. For their part, the Serbs and Croats needed to convince the international community (and, 
perhaps, the Muslims themselves) that war was so costly and outcomes so certain that their 
partition proposal was the only sensible option. The Muslims, in contrast, needed to contest these 
certainties in order to win back international support and bolster their negotiating power, if not 
completely reshape the agreement from the ground up. There was, therefore, no certainty at all. 
Peace in Bosnia began to take a new and unfamiliar shape in June of 1993, and each party was 
compelled to assert its desired outcome by force. Bargaining was to take place on the battlefield 
as much as in Geneva, and combat continued virtually unabated despite the 15 June ceasefire.   
 
How large are the ethnic enclaves beyond the ceasefire lines? 
 
  
 Isolated ethnic enclaves played a major part in reducing trust among the belligerents and 
increasing their territorial dissatisfaction. Pressure on both Bosnian Muslim and the Bosnian 
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Croat enclaves undermined goodwill among the parties, and generally handicapped their 
willingness to cooperate. This was particularly true of Gorazde, the only Muslim enclave that the 
Serbs had not captured in the formerly Muslim-dominant Drina River valley.414 One day after the 
tripartite ceasefire was signed on 15 June, a frustrated Izetbegovic abandoned discussions about 
the new Serb-Croat peace plan, telling reporters: “I can’t continue talking because of the fighting 
in Gorazde,”415 and insisting that ongoing Serb assaults posed an existential threat to the 
enclave.416 Similar feelings abounded over Srebrenica and Zepa, other UN safe areas that saw 
continued fighting and Muslim guerilla operations.417 On 20 June, four days before the 
ceasefire’s ultimate collapse, a UN official commented that “Zepa, Srebrenica and Gorazde are 
just a mess,”418 but that conditions in Srebrenica were even more dire than those in Gorazde.419 
The Bosnian Muslims were so incensed by the pressure on these enclaves that a Bosnian Army 
commander threatened the use of chlorine gas if the Serbs did not relent.420 Regardless of the 
threat’s dubious credibility, the statement clearly signaled the passion the Bosnian Muslims felt 
for these enclaves and the rage their circumstances fomented.  
 Given the significance of Gorazde, Srebrenica, and Zepa, the Bosnian Government was 
unlikely to abandon these enclaves in a peace plan or cooperate with those enemies antagonizing 
their isolated coethnics. As such, a ceasefire freezing the established frontlines and potentially 
leading into the Serb-Croat peace proposal—which would have given the Serbs the territory on 
which the enclaves were situated—was intolerable. Gorazde, Srebrenica, and Zepa were major 
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hindrances to cooperation between the Serbs and Muslims, and this, in part, undermined the 
tripartite ceasefire’s viability.  
The Bosnian Croats, too, felt the pressure of threatened enclaves. In central Bosnia, the 
cities of Vitez, Kiseljak, Konjic, and Zepce remained essential Bosnian Croat enclaves, whose 
people were in grave danger of succumbing to the Bosnian Army’s forces.421 Fearing for their 
safety, the HVO units in these areas sought help from both Croatia and, interestingly, the VRS 
(see the below discussion of relative power).422 In effect, the Bosnian Croats were tremendously 
dissatisfied with the insecurity of their enclaves in central Bosnia, and looked towards military 
force to ameliorate their position.  
Hypothesis 1 posits that ceasefires will be less durable when there is dissatisfaction with 
the territorial distribution. The above results strongly corroborate the hypothesis. By 18 June, 
when the tripartite ceasefire came into effect, the Bosnian Serbs and Croats had the territory they 
desired, but, for the Serbs, the reigning Vance-Owen peace plan was deeply dissatisfying. A 
ceasefire under such conditions was unacceptable, for they could not afford to appear willing to 
entertain its proposed divisions. The Muslims were likewise unprepared to accept a ceasefire 
under the conditions of the Vance-Owen plan, and hoped for battlefield and international tides to 
turn in their favor. The Croats, too, feared for the security of their enclaves in central Bosnia and 
sought to defend them with military force. With such deep dissatisfaction, and such incentive to 
continue fighting as new proposals were offered, none of the parties could fully commit 
themselves to the tripartite ceasefire agreement.  
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Relative Power 
 
What is the ratio of infantry forces? What is the ratio of equipment (artillery, tanks, airborne 
weapons, sea-based weapons, etc.)? How do the belligerents perceive the power of their 
opponents? 
 
 As June began, Bosnia’s armies had dramatically different capabilities. These 
asymmetries, and the impact they would have an alliance building, were to be significant 
challenge to the tripartite ceasefire’s longevity. Of even greater importance, however, were the 
optimistic perceptions that the armies had of their own ability to achieve victory, a product of 
self-interested alliances, gambles on external help, and hope. Unconstrained by a mutually 
hurting stalemate, the belligerents remained confident in their ability to secure their ambitions 
with military might.  
Military Balance offers data accurate to 1 June 1993, a mere 14 days before the ceasefire 
was signed. At this point, the ARBiH had 180,000 soldiers, the HVO had 50,000 soldiers, and 
the VRS had 80,000 soldiers, resulting in a ratio of 6:2:3.423 In terms of manpower, therefore, the 
Bosnian Army was clearly superior to both of its enemies. However, throughout 1993 the VRS 
often came to the support of the weaker side in the Muslim-Croat civil war in order to sharpen 
the losses of both sides;424 this was the case in the Zepce-Zavidovici-Maglaj area, where the VRS 
provided support to an outnumbered HVO.425 In such instances of cooperation, the manpower 
advantage of the Bosnian Army could be mitigated. The inverse was true of the militaries’ access 
to matériel. In early June, the ARBiH possessed 62 pieces of equipment (such as heavy weapons, 
artillery, and vehicles), the HVO 550, and the VRS 1,565, for a ratio of 0.3:3:7.426 It is difficult 
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to overstate the extent to which the Bosnian Army was materially disadvantaged; nevertheless, 
the aforementioned variability in military coordination during this three-sided war could 
sometimes dampen asymmetries.  
 It was in this highly asymmetric context that the ARBiH received new leadership.427 The 
Bosnian Army throughout 1992 and early 1993 was led by Sefer Halilovic, who commanded a 
massive, volunteer-heavy army with a rudimentary organizational structure and a significant lack 
of equipment and training.428 On 8 June 1993—seven days before the tripartite ceasefire was 
signed—Halilovic was replaced by Rasim Delic, who intended to improve the Army’s discipline 
and professionalism.429 Though these structural adjustments necessitated long-term efforts that 
did not drastically change the situation in June,430 Delic did make strategic choices that had an 
immediate and profound impact on the ARBiH’s self-perception and role in the war. 
Acknowledging that the Army could not survive the loss of morale that would accompany a 
static defensive position, Delic pursued offensive victories in order to inspire his troops.431 Most 
notably, this included the capture of Travnik, a battle which the Bosnian Army had begun under 
Halilovic on 4 June and which Delic inherited on the 8th.432 Despite signing a general ceasefire 
upon assuming command, Delic continued the offensive and cleared Travnik, taking advantage 
of the Muslim’s local manpower advantage and dedicating twice as many troops to the battle as 
the HVO.433 Thereafter, he pushed his forces deeper into central Bosnia and captured numerous 
key cities through 16 June, one day after the tripartite ceasefire was signed.434  
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The victory at Travnik was of tremendous important to the ARBiH, causing morale to 
soar among its soldiers.435 This boost in morale marked an important shift in the Bosnian Army’s 
perception of itself, increasing its confidence in spite of its material disadvantages. It was this 
sense of momentum and capability, paired with the Army’s manpower advantage, that caused a 
British UNPROFOR official to comment that “the [ARBiH] appear to have no intention of 
surrendering their present advantage, by observing the cease-fire.”436 On the eve of the tripartite 
ceasefire, the Bosnian Army appeared prepared to capitalize on their initiative and pursue 
military victory.  
 Like the ARBiH, the HVO began 1993 as a relatively weak organization, having relied 
mainly upon the Croatian HV to achieve military victories throughout the previous year.437 This 
changed with the onset of the Muslim-Croat civil war in April of 1993. In the early phases of the 
war, the Bosnian Croats had been able to comfortably manage minimal lines of confrontation 
with the VRS while keeping careful watch over their Muslim neighbors.438 When the Muslim-
Croat alliance dissolved, however, the HVO added to this defense against the VRS a higher 
intensity and larger-scale conflict with the Bosnian Army.439 Though the ARBiH was not as 
skilled as the VRS, the sheer magnitude of its force posed a challenge to the comparatively 
miniscule HVO, which now needed to spread its few soldiers across two theaters.440  
 Throughout June, as the Bosnian Army’s counteroffensive swept through Travnik and 
Kakanj, the HVO incurred intolerable losses.441 On 9 June, as Delic disregarded a general 
ceasefire and pushed his forces through and beyond Travnik, Mate Boban made a public appeal 
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for assistance to Tudjman; on 30 June, the political head of the HVO, Jadrano Prlic, called for a 
general mobilization of all Bosnian Croats between the ages of 18 and 60.442 At this point in the 
central Bosnian offensive, the HVO had lost 2,000 soldiers, and 60,000 Bosnian Croats had fled 
their homes.443 Faced with a large manpower disadvantage, isolation in central Bosnia, and a 
highly motivated Muslim opponent, the HVO had no option but to seek assistance from the HV, 
and, surprisingly, the Bosnian Serbs.444 The HV did not come to the aid of the Bosnian Croats 
until late July, long after the attack on the Zepce-Zavidovici-Maglaj region finally dissolved the 
tripartite ceasefire.445 However, June saw the beginning of cooperation between the HVO and 
VRS, which would prove to be of central importance to the dynamics of the Bosnian war in 
1993. 
 The start of the Muslim-Croat civil war opened new military possibilities for the Bosnian 
Serbs, whose foes were now distracted from a unified defense by their internecine rivalry. VRS 
strategy throughout 1993 was focused on the consolidation of Bosnian Serb control over the 
Drina valley, a goal which had been denied by successful ARBiH offensives in 1992.446 The 
dissolution of the Muslim-Croat alliance provided a welcome chance for the Bosnian Serbs to 
partially disengage and focus on defending their gains from the previous year, watching gleefully 
as their enemies slaughtered one another.447 For example, the VRS sat atop Mt. Vlasic—where 
the later military drama of the Carter ceasefire would unfold—and looked down upon Travnik as 
the ARBiH pushed out the Bosnian Croats, sending only an occasional round of shelling into the 
fray.448 Yet the Bosnian Serbs could not remain completely detached. The Muslim-Croat civil 
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war was clearly in the interest of the VRS, incentivizing the Serbs to offer support to whichever 
side appeared weakest in order to maximize the conflict’s duration and costliness.449 This aid 
took the form of propaganda, indirect fire support, and, occasionally, direct assistance from VRS 
armor and soldiers.450  
The VRS, therefore, acted as a dynamic balance in the Muslim-Croat civil war. In Maglaj 
and Tesanj, for example, it supported the Bosnian Croats’ offensive operations,451 while in the 
Croat enclaves of Konjic, Kiseljak, and Zepce the VRS supported the HVO’s defensive 
operations.452 On the other hand, in the southern Neretva valley the VRS worked against the 
Bosnian Croats by holding their fire against the Muslims.453 This type of balancing was 
particularly important in Zepce, where the HVO had been pushed to the brink of defeat following 
an ARBiH offensive on 18 April.454 Entirely surrounded, the only channels of communication 
available to the Bosnian Croats were those that passed through VRS-controlled territory, leading 
the two armies to sign a local ceasefire on 14 June that marked the start of regional VRS-HVO 
cooperation (one day before the general tripartite ceasefire was signed).455 When fighting broke 
out in the Zepce-Zavidovici-Maglaj region, the VRS actively collaborated with the HVO against 
the Muslims, contributing armor and troops that proved decisive for securing a Croat victory.456 
This support ultimately allowed the Bosnian Croats to seize the strategic initiative in early 
July.457 
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The Bosnian Serbs’ balancing act was thus essential to power asymmetries and 
perceptions in June of 1993, particularly in that period of time surrounding the tripartite 
ceasefire. When the Bosnian Serbs did directly engage with its enemies in June, as in clashes 
between the ARBiH and VRS near Gorazde and Trnovo, there was no clear victor, though July 
saw the VRS advance aggressively through ARBiH positions.458 It is clear, then, that the balance 
of power in Bosnia during the summer of 1993 was inconclusive and contested. The ARBiH 
dominated in morale and manpower, the HVO had a slight equipment advantage and benefitted 
from significant VRS support, and the VRS could rest its well-equipped but small force while 
helping its enemies weaken themselves. None of the forces recognized a mutually hurting 
stalemate, and were prepared to continue fighting to secure the strategic initiative. Unlike on Mt. 
Vlasic in 1994, where the VRS and ARBiH were both badly suffering while gaining no territory, 
the entirety of Bosnia in 1993 was fluid and dynamic. Hypothesis 2 posits that an actual or 
perceived mutually hurting stalemate will increase ceasefire durability. In late June of 1993, as 
the tripartite ceasefire took effect, none of the parties felt or perceived such a stalemate, 
believing instead that they could feasibly achieve their strategic aims through continued combat. 
Given that the tripartite ceasefire was largely ineffective, these results corroborate the 
hypothesis.  
 
Who is providing external support to whom? How much support are they providing? What is the 
character of that support? Is the conflict being mediated?  
 
 As previously discussed, many international actors were involved in mediating the 
Geneva talks that marked the transition between the Vance-Owen and Serb-Croat plans. At that 
point in the conflict, however, there was very little external military intervention beyond the 
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presence of UNPROFOR. On 18 June, the UN Security Council voted to bolster the UN 
peacekeeping force with an additional 7,600 troops, but these reinforcements were not to deploy 
for a number of weeks.459 Indeed, much of the role of external actors in the period surrounding 
the tripartite ceasefire was rooted in anticipation and perception. The Bosnian Muslims, 
particularly the hardliners among them, sought to secure military action from NATO by 
continuing to fight.460 Moreover, the Bosnian government was so convinced that NATO was on 
the verge of intervention that the U.S. had to force them to negotiate in Geneva, instead of 
simply continuing the fight until help arrived.461 Likewise, Delic was adamant upon signing the 
ceasefire agreement that the UN should strictly enforce sanctions on ceasefire violations.462 The 
Bosnians, therefore, were to receive no actual aid in late June; isolated and alone, their military 
maneuvers were not undergirded by, but rather intended to garner, international support.  
 The Bosnian Croats were in a better, but still isolated position. As previously noted, the 
Bosnian Army’s June counteroffensive in the Lasva valley region clearly demonstrated the 
HVO’s tactical and organizational inadequacies, resulting in its numerous calls for support from 
Croatia.463 Unlike the Muslims, whose ethno-cultural isolation made them dependent upon the 
will of the international community, the Bosnian Croats were able to call upon a neighboring 
patron state interested in the security of its coethnics. As the HVO turned on the Bosnian 
Muslims in May of 1993, Tudjman appealed to the Bosnian Croats to cease their attack, arguing 
that it would benefit only the Serbs.464 The HVO disregarded these appeals, and, as the Bosnian 
Army began to lose in early June, their calls for assistance trapped Tudjman in a difficult 
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position: national interest compelled Zagreb to protect the fate of Herceg-Bosna, but 
international audience costs and the risk of sanctions deterred it from actively participating in 
Bosnia.465 Tudjman vacillated throughout June until finally choosing the national interest, 
sending HV troops into Bosnia in late July.466 This patronage would prove essential to the 
continued survival of the HVO and the cause of Herceg-Bosna.467 Though decisive, this support 
was far from guaranteed when Petkovic signed the tripartite ceasefire in mid-June. At that time, 
the Bosnian Croats could only hope that Zagreb would come to their rescue.  
 Finally, though Serbia and Russia offered diplomatic support to the Bosnian Serbs,468 the 
VRS seems to have received little to no external military aid at this point in the conflict. Given 
the strength of its military leadership, the quality of its equipment, and the talent of its soldiers, 
the Bosnian Serb Army was largely left to its own devices. 
 The above results support hypothesis 3, which argues that external intervention on behalf 
of the weaker party will increase ceasefire durability. No external parties came to the assistance 
of either the HVO or ARBiH, who were both desperately attempting to secure help from outside 
powers. If anything, this lack of support helped to shorten the tripartite ceasefire, since both 
parties felt compelled to keep fighting as a means of dragging outsiders into the conflict.  
 As belligerents waited for the international community to intervene on the ground, and as 
the international community waged diplomatic warfare over the new peace plan in Geneva, a 
number of actors attempted to oversee and coordinate the ceasefire agreement. In January of 
1993, the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats established a Joint Coordinating Commission 
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(JCC) to implement an earlier ceasefire between an increasingly hostile HVO and ARBiH.469 
Despite concerted efforts, the JCC was unable to control the situation on the ground, and 
observed ineffectually as tensions between the Croats and Muslims burst into civil war.470 The 
JCC was replaced by the Joint Operational Center (JOC) on 22 April, as stipulated by the 
Izetbegovic-Boban call to cease hostilities, a joint response to the still-escalating conflict.471 On 
25 April, the European Community Monitor Mission representative at the JOC noted that the 
organization had yet to take effective action, but remained hopeful that leadership from the 
former JCC would successfully bring their experience to bear.472 To buttress these monitoring 
efforts, as noted above, the signatories of the tripartite ceasefire also signed auxiliary documents 
intended to facilitate UN monitoring: the HVO and ARBiH agreed to provide daily updates to 
UNPROFOR, and the VRS ordered that an eight-person UN team be allowed to pass freely 
through Serb lines.473 
 Despite these efforts to mediate potential disagreements and violations, the monitoring 
mechanisms proved highly ineffectual, and combat continued unabated. In certain instances, the 
UN monitors were even prevented by the belligerents from performing their mission, as when 
Bosnian Croats stopped a UN monitoring team from entering Maglaj in late June.474 On 28 June, 
discouraged by the intense combat between the ARBiH and HVO following the dissolution of 
the tripartite ceasefire, the JOC dissolved itself.475 While international mediators attempted to 
successfully forge a peace agreement, ceasefire mediators and monitors on the ground were 
largely ineffective.  
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 According to hypothesis 4, mediated conflicts should have more durable ceasefires. It is 
apparent that in June of 1993, mediators and mediating bodies were hard at work in Bosnia. 
Efforts were made not only to manage the political conflict, but to directly manage the ceasefire 
as well. In spite of this, the tripartite ceasefire fell far short of the 56-day threshold, thereby 
disconfirming the proposition.  
 
Actor Cohesion 
 
How many actors are engaged in the conflict zone? How many actors are party to the ceasefire 
agreement? What is the scope of the ceasefire? 
 
 As the tripartite ceasefire came into effect, it was expected to constrain the behavior of 
three armies. Yet the situation was much more complicated, for each actor was marked by deep 
internal divisions and implicated in complex international coalitions. In this context of low actor 
cohesion, cooperation was extremely difficult. However, the historical data does not conclusively 
indicate that this low cohesion was a fundamental cause of the tripartite ceasefire’s collapse.  
In the summer of 1993, four actors were primarily responsible for influencing the 
direction of the Bosnian civil war: the ARBiH, HVO, VRS, and UNPROFOR. At this point in 
the conflict, Fikret Abdic, a Bosnian Muslim businessman and political magnate, had not yet 
declared his rebellion and opened the complex theater of war in Bihac, thereby simplifying the 
landscape of influential belligerents. However, as will be seen below, Izetbegovic’s handling of 
the June Geneva talks was a major force in Abdic’s pursuit of power.  Of these parties, all three 
of the primary belligerents—the Bosnian Croats, Muslims, and Serbs—signed the tripartite 
ceasefire agreement, which was to be a general ceasefire covering the entirety of Bosnia-
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Hercegovina.476 I argue in hypothesis 6 that a greater number of belligerents will decrease 
ceasefire durability by making cooperation more complex. The circumstances of the tripartite 
ceasefire support this proposition: with three belligerents party to the agreement, the 
coordination of their conflicting interests and needs was virtually impossible (as well as 
politically undesired). Moreover, I posit in hypothesis 7 that local ceasefires will be more durable 
than general ceasefires; again, this proposition is supported. The country-wide tripartite ceasefire 
agreement, signed by three belligerents, fell far short of the 56-day cutoff.  
 
How fragmented are the actors? How contested is decision making?  
 
 Already by the summer of 1993, actor fragmentation and power struggles were endemic 
to the belligerents in the Bosnian civil war. These characteristics were particularly pronounced 
within the Bosnian Muslim side, where crime, hardliners, and dissidents placed immense 
pressure on the established structures of hierarchy. Organized crime in Sarajevo would be a time-
consuming distraction for Alija Izetbegovic throughout the second half of 1993,477 and it was not 
until October of that year that Rasim Delic would take steps to undermine criminal influence in 
the military.478 Pressure also came from hardliners in the Bosnian government, who created rifts 
over strategic policy decisions and pushed the ARBiH to continue fighting throughout early 1993 
in order to force Western intervention.479 Ultimately, the most meaningful division within the 
Bosnian government emerged from the tension between Izetbegovic and Fikret Abdic, a Bosnian 
business mogul who had won the presidential race, but for indeterminate reasons had ceded the 
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position to Izetbgovic.480 Abdic heavily criticized Izetbegovic’s decision to boycott the Geneva 
talks on 21 June, causing the Bosnian Presidency to send a delegation to the talks without 
Izetbegovic.481 This was perceived as an attempt by Abdic to contest Izetbegovic’s power,482 a 
seemingly accurate analysis in light of Abdic’s later breakaway rebel movement in Bihac.483  
 Decision making within the Herceg-Bosna leadership appears to have been less 
contested, but, as we have seen above, coordination between the Bosnian Croats and Zagreb was 
far from easy. Moreover, although Tudjman eventually supported the Croat national interest by 
sending troops into Bosnia, his autonomy and self-interest called his reliability into question. A 
similar dynamic was at play on the Serb side. The aforementioned division between Belgrade 
and Pale over the Vance-Owen peace plan showcases a patron-subject division akin to that 
among the Croats. Compounding this was the Karadzic-Mladic/Milosevic split, which fostered 
significant internal decision-making tension among the Serbs (as explored at length in the 
previous chapter). In the summer of 1993, none of the Bosnian civil war’s belligerents were free 
of these internal political tensions.  
 
How efficient is the military chain of command? How disciplined its fighting force?  
 
 
 The ARBiH in the summer of 1993 was just beginning to professionalize its forces, a 
process that would not be fully realized until the reorganization efforts of the 1995 Carter 
ceasefire. Soon after departing from the Bosnian Army in early June, Halilovic took note of the 
ARBiH’s imperative need for increased discipline, writing:   
The question of military discipline is the question of our survival… Of course, it is 
urgently necessary to organize courses in the brigades for squad commanders, courses at 
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the corps level for Army and company commanders, and a military officers’ school at the 
main staff level for schooling junior officers and officer cadres, and all this for the 
purpose of strengthening military discipline, and therefore combat discipline.484  
 
Though Halilovic had provided the basic structures of military organization, it was the task of his 
successor, Rasim Delic, to guide the ARBiH to its full potential.485 As noted above, Delic did 
take important steps with the ouster of crime lords in the 8th and 10th Mountain Brigades in 
October of 1993, but these important signals did not come until long after the tripartite ceasefire 
had been broken.486   
 A central challenge to Bosnian Army leadership and discipline came from the Muslim 
refugee population in central Bosnia, which was characterized by an increasingly religious, 
hardline worldview.487 Refugees poured into the Travnik-Zenica region from Jajce, Donji Vakuf, 
and western Bosnia, infuriated and radicalized by the human rights abuses inflicted upon them 
by the Serbs, and, later, the Croats.488 From these hardened identities emerged the 7th Muslimski 
and 17th Krajina Brigades of the ARBiH III Corps,489 Bosnian Army units composed primarily of 
refugees cleansed from their homes.490 These untrained soldiers were angry, eager, and had very 
little left to lose, but their lack of discipline was worrisome to the Army’s leadership, as was the 
increasing number of foreign Islamic volunteers in the units.491 Despite the soldiers’ 
transgressions (such as the harassment of locals because of their religious beliefs) and the 
Army’s concern, the highly able 7th Muslimski and 17th Krajina Brigades were used to lead the 
ARBiH’s central Bosnian counteroffensive in June.492 Later in June, it was this same ARBiH III 
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Corps that fought against the HVO-VRS tandem in the Zepce-Zavidovici area as the tripartite 
ceasefire collapsed. Some sources report that it was in fact the ARBiH III Corps that initiated 
fighting,493 though, as previously noted, this history is contentious and unclear. It is, however, 
reasonable to accept the proposition that the ARBiH III Corps differed dramatically from other 
Bosnian Army units, and that the “gulf in understanding” between these hardline units and their 
counterparts extended to the relationship between the ARBiH III Corps and the political 
leadership in Sarajevo.494 Indeed, it was resistance on the part of the ARBiH III Corps 
commander, Enver Hadzihasanovic, that led, in part, to the dissolution of the frustrated and 
ineffectual JOC.495 Whether or not the Bosnian Army is to blame for fighting in the Zepce-
Zavidovici-Maglaj area remains unclear. It is, however, abundantly apparent that there were 
significant discipline and cooperation problems within the Bosnian Army as a result of the 
ARBiH III Corps’ hardline attitude.   
 In contrast, the Bosnian Croat forces, particularly those around the Zepce-Zavidovici-
Novi Seher region, were relatively organized and disciplined.496 Nevertheless, criminal elements 
in Kiseljak and Mostar marred discipline, and most HVO troops, having been drafted or brought 
in from reserves, lacked the will to fight when they were away from their home regions.497 
Moreover, though Commander of the Operational Zone Central Bosnia Colonel Blaskic issued 
detailed orders to his subordinates on 16 June to direct the implementation of the tripartite 
ceasefire, and though these orders appear to have reached the lower levels of the military 
command, the frequent breaches of the agreement indicate that there were major compliance 
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issues.498 If it is to be believed that the Bosnian Croats began fighting in the Zepce-Zavidovici 
area in late June, then either the HVO had significant discoordination between its high-level and 
low-level commands, or the actual political will of the high-level command to observe the 
agreement was lacking. Given that this question is largely unanswerable with the current 
historical data, it can be said that, at the very least, the HVO had fewer discipline issues than the 
ARBiH. Nevertheless, neither group could approximate the professionalism of the VRS.499   
Hypothesis 4 argues that ceasefire durability will decrease as actor division increases, and 
the above results support the proposition. The Muslims, Croats, and Serbs were all highly 
fragmented and marred by contested decision-making processes. Moreover, the ARBiH and 
HVO in 1993 were marked by discipline and coordination issues. It remains unclear if spoilers 
were responsible for the onset of fighting in the Zepce-Zavidovici-Maglaj area; nevertheless, the 
high levels of actor division during the summer of 1993 did make the tripartite ceasefire 
extraordinarily complex to coordinate, monitor, and manage.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The tripartite ceasefire came at a moment of transition and uncertainty in the Bosnian 
civil war. The belligerents were in the process of abandoning the Vance-Owen peace plan and 
laying the groundwork for something new; the international community was beginning to shift 
its diplomatic weight away from the Muslims, and remained resistant to the possibility of 
intervention; and the belligerents—particularly the ARBiH and HVO—all saw victory as 
possible, but were desperately attempting to secure outside assistance while simultaneously 
organizing their forces. In these circumstances of constant change and tremendous uncertainty, 
                                               
498 Shrader, The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia, p. 134.  
499 Central Intelligence Agency, Balkan Battlegrounds, pp. 141-142.  
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continued fighting was too beneficial and the cessation of hostilities too complex to be 
successful. The tripartite ceasefire, having lasted for barely 7 days, is emblematic of these 
dynamics.  
 Looking categorically at the variables of interest, it is clear that the tripartite ceasefire 
maps neatly onto the theoretical model established in chapter two. There, I argued that high 
territorial dissatisfaction, high power asymmetry, and high actor division would result in less 
durable ceasefires. In June of 1993, none of the belligerents were fully satisfied with the situation 
on the ground, and were not prepared to stop fighting until they had unequivocally achieved the 
leverage necessary for a negotiated settlement to fall in their favor. Territorial dissatisfaction 
was, therefore, high. Though the armies did find ways to balance each other, particularly with the 
VRS offering its self-interested support to the HVO and ARBiH, each belligerent held the 
perception that it could continue to achieve gains through military force. As a result, no mutually 
hurting stalemate set it. Finally, each actor faced significant internal divisions, and, though it 
cannot be said confidently that spoilers ended the tripartite ceasefire, these divisions certainly 
made coordination and cooperation more difficult. Thus, actor cohesion was low. Ultimately, 
each variable was at its fullest expression in the summer of 1993, and, as expected, the ceasefire 
fell far below the cutoff point. Cooperation under the circumstances in June was all but 
impossible.  
 It now remains to be seen how these two ceasefires of dramatically different duration—
the 78-day Carter ceasefire and the 7-day tripartite ceasefire—compare to one another. In the 
following chapter, I conclude the analysis by directly comparing these cases, identifying 
important variables, exploring interaction effects, and offering an explanation as to why these 
two ceasefires might exhibit such drastic variation in their durability. I then use these 
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conclusions to construct a typology of ceasefire durability and generate numerous policy 
recommendations. Finally, I discuss methodological issues that may have impacted my results 
before offering suggestions for future research.
Before the Peace: Conclusion  Justin Winokur 
 127 
 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 What have we learned? I began this undertaking by positing a connection between 
ceasefire durability and three factors related to cooperation: territorial satisfaction, the relative 
balance of power, and actor cohesion. Territorial satisfaction relates to belligerents’ commitment, 
in that they perceive a connection between territorial allocation at the time of the ceasefire and 
the possible distribution of territory in the final peace settlement. If political elites feel as if the 
ceasefire lines do not acceptably interface with their image of the “ethnic homeland,” they are 
not likely to respect the agreement. Relative power relates to belligerents’ capabilities, in that 
power asymmetries should undermine the systems of reciprocity and deterrence that allow 
ceasefires to function. If the belligerents are not locked in a mutually hurting stalemate, 
continued fighting will not be costly enough to make a ceasefire appealing. Finally, actor 
cohesion relates to belligerents’ credibility and commitment, in that internally divided actors 
may give rise to spoilers that work to violate and collapse the agreement.  
I expected ceasefires to be more durable when the belligerents were satisfied, locked in a 
mutually hurting stalemate, and internally cohesive. Conversely, I anticipated that ceasefires 
would be less durable when the belligerents were dissatisfied, when power asymmetries were 
high, and when there were marked internal divisions. As I present the findings below, it will 
become clear that ceasefire durability is the product of an interaction effect between satisfaction 
and the perception of a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS). After exploring this idea, I present a 
typology of situations under which we should expect different outcomes in ceasefire durability, 
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and offer policy recommendations to enhance ceasefire durability in each case. I then discuss 
methodological issues, and suggest directions for future research.  
In order to test my theoretical propositions, I analyzed two cases from the Bosnian civil 
war—the long-duration Carter ceasefire and the short-duration tripartite ceasefire. Let us now 
employ Mill’s method of difference to compare these two ceasefires. According to the method of 
difference, causality cannot be solely attributed to any variables shared between two cases of 
different outcomes. Rather, only those variables that are unique to each case can independently 
explain variation in the dependent variable. Ordering the cases in the following table gives us 
these results:   
 
 
Figure 6.1: A comparison of the cases using Mill’s method of difference. 
 
In both the Carter and tripartite ceasefires, parties exhibited low territorial satisfaction and low 
actor cohesion. As such, these variables cannot independently explain the differences in their 
duration. Rather, Mill’s methods indicate that the presence of a mutually hurting stalemate 
should directly correlate to ceasefire durability. If parties are constrained by a mutually hurting 
stalemate, ceasefires will endure; without a mutually hurting stalemate, they will quickly 
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collapse. Yet looking back on the case studies, we see a more complicated picture: an interaction 
effect between satisfaction and relative power.  
The case studies indicate that ceasefire durability is a function of belligerents’ satisfaction 
with the territorial distribution at the time of the ceasefire, and their ability to change that 
distribution if they are dissatisfied. Neither factor alone determines ceasefire durability. Mutually 
hurting stalemates decide the capability—that is, whether or not belligerents will be able to break 
the ceasefire. Yet ability must be accompanied by motivation. Territorial satisfaction, therefore, 
decides the desire—whether or not the belligerents will want to break the ceasefire. As I will 
show in my typology below (see Figure 6.2), different configurations of ability and desire will 
lead to different types of ceasefire durability. Indeed, we have already observed two of these 
configurations in the Carter and tripartite ceasefires.  
As the ARBiH and VRS agreed to the Carter ceasefire, it was apparent that the ARBiH 
was fearful that the reigning territorial distribution, which greatly favored the Bosnian Serbs, 
would form the basis of a peace settlement. Yet the two militaries had come to a stalemate in the 
months before Carter’s mediation mission. While the Bosnian Serbs used the ceasefire to pursue 
a favorable peace settlement, the Bosnian Muslims used the ceasefire to build up their forces. 
These military preparations caused the Bosnian government to believe that the military balance 
was now in their favor, altering their perception of a mutually hurting stalemate. The Carter 
ceasefire therefore endured for as long as the Bosnian government remained dissatisfied, but 
unable to confidently use force. As soon as it believed that it could effectively use its military to 
attain a more satisfactory outcome, the Bosnian government broke the ceasefire.  
As in the Carter ceasefire, the parties to the tripartite ceasefire were all dissatisfied with 
the reigning territorial distribution. However, they all believed that they could reasonably 
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achieve a more satisfactory outcome through the continued use of force. In various theaters of 
war, the VRS, HVO, and ARBiH all had a military advantage that they pressed in spite of the 
ceasefire agreement. Dissatisfaction impeded their commitment to the idea of a ceasefire 
agreement; capability allowed them to violate the agreement with impunity. Therefore, none of 
the parties needed time to build the capacity to achieve their goals. Instead, they could 
immediately use their militaries to pursue more favorable territorial outcomes.  
According to the method of difference, the case studies indicate that actor cohesion is not 
causally related to ceasefire durability. Historical data, however, is lacking. This makes it 
difficult, for example, to determine if the ARBiH III Corps in fact spoiled the tripartite ceasefire. 
Given the current record, it cannot be said that this was the case, indicating that neither ceasefire 
collapsed as a result of spoiler dynamics. This removes actor division as a causal variable. 
Instead, the available data shows that actor divisions exacerbate the existing impediments to 
cooperation produced by dissatisfaction and power asymmetries. When, for example, the 
tripartite ceasefire collapsed, the cause was primarily its particular confluence of dissatisfaction 
and power asymmetry. Yet the extremism of the ARBiH III Corps’ leadership inhibited (among 
other things) the efficacy of the JOC, further weakening already ineffective mechanisms 
intended to increase ceasefire durability. This is not causality. However, further research (see 
below) will be necessary to corroborate the result.  
Given the interaction effect between satisfaction and capability, it is possible to 
extrapolate a number of additional interactions that are linked to cooperation. These interactions 
can be paired with policies intended to facilitate cooperation and increase ceasefire durability.500 
                                               
500 As noted in the introduction’s discussion of ceasefires in the peace process, there is not a clear connection 
between durable ceasefires and peace settlements. While the policies that I recommend in this study are intended 
to increase ceasefire durability, I do not intend to imply that these policies should lead to the resolution of the 
conflict. This may certainly be the case. However, it may also be that durable ceasefires in fact worsen wars and 
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The following paradigm outlines four possible ceasefire types, which will be explored in detail 
below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: A typology of ceasefire durability. 
 
Ceasefire Type 1: Durable 
 
Durable ceasefires occur when belligerents are satisfied with the ceasefire lines and have 
entered a mutually hurting stalemate. These ceasefires endure because belligerents have achieved 
their core territorial ambitions and lack the military ability to pursue additional gains. Pleased by 
their situation and unable to progress any further, the belligerents should see no rational reason to 
                                               
make them more difficult to resolve. This study is intended to clarify the dynamics of ceasefire durability, and to 
aid those who call for durable ceasefires before initiating humanitarian missions and peace negotiations. I 
implore these individuals to think critically about the role of ceasefires in the broader arc of conflict before 
calling for their establishment.   
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abrogate the agreement. In such circumstances, it is possible that the belligerents will be 
prepared to negotiate a mutually acceptable peace settlement and put an end to the conflict. 
However, it is also possible that the belligerents may seek to use military force to procure 
additional value, beyond that which satisfies their minimum requirements. In order to do this, 
belligerents will need to use the window of opportunity provided by the ceasefire to build up 
their military forces and grow confidence in their ability to escape the stalemate.  
 Durable ceasefires should therefore be approached with a combination of maintenance 
and monitoring. Maintenance refers to the fact that these ceasefires are already quite durable 
unto themselves, given the concurrence of satisfaction and a mutually hurting stalemate. As such, 
little needs to be done to increase the structural durability of the agreement. Instead, policy 
should be directed at maintaining satisfaction with the territorial distribution and perpetuating 
perceptions of a mutually hurting stalemate. This means that strict monitoring regimes should be 
put into effect, so that military buildups and changes in posture can be made open and visible. 
This will either discourage such buildups by prompting equal buildups in the opposing force 
(thereby maintaining deterrence), or it will signal when the ceasefire is on the verge of collapse.   
 Humanitarian organizations and peace negotiators should find that durable ceasefires are 
best suited for missions in the conflict zone. When buttressed by effective monitoring regimes, 
the agreement will either be strong enough to foster extended missions, or an impending collapse 
will be broadcast clearly enough to safely remove at-risk aid workers and negotiators before 
combat begins anew.  
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Ceasefire Type 2: Variable 
 
Variable ceasefires occur when belligerents are satisfied with their territorial holdings, 
but no mutually hurting stalemate deters them from the continued use of military force. Such 
ceasefires may progress in one of two ways. If the belligerents have no additional territorial 
ambitions, or if they have a sufficient amount of goodwill, the ceasefire should endure. If the 
belligerents seek to procure additional value beyond their minimum level of satisfaction, no 
military obstacles prevent them from immediately breaking the ceasefire and continuing the 
fight. Variable ceasefires thus occupy a precarious space between durability and weakness, 
balanced entirely on the belligerents’ perceptions of themselves and of each other. If both parties 
demonstrate the necessary will, satisfaction may be enough to propel the cessation of hostilities 
forward. Yet if the belligerents desire more land, or if they fear that the other belligerent shall 
attack out of greed, then the ceasefire is likely to endure only for as long as it takes for the 
belligerents to feel sufficiently confident or threatened.  
Variable ceasefires should be approached with a combination of mediation, then support. 
Mediators should work with the belligerents to maintain current levels of satisfaction and prevent 
greed, despite their ability to continue fighting. This may involve, for example, emphasizing the 
costs of war relative to the meagerness of potential gains, as well as highlighting the benefits of 
continued non-violence. Mediators should also serve as interlocutors between belligerents, 
communicating their continued satisfaction with and commitment to the established territorial 
distribution. Since both parties are beginning from a point of satisfaction, these efforts should be 
sufficient to stave off collapse. Moreover, dialogue-based methods are preferable to military 
support because they are less likely to instill fear and cause misperceptions. However, if 
mediation seems to be ineffective at reigning in greed, third parties should support the ceasefire 
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through more direct measures. An important first step would be sanction regimes that increase 
the cost of greedy territorial grabs and raise the benefits of the continued observance of the given 
ceasefire lines. A more invasive next step would be the creation of a mutually hurting stalemate 
by offering either additional military supplies or direct military intervention. This would create 
deterrence dynamics that should prevent greed from imperiling the agreement, thereby enhancing 
the ceasefire’s durability.  
Humanitarian organizations and peace negotiators should exercise caution when 
undertaking missions during variable ceasefires. As long as satisfaction prevails and fear is 
minimal, the ceasefire is likely to endure. However, in the absence of a mutually hurting 
stalemate, these conditions could quickly change and endanger aid workers and negotiators 
stationed in the conflict zone.  
 
Ceasefire Type 3: Dependent 
 
 
Dependent ceasefires occur when belligerents are dissatisfied with the given territorial 
distribution, but are prevented by a mutually hurting stalemate from taking action to change this 
distribution. The durability of such ceasefires depends upon the length of time it takes for 
belligerents to increase their confidence in the utility of military force, as was the case in the 
Carter ceasefire. Dissatisfied belligerents will not commit to the ceasefire, and must use the 
pause in the fighting to improve their military capacities. The ceasefire will collapse only when 
they feel able to, or are actually able to, successfully escape the mutually hurting stalemate and 
forcefully alter the distribution of territory.  
Dependent ceasefires should be approached with a combination of mediation and 
monitoring. Mediators must engage with the belligerents to find possible ways of overcoming 
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their dissatisfaction with the territorial distribution. All the while, monitoring regimes should 
broadcast military buildups and changes in posture. As noted above, this will either prompt a 
deterrence response from the enemy, or it will signal to at-risk individuals, such as humanitarian 
workers and negotiators, that the ceasefire is likely to collapse.  
Humanitarian organizations and peace negotiators should be aware of the risks associated 
with missions during dependent ceasefires. If no monitoring regimes are in place, the ceasefire 
could collapse unexpectedly once one of the belligerents has achieved a certain amount of 
confidence in its military capabilities. International groups should feel confident beginning 
missions in these circumstances, but should prepare contingency plans for quick emergency exits 
in the event of a sudden collapse, as was the case with the Bosnian Army’s offensive on Mt. 
Vlasic.  
 
Ceasefire Type 4: Weak 
 
 
 Weak ceasefires occur when belligerents are dissatisfied with the distribution of territory 
and are not prevented by a mutually hurting stalemate from using force. Conflict parties 
therefore have both the motivation and means to continue fighting. Under such circumstances, 
ceasefire agreements are not likely to endure.  
 Weak ceasefires should be approached with a combination of mediation and support. 
International mediators should work to either alter belligerents’ perceptions of acceptable 
territorial distributions, or (the likelier option) bring about a “turning point” that will result in a 
perceived stalemate.501 To support these efforts, external third parties should support the weaker 
military force by imposing sanctions and offering material aid or direct intervention. These 
                                               
501 Zartman, “Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts,” p. 18. 
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policies should alter cost-benefit calculations and create functioning systems of reciprocity and 
deterrence, enhancing ceasefire durability.  
Humanitarian organizations and peace negotiators should avoid sending vulnerable 
workers into conflict zones during weak ceasefires. These agreements are likely to be ineffective 
and to collapse quickly. Aid workers and negotiators on the ground will be at high risk, and will 
likely be thrust into mortal danger as conflict intensity fails to substantially decrease.   
These structural characteristics, outcomes, and policy recommendations can be 
comprehensively organized in the following table:  
 
 
Figure 6.3: Ceasefire type and policy recommendations. 
 
 Though these are useful results, their supporting empirics are far from perfect. This study 
is a necessary preliminary step for a deeper understanding of cooperation, ethnic civil war, and 
ceasefire durability. It is, however, of a limited scope, and comes burdened with certain 
methodological flaws that bear recognition and amelioration in future research. Most 
importantly, as I discussed in chapter 3, Mill’s method of difference cannot generate hypotheses, 
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but instead serves only to eliminate them. Though I attempted to be cautious and comprehensive 
in my theorizing, there may be certain important variables that I have overlooked. It may be that 
these missing variables are the true sources of causality. As such, future research should seek to 
identify other variables that may impact cooperation in ethnic civil war, and incorporate them 
into tests of ceasefire durability. This study, for example, looked at ethnicity as a broad cultural 
phenomenon, but it did not compare the effects of different cultural systems on cooperation, as 
did Sapone.502 Future research on such additional variables will help to clarify our understanding 
of ceasefire durability in ethnic civil wars.  
 In terms of the direct comparison of the Carter and tripartite ceasefires, some important 
omissions reduce my confidence in certain results. Both ceasefires were general, taking effect 
across the entirety of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Since there was no variation in this regard, it cannot 
be said whether hypothesis 7 is truly corroborated or not. It will be necessary to directly compare 
the durability of local and general ceasefires in order to arrive at such a conclusion.  
 As noted earlier in this chapter, I reject the causality of actor coherence only tentatively. 
There are two reasons for this. First, much is to be desired from the data. Where actor coherence 
may have played an essential role in causing a ceasefire collapse, the historical record is deeply 
politicized and quite inconclusive. It is clear that, when the tripartite ceasefire fell apart, the 
ARBiH III Corps was culturally distinct from the rest of the Bosnian Army. Composed of 
refugees who had been subjected to terrible atrocities, the level of religiosity and anger in the 
Corps increased its volatility and aggression. However, there is no definitive account of who—
the ARBiH or the HVO—bears the burden of responsibility for combat in the Zepce-Zavidovici-
Maglaj region. In light of this, it cannot be said that the ARBiH III Corps spoiled the ceasefire by 
                                               
502 Sapone, “Ceasefire: The Impact of Republican Political Culture.” 
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attacking HVO positions in Zepce. This merits deeper archival study into the onset of that 
particular bout of fighting, which is unfortunately hampered by the situation’s political 
overtones.  
 Second, the method of difference is a Boolean method, and does not measure subtle 
changes in the value of the independent variable. Actor cohesion in the Carter ceasefire was 
coded as “moderately low,” while actor cohesion in the tripartite ceasefire was coded as “low.” 
In both circumstances, the belligerents were hampered by numerous internal divisions; however, 
these divisions were slightly less pronounced in the winter of 1995 than the summer of 1993. 
These differences are not stark enough to merit differentiation in the method of difference, and 
therefore I considered them to be of equal value. As a result, the method of difference does not 
attribute causality to this variable. On the one hand, one may dispute my use of Mill’s method in 
this instance, arguing instead that “moderately low” and “low” are distinct enough to merit 
causality. I would suggest, however, that a more sensitive approach is necessary to truly 
understand the relationship between actor cohesion and cooperation. This means, for example, 
constructing linear regression models that clarify relationships between actor cohesion and 
cooperation at numerous continuous values of the independent variable.  
 It would have also been useful to compliment the method of difference with the method 
of agreement. In this study, I compared only two ceasefires of different outcomes to eliminate 
variables shared across cases. A next step would be to compare two ceasefires of the same 
outcome to eliminate variables that are distinct among cases. Doing so would further clarify our 
understanding of the structural sources of ceasefire durability and weakness. Given the limited 
scope of this study, however, I could choose only one approach. I selected the method of 
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difference, feeling that it was more appropriate for directly answering the question of variations 
in ceasefire durability, which inherently requires a comparison of different outcomes.  
 In chapter 3 I discussed the issue of cutoff points. It bears repeating here that these cutoff 
points are arbitrary, and can skew our understanding of causality. Given that the scope of my 
research permitted only a brief qualitative analysis of a limited number of case studies, using a 
cutoff point to distinguish long-duration ceasefires from short-duration ceasefires was the most 
sensible approach. It is also not an unprecedented approach; by using Gartner and Bercovitch’s 
same cutoff point for short-lived conflict settlements, my results should be comparable to those 
of other researchers. Moreover, by selecting two ceasefires at drastically different ends of the 
duration spectrum, I was able to maximize the contrast between the two cases and mitigate some 
of the issues that would result from an arbitrary cutoff. Nevertheless, future research should 
endeavor to address ceasefire durability from a large-N qualitative perspective, using duration 
modeling to derive a more nuanced understanding of the phenomenon than is possible using the 
cutoff method.   
 It is important to recognize the problems inherent in generalizing from small-N studies. 
This is a study of ceasefire durability in ethnic civil wars, and thus its conclusions and policy 
implications are intended to be universally and generally applicable. This is a bold intention, 
given that my case studies deal solely with Bosnia, a single conflict between a limited number of 
people in a small region of the world. Some may argue that I have simply constructed a theory of 
Bosnian ceasefires. I feel, however, that the circumstances of the Bosnian conflict are 
sufficiently representative of ethnic civil war dynamics to allow for some level of 
generalizability. Nevertheless, a necessary next step to test the external validity of my results 
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would be to either perform this same study in a different region, or to perform a large-N study of 
ceasefire durability in ethnic civil wars around the globe. 
 Finally, it is likely that these theoretical considerations are applicable beyond the realm of 
ethnic civil war. Ethnic conflict may make claims to territory particularly contentious, given that 
elites are able to employ the concept of the ethnic homeland to bolster the perception of 
indivisibility. Nevertheless, my theory indicates that whenever territorial aspirations and relative 
power are relevant, their interaction should help to explain ceasefire durability. As a result, the 
ceasefire durability typology and its concomitant policy recommendations may be analytically 
significant for a much broader universe of cases than considered in this study. 
For example, on 26 March 2018, the Nigerian government acknowledged that it was in 
talks with the insurgent group Boko Haram to negotiate a ceasefire and end violence that has 
ravaged the country since 2009.503 Though the insurgency is not organized along ethnic 
dimensions, the durability of this ceasefire should nevertheless depend on both parties’ territorial 
satisfaction and relative power. It is likely that satisfaction is low, since Boko Haram seeks to 
carve out its own Islamic State, but has lost much of the territory it had won during the initial 
phases of its insurgency.504 Simultaneously, a mutually hurting stalemate may be on the horizon, 
given that Boko Haram’s attacks are increasing in frequency and intensity, but remain isolated to 
only a limited number of locations.505 If such circumstances continue, it is likely that any 
agreement between the Nigerian government and the insurgents will result in a dependent 
ceasefire. This knowledge will help the parties determine whether or not a ceasefire is actually in 
their best interests, and, if the agreement is signed, how they should work to maximize its 
                                               
503 Felix Onuah, “Nigeria talking to Boko Haram about possible ceasefire,” Reuters, 26 March 2018.  
504 Ibid. 
505 Mark Wilson, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram attacks in numbers – as lethal as ever,” BBC, 25 January 2018. Accessed 
at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42735414.  
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durability and prepare for its collapse. Likewise, this knowledge will help the international 
community by clarifying the risks associated with work in the conflict zone during the ceasefire. 
Though the Boko Haram insurgency is not an ethnic conflict, it is quite plausible that my 
theoretical insights are applicable to its context, and that my policy recommendations will be 
useful for future conflict management efforts. In order to strengthen these claims, future research 
should apply this theory to a variety of conflict contexts in order to test the limits of its 
relevance.  
Until now, no analytical framework has existed to systematically approach and diagnose 
ceasefire durability. But more work remains. Further studies need to uncover other important 
variables, strengthen the evidence that the variables considered in this study are indeed causal, 
and test the external validity of the results. This will deepen our understanding of cooperation in 
ethnic civil wars and lead to better decision-making as ceasefire agreements are negotiated and 
signed. Though only a single thread in the broad tapestry of global peace and conflict, such 
knowledge will allow us to more effectively manage the violence of the future.  
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